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Author: Howard Dove 
Title: Distress Risk, Financial Crisis and Investment Strategies – Evidence From 
the United Kingdom 
Abstract 
The thesis focuses on the impacts of market distress conditions and firms’ default 
probability on two key investment strategies in the UK. These are investment decisions 
in value firms versus growth firms (chapter 3), and well-performing firms versus 
poorly-performing firms (chapter 4). Although distress risk (measured by the market 
conditions and default probability) is a relevant factor in explaining the general 
movement of stock returns, this is the first study addressing a direct link between these 
distress elements and the above two investment choices. The thesis employs a range of 
distress indicators, including the following: firm-specific proxies such as Fama-
French’s (1993) three factors (i.e. the market beta, firm size and book-to-market 
factors), idiosyncratic volatility, default risk, and market-related factors (e.g. business 
cycles, market downturn and upturn conditions). More recent data and well-developed 
proxies are used to make sure the results are valid and robust. First of all, the thesis 
finds positive abnormal returns from investing in value and momentum companies. 
Among these investment strategies, momentum stocks generate significant profitability 
in the short run. However, the value firms’ investments generate positive but 
insignificant profit. In terms of explanatory ability, distress risk is found to play an 
important role in explaining value and momentum anomalies. For example, there is 
evidence that highly volatile stocks tend to suffer greater default risk, and that stocks 
with a higher default risk generate lower returns. The results in this study also suggest 
that momentum-oriented investors would benefit from significantly high returns during 
market upturns, however these strategies would lead to great losses during recessions. 
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Glossary 
Since there are many technical terms and concepts have different meanings in the 
literature depend upon the context they are in, this section will define what they mean 
in this thesis as well as their interchangeable terms. 
1. Default probability: sometimes used as an alternative for probability of 
bankruptcy and probability of default. The term refers to the likelihood of a firm 
failing to meet its financial obligations and having to shut down the business as 
a result. There have been a number of studies constructing a method to quantify 
this default probability. Some of them are Z-score proposed by Altman (1968), 
O-score by Ohlson (1980), Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default and Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagy’s (2008) method. See Appendix 3 for details of the formula 
and method of constructing each score. 
2. Distressed firms (stocks) or firms in financial distress conditions: are defined as 
firms that are at risk of not meeting their financial obligations either in the short- 
or long-run. In this thesis, they refer to firms with a high probability of 
bankruptcy. 
3. Distress risk: refers to the risk elements associated with firm-level distress, such 
as default risk, volatility risk, size, and default spread etc. 
4. Firm size: Market capitalisation or market value of a firm’s outstanding shares. 
5. Fundamental variables: refer to a key firm’s accounting variables that can 
provide a primary assessment of the firm value, cash flows and growth 
prospects. Some examples are market capitalisation, book-to-market equity 
ratio, earnings to price, cash flow to price, leverage and dividend yield. 
6. Volatility or Idiosyncratic Volatility: is the time-series standard deviation of 
individual share prices. 
7. Business cycle variables: are four variables that reflect changes in investment 
choices in the market, including Default spread, Dividend yield, Term spread 
and Short-term Treasury Bill. 
8. An augmented model: is a modified version of a model that is built in an effort 
to improve the original model. In this thesis, an augmented model refers to an 
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extension of the original model including a Default factor. For example, an 
augmented Fama and French model is a model whose explanatory variables are 
the Fama and French three factors and a Default factor. The Default variable can 
be one of the following three proxies for Default risk: Default risk based on O-
score (DEF), Default risk based on Z-score (DEF’) or Default risk based on CHS 
score (CHS). 
9. Robust: A result (or a value) is robust is when it is not sensitive to the choice of 
testing method, proxies used (or measurement). If other methods and measures 
are used instead, the conclusions remain unchanged. The process used to verify 
whether a result is robust is called a robustness check. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A primary motivation for carrying out this research is to collectively study the relation 
between distress risks and two key investment strategies in the UK. They are value 
strategies and momentum. The topic of market anomalies including value premium and 
momentum have been discussed mostly in relation to the U.S market or to a group of 
countries. Studies focusing exclusively on the UK market are limited and date back to 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Given the important role of the UK in the global economy 
and the possible impact of the global recessions that have occurred recently, it is worth 
revisiting the question of whether value and momentum abnormal returns exist in the 
UK market. Secondly, the thesis aims to bridge a gap in the literature between firm 
default risks, business cycles and investment strategies. Under a risk-based explanation, 
there are studies supporting the idea that these factors could contribute to capturing the 
movement? in return of assets. On the one hand, among others, Fama and French’s 
(1993) study shows that market- and firm-related risk factors play a leading role in 
explaining the movement of equity returns. On the other hand, Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) document that Fama and French’s three factors have not been able to capture 
firm distress risk when pricing assets. Therefore, distress risk, such as firm default risk, 
business cycles and market downturns, may be able to explain asset returns. This study 
first looks at the potential links between those factors and asset returns, and the results 
confirm that they are indeed important in capturing the movement of asset returns in the 
UK. 
More importantly, this thesis pays particular attention to the performance of those 
investment strategies over different market conditions, i.e. recessions versus 
expansions. This could significantly benefit the investment decision-making process, 
given the current situation in which the UK market is experiencing market downturns 
as a result of the recent financial crisis. 
Lastly, the thesis employs a wide range of recently-researched indicators for firm 
default risk, including the Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) probability (CHS), 
along with the conventional measures: Ohlson’s O-score (1980) and Altman’s Z-score 
(1968) to proxy for firm default risk. It, furthermore, employs idiosyncratic volatility to 
proxy for stock volatility risk, and business cycle variables to capture the impacts of 
market downturns. This approach contributes to a more comprehensive and robust 
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analysis of the relationship between firm default risk, business cycles and performance 
of the above investment strategies. 
In summary for the proxies, we consider three main group of proxies for distress 
conditions: (i) firm’s probability of bankruptcy, (ii) idiosyncratic stock volatility and 
(iii) the traditional indicators including market beta, firm size and book-to-market 
equity ratio. The main focus of this thesis is on distress risks, it finds that market 
conditions such as financial crises and business cycles are indeed relevant factors. 
Therefore, these factors are also included for the purpose of further capturing the impact 
of changes in investment opportunities during market downturns. 
The thesis’ objective is to study the impacts of the proxied distress conditions and firms’ 
default probability on investment strategies. It focuses on value and growth strategies, 
and momentum strategies. Their role in investment appraisals has attracted much more 
attention, especially since the 2008 financial crisis when the impact of distress risk 
manifested and when investment decisions became more challenging. Yet, there have 
not been constructive efforts to understand the potential links between distress 
conditions, default risk and the performance of the above prominent investment 
strategies.  
Given the result of the European Union (EU) referendum, many economists and 
policymakers are warning of a period of uncertainty for the UK economy. For example, 
a report by HM Government (2016) predicted that a vote to leave the EU would lead to 
a decade of uncertainty which would have a negative impact on UK businesses, trade 
and investment. Open Europe, a leading independent think tank, estimated the impact 
of leaving the EU would be between -2.2% and 1.6% in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
for the UK in 2030 (Booth, Howarth, Persson, Ruparel and Swidlicki 2015). Signs of 
low investment into the UK have been reported from both EU and non-EU investors 
following the vote. The Financial Times reported a third of top employers surveyed by 
the Institute of Directors are considering reducing their investment plans as a result of 
the vote (Tetlow and O’Connor 27th June 2016). Virgin Group, a multinational 
conglomerate, also announced its cancellation of a deal to buy a UK company 
employing 3,000 staff (Gordon, 28th June 2016). Moreover, the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange 350 (FTSE350) index fell by 7% just 2 days after the EU Referendum 
outcome was released. It has been gradually picking up but was still considered to be 
more volatile than the DAX30 index in Germany after the vote (Weale, 2016). It is 
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unclear what arrangement the UK government would achieve after triggering Article 
50 (a withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty) and what the alternative agreements 
between the UK and the rest of the world would be. The UK has notified the EU of its 
intention to exit the trading blocs and has started a minimum 2 years of negotiation 
between the UK and the EU. As this article has not been exercised before, the level of 
market uncertainty and investor confidence in the UK assets are hard to predict 
accurately. Some have even said that the consequence could be comparable to the 2008 
financial crisis (Tetlow, 2016). It is, therefore, a particularly crucial time to study the 
impacts of market downturns and firm distress risk on the returns of investment 
strategies, and this hopefully will help in explaining the link between those risks and 
investment decision when the future of the UK is made a bit clearer. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the research 
methodology used in the thesis. Chapter 3 studies how firm distress risks, including 
default risk and stock volatility, contribute to explaining value anomaly in the UK. 
Chapter 4 also looks at the role of distress conditions in capturing momentum anomaly. 
Chapter 5 summarises the main contributions and findings of each chapter, and 
concludes the thesis with potential areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines variables, methodology and statistical processes used in the thesis. 
It first describes characteristics of the sample, the construction of each variable and the 
initial analysis of the variables in question. The chapter then provides a source code on 
which Chapter 4 relies to generate CHS – a highly complex proxy for default risks 
proposed by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). Although formation of the CHS 
variable was presented in the Campbell et al. (2008) paper, this program would provide 
researchers and practitioners with a statistical tool to apply this algorithm in practice. 
The use of this method when predicting the risk of corporate failure could also 
significantly reduce calculation errors.  
2.2 SAMPLE  
All equity data were obtained from the DataStream Thomson Reuters database, except 
the market factor for the UK market which was made available on Kenneth R. French’s 
database. Where company accounting data such as Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
was not available on these databases, they were collected from Bloomberg and cross 
checked in company financial statements. The UK Gilt rates were obtained from the 
UK Debt Management Office database. 
The sample used in this thesis consists of 290 firms in the FTSE350 and covers a period 
from 31st January 1990 to 31st December 2012. As of 31st December 2012, when the 
data were collected, the FTSE350 index incorporated the largest 354 UK firms by 
capitalisation listed in the London Stock Exchange. Among these companies, 64 were 
new firms with less than a year of data. The rationale behind excluding newly added 
firms is based on the following reasons. Firstly, investment strategies considered in this 
thesis are based on past performance of stocks, therefore it is necessary that they have 
some historic data. Secondly, a minimum one-year period would allow investors to filter 
noise and unverified information in regard to the new companies before making any 
investment decisions. This then creates a sample of 290 firms across 276 months, 
forming a dataset of 79,246 firm-month observations1. The companies’ name and their 
                                                 
1 Note that not all 290 firms have a lifespan of 276 months. Therefore, the number of observations in 
the dataset is less that the value of 290 times 276. 
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trading details, such as company ticker, sector and IPO date are presented in Appendix 
1. 
During the sample period, if any newly listed firm became eligible, they were added to 
the portfolios of that year. Similarly, any de-listed firms were not included in the 
portfolios from the year they were de-listed. This is to reflect the real trading options 
that were available at the time of investment. 
It is worth noting that the sample used in Chapter 3 excludes financial firms and firms 
with no BM data. This results in a sample of 269 companies. This approach is in line 
with the existing literature on value anomaly. The reason for this exclusion is that 
financial firms have a very different capital structure compared with non-financial 
firms. For example, the high leverage observed in financial institutions does not 
necessarily mean they are in financial distress, which is usually the case for non-
financial firms (Fama and French 1992). This constraint does not apply to momentum 
research, thus the analysis in Chapter 4 is based on a full sample of 290 companies. 
In summary, all portfolio-based factors in the thesis are constructed from the full sample 
of 290 firms. The exception is in constructing dependent variables. The sample used to 
compute portfolios in Chapter 4 is again based on the full sample of 290 companies; 
however, Chapter 3’s dependent variables are constructed from a sample of 269 non-
financial firms because of the reasons given above. 
2.3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The thesis follows one particular school of thought that attributes market anomalies to 
risk elements that have not been correctly priced by the market. It then develops a range 
of risk-based models, trying to capture the risk patterns in stock returns. Although the 
thesis does not engage in the debate on best-fit models, it has an ambition to explore 
possible approaches to measuring key risk elements in average stock returns. There are 
two main methods used in this study to aim to achieve these objectives. They are 
discussed in turn as follows. 
• Regression method (Chapters 3 and 4) 
Regression method is a dominant statistical approach in economics, finance and 
investing for modelling the relationship between one dependent variable and a 
series of explanatory variables. As the regression system has been discussed 
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extensively in textbooks as well as in the literature, it is not the intention of this 
section to cover the characteristics and estimating procedures, or to model 
diagnostics in regression analysis. It is rather to highlight how regression method 
is implemented in examining the research questions set out in this thesis. 
In the asset pricing literature, building and using risk factors as explanatory 
variables in regression modelling has been widely used by both academics and 
practitioners. In order to model the relationship between distress risk among other 
risk elements and value anomaly (Chapter 3), and their relationship with 
momentum anomaly (Chapter 4), the thesis uses a traditional CAPM-based linear 
regression method.  
This approach assumes excess return of asset i at time t is explained by the 
following model:  
(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) = 𝛾𝑜 + 𝛾𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑡 𝑋𝑘,𝑡
𝑢
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where, Ri,t is the return on asset i at the end of period t; Rf,t is the risk-free asset at 
time t; Rm,t is the market portfolio at the end of period t; Xk,t is the risk factor at the 
end of period t; u is the number of risk factors included in the regression apart from 
the market factor; and i,t is an error term. As all of the above variables are return-
based variables, they are real numbers and can take both negative and positive 
values. This applies to all variables used in the rest of the thesis, unless otherwise 
stated. 
Regression coefficients are the estimated parameters on the corresponding 
explanatory variable vectors. The model (2.1) then can be re-written as follows. 
([
𝑅𝑡0
𝑖
𝑅𝑡1…
𝑖
𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑖
] − [
𝑅𝑡0
𝑓
𝑅𝑡1…
𝑓
𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑓
]) =  𝛾𝑜 + 𝛾𝑚 ([
𝑅𝑡0
𝑚
𝑅𝑡1…
𝑚
𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑚
] − [
𝑅𝑡0
𝑓
𝑅𝑡1…
𝑓
𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑓
]) + ∑𝛾𝑘,𝑡 [
𝑋𝑡0
𝑘
𝑋𝑡1
𝑘 …
𝑋𝑡𝑛
𝑘
]
𝑢
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where, 𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑖
 is the return on asset i at the end of period tn where n takes values from 
1 to n; n is the number of time intervals in the sample period; 𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑓
 is the risk-free 
asset at time tn; 𝑅𝑡𝑛
𝑚  is the market portfolio at the end of period tn; 𝑋𝑡𝑛
𝑘 is the risk 
factor kth at the end of period tn; u is the number of risk factors included in the 
regression apart from the market factor; and i,t is an error term.  
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
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In asset pricing, explanatory variables are usually constructed using the mimicking 
portfolio approach. According to this approach, the risk variables are the return 
differentials between two portfolios of different risk levels.  
In this model, the risk variables Xk,t need to meet certain criteria in order for the 
regression method to deliver the desirable outcomes.  
Firstly, Xk,t should be selected and constructed in a way that it can capture the risk 
element it is meant to proxy for. In the thesis, the set of explanatory variables are 
selected from mainstream literature on asset pricing models. For BM and firm size 
effect, it uses High-minus-Low (HML) and Small-minus-Big (SMB) variables 
suggested by Fama and French (1993), based on ranking firm BM ratios and market 
capitalisation, respectively. To proxy for momentum (or past return) effect, Carhart 
(1997) proposes the use of the Winner-minus-Loser (WML) factor which is based 
on stock past returns. The set of proxies used in this thesis for business cycle 
variables have been widely implemented in asset pricing studies, for example 
Petkova (2005), Zhang (2005) and Henkel, Martin and Nardari (2011). In terms of 
proxies for default risk, following Griffin and Lemmon (2002), the thesis constructs 
a default factor from a number of probability-of-bankruptcy indicators, such as O-
score and Z-score. To enhance the analysis, it also proposes using CHS, a new 
measure of probability of corporate failure first built by Campbell et al. (2008). In 
this thesis, the above risk variables have demonstrated the ability to proxy for the 
risk patterns that we aim to capture in average stock returns. As the literature grows, 
there may be alternative proxies developed. However, in this study we do not 
pursue this possibility which would be an area for future research. 
Secondly, country-specific characteristics are also taken into account when 
building the variables for the UK market. For example, when constructing CHS 
default proxy for FTSE350 companies, the Logit regression does not include the 
price-per-share variable as a predictor variable. For US firms, they are required to 
have a minimum $1 price per share, and are delisted if they do not, regardless of 
their performance. However, the London Stock Exchange does not have that listing 
requirement. Therefore, unlike in the US, companies in the UK are not de-listed on 
the basis of low price-per-share.   
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Thirdly, explanatory variables Xk,t are treated in a consistent way. In this thesis, risk 
factors are formed with a 6-month lag with an exception of the WML variable. This 
is to allow investors to make informed decisions, given that information, such as 
accounting announcement and financial ratios, is usually made available to the 
public a few months after the financial year ends. This lag is shorter (1 month) for 
the WML variable as it is based on past stock prices and this information is 
published almost instantly. In addition, where risk variables are constructed based 
on forming portfolios, the same breakpoint of 30:40:30 is applied throughout. This 
means that if the sample is split into 3 groups of High, Medium and Low, the 
composite stocks will be among the top 30%, the middle 40% and the bottom 30% 
of the sample, respectively. This is seen in forming variables proxied for BM and 
size effects (i.e. HML, SMB)2, momentum (WML), three default risk factors 
(denoted as DEF, DEF’, and CHS in subsequent sections) and default spread 
variable. 
Finally, possible econometric problems should be assessed when constructing risk 
variables to make sure the estimations are efficient and unbiased. There are a 
number of econometric issues that particularly concern the way explanatory 
variables are built, such as autocorrelation and multicollinearity. For example, to 
avoid multicollinearity biases there must be no correlation between risk factors. 
The thesis takes as a starting point the three-factor model proposed by Fama and 
French (1993) and the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997). From each 
model, it develops an augmented model with a number of default risk variables. 
This is to examine the role of distress risk in explaining value and momentum 
anomalies in different settings – the main hypotheses set out in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
the thesis. 
• Portfolio-based approach (Chapter 3) 
Sometimes, it is not possible to construct a risk factor or it does not make economic 
sense to build one. In these cases, a more appropriate method to capture the risk 
element in question would be by looking at the difference in performance of two 
(or more) portfolios which react differently to that particular risk element. In 
                                                 
2 HML, SMB variables are obtained from Kenneth R. French’s data library which also used the same 
30:40:30 breakpoint. 
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addition, if comparing the performance between those portfolios is also one of the 
research objectives, as for example in Fama and French (1992, 1993), the portfolio-
based approach has been proven to be useful. This is the case in Chapter 3 which 
addresses performance of stock with different idiosyncratic volatility levels.  
In line with previous studies in value strategies literature3, Chapter 3 combines both 
risk-based regression and portfolio grouping approaches. Besides constructing risk 
factors which are used as explanatory variables, the portfolio grouping method 
applied to dependent variables helps to understand the risk patterns in the portfolio-
based dependent variables. 
According to this method, the sample is split into a number of portfolios based on 
a set of criteria. Stocks in each portfolio should share similar characteristics. The 
excess returns on these portfolios are then used as the dependent variable in 
regression (2.2). In theory, if the difference in performance of these portfolios is 
explained by the model, the estimated parameters will indicate the extent to which 
the movement in stock returns in each portfolio is captured by the risk factors 
included in the model. In other words, this approach shows the relative relationship 
(but not causal relationship) between the risk patterns associated with the 
characteristics that stocks in one portfolio have in common, and the risk factors in 
the estimation model. 
Depending on the number of criteria applied to forming the portfolios, stock in each 
portfolio will be examined in different dimensions. For example, in Chapter 3 the 
sample is classified into 2 size portfolios, Small and Big, and separately into 3 
Book-to-Market portfolios, High BM, Medium BM and Low BM. As a result, there 
are 6 portfolios which are intersections between these 2 size and 3 book-to-market 
portfolios. They are Small/High BM, Big/High BM, Small/Medium BM, 
Big/Medium BM, Small/Low BM and Big/Low BM. A regression approach is then 
applied to these portfolios. In this example, the regression model (2.2) can be re-
written. 
                                                 
3 See Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995), and Zhang (2005) for examples in the US, Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) for the UK and Fama and French (2012) for international examples. 
  
23 
([
𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝑀
𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝐿
𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝐿
] − [
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
]) = [
𝛾0
𝑆/𝐻
𝛾0
𝐵/𝐻
𝛾0
𝑆/𝑀
𝛾0
𝐵/𝑀
𝛾0
𝑆/𝐿
𝛾0
𝐵/𝐿
] + [
𝛾𝑚
𝑆/𝐻
𝛾𝑚
𝐵/𝐻
𝛾𝑚
𝑆/𝑀
𝛾𝑚
𝐵/𝑀
𝛾𝑚
𝑆/𝐿
𝛾𝑚
𝐵/𝐿
] ([
𝑅𝑡
𝑚 𝑅𝑡
𝑚
𝑅𝑡
𝑚 𝑅𝑡
𝑚] − [
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
𝑅𝑡
𝑓
]) +
 ∑
[
 
 
 𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝑆/𝐻
𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝐵/𝐻
𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝑆/𝑀
𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝐵/𝑀
𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝑆/𝐿
𝛾𝑘,𝑡
𝐵/𝐿
]
 
 
 
𝑥 [
𝑋𝑡
𝑘 𝑋𝑡
𝑘
𝑋𝑡
𝑘 𝑋𝑡
𝑘
]
𝑢
𝑘=1
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Where, 𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝐻 , for example, is the return on the small/high BM portfolio at the end 
of period t; 𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝑀 is the return on the small/medium BM portfolio at time t; 𝑅𝑡
𝑆/𝐿 is 
the return on the small/low BM portfolio at time t; 𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝐻 is the return on the big/high 
BM portfolio at time t; 𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝑀  is the return on the big/medium BM portfolio at time 
t; 𝑅𝑡
𝐵/𝐿  is the return on the big/low BM portfolio; and i,t is an error term. 
In Chapter 4, which concerns momentum anomaly, the portfolio-based approach 
is, however, not suitable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is well recognised in 
the literature that the Winner-minus-Loser variable can capture the momentum 
effects in common stock returns. It was suggested that this variable should be used 
by Carhart (1997) in the four-factor model. Secondly, the aim of Chapter 4 is to 
explain momentum anomaly. While it is unprecedented in the literature about 
momentum to use a portfolio-based approach, the thesis finds no evidence 
suggesting that this method would improve understanding of the underlying 
reasons behind momentum anomaly. Lastly, the trading rules in momentum 
strategies distinguish companies performing well in the past from those performing 
poorly. In the FTSE350, it is observed that in either group of companies there is no 
clear pattern with respect to other company characteristics, such as size, and book-
to-market values. That means if one determines to use the portfolio-based approach, 
the resultant portfolios would not have a consistent set of characteristics, and, 
therefore, there is a risk of sample biases.  
Either of the above approaches would need a base asset pricing model which consists 
of a dependent variable and a set of independent (or explanatory) variables. The next 
section will describe the definition, data source and procedure involved in constructing 
each variable used in this thesis. More details on the variable construction are also 
summarised in Appendix 3 at the end of this thesis.  
(2.3) 
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2.4. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
2.4.1. Defining variables 
Dependent variables, denoted by (Ri – Rf), are the excess returns on equity investment 
relative to risk free investment. The first component, Ri, is the monthly value-weighted 
rate of returns on equity investment. The monthly compound rate of return of stock u, 
ru,t, in month t is computed from the price index using the following formula. 
𝑟𝑢,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑢,𝑡) − 𝐿𝑛 ((𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑢,𝑡−1) 
Where, ru,t, is the monthly compound rate of return of stock u in month t; 
Price index u,t, is the price index of stock u in month t; and 
Price index u,t-1, is the price index of stock u in month t-1. 
Ri,t is the value-weighted rate of returns of portfolio i, consisting of n stocks in month t. 
It is the average rate of returns of all constituent stocks, where the weights are 
proportional to outstanding market value (i.e. market capitalisation). 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑢  𝑟𝑢,𝑡
𝑛
𝑢=1
 
Where, Ri,t is the value-weighted rate of returns of portfolio i in month t, consisting of 
n stocks; the weights wu is equal to market value of stock ru at time t divided by the total 
market value of all constituent stocks. 
The second component, Rf, is the risk-free rate of return. In line with previous studies 
in the UK stock market, the UK LIBOR 1-month is chosen to proxy for the risk-free 
asset. In theory, it is the return on asset that bears no risk. In practice, it is usually the 
safest asset available, having a short-term maturity and being guaranteed by the 
government. Although there are LIBOR with a shorter maturity, such as overnight or 
one-week rates, the thesis limits its analysis to monthly trading frequency. Firstly, this 
is because, in line with the literature, this thesis does not focus on arbitrage or high 
frequency trading, but rather on long-term investment strategies. Secondly, high 
frequency trading can be costly due to transaction costs, which are assumed to be 
marginal in most studies on investment strategies. Also, in the long run high transaction 
costs due to high frequency trading can outweigh profits.  
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
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LIBOR 1-month middle rates are obtained monthly between January 1990 and 
December 2012 (DataStream mnemonic code: BOELI1M). The LIBOR 1-month rates 
over this period were greater than zero, ranging between 0.455% and 18.29% per year 
(approximately 0.04% and 1.41% per month). It is worth noticing that the LIBOR rates 
reported on the majority of mainstream databases, including DataStream, are on a yearly 
basis. They can be converted to compound monthly rates using the following formula: 
𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 = (1 + 𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦)
1
12 − 1  
Where, rmonthly is the compound monthly rate of returns (in percentage), and 
ryearly is the annual rate of returns (in percentage).  
The final step of constructing the dependant variable is calculating portfolio excess 
returns. The excess rates of return on equity are then computed monthly as the 
difference between value-weighted rates of return on equity investment and LIBOR 1-
month rates. The excess returns can take both positive and negative values because 
investing in stock markets is riskier but not necessarily more profitable than the risk-
free asset. 
The above explains the general method by which returns for each portfolio are 
constructed. For each chapter, the investment strategy that is addressed in the chapter 
will determine the size and characteristics of constituent stocks that made up the 
dependent valuables. More specifically, Chapter 3 aims to explain the relationship 
between value premium and default risks from three different angles: size/BM effects, 
idiosyncratic stock volatility, and default probability. 
(i) In Chapter 3, we form 6 portfolios consisting of stocks with different sizes 
and BM characteristics. They are Small/Low, Small/Medium, Small/High, 
Big/Low, Big/Medium and Big/High portfolios.  
(ii) Separately, we also form 9 portfolios based on firm-level idiosyncratic 
volatility and BM ratio. They are constructed as intersections between 3 
volatility portfolios and 3 BM portfolios. They include: High Vo/High BM, 
High Vo/Medium BM, High Vo/Low BM, Medium Vo/High BM, Medium 
Vo/Medium BM, Medium Vo/Low BM, Low Vo/ High BM, Low 
Vo/Medium BM, and Low Vo/Low BM. 
(2.6) 
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(iii) For robustness purposes, 9 different intersection portfolios are constructed 
from 3 default probability portfolios (measured by O-score) and 3 book-to-
market portfolios. They are intersections between 3 DEF portfolios and 3 
BM portfolios. They include: High DEF/High BM, High DEF/Medium BM, 
High DEF/Low BM, Medium DEF/High BM, Medium DEF/Medium BM, 
Medium DEF/Low BM, Low DEF/High BM, Low DEF/Medium BM, and 
Low DEF/Low BM. 
The dependent variables are the excess returns on each of the above portfolios relative 
to the risk-free rate. Tables 2.1 to 2.3 summarise descriptive statistics of these variables, 
and figures 2.1 to 2.3 plot the variables.  
This chapter uses scatter diagrams to display dependent variables (in Section 2.4.2) 
whilst using line charts to provide a visualisation of independent variables (later in 
Section 2.5.3). While this different treatment is for visualisation purposes only and 
should not affect the analysis, the reasons for doing this lie in the way each type of 
diagram displays values for the variable in question: 
(i) The primary objectives of the thesis are assessing whether there are 
abnormal returns in value and momentum investing, and studying the 
underlying factors that explain the anomalies. Therefore, for dependent 
variables scatter diagrams could draw attention to the magnitude of 
abnormal returns or the extent to which value and momentum strategies 
generate abnormal returns; and 
(ii) For independent variables, it is the risk patterns in these variables and their 
value changes over time that could potentially explain the abnormal returns 
(proxied by the dependent variables). Thus, line graphs could fit the role 
better than scatter graphs. 
It is worth mentioning that in line with the study of Dimson et al. (2003) for the UK, in 
terms of dependent variables, the above portfolios are constructed using the 40:20:40 
breakpoint. As non-US markets have significantly fewer listed companies, the above 
breakpoint is to cover more of the value and growth characteristics. However, this line 
of explanation does not apply to independent variables which are constructed using a 
30:40:30 breakpoint. This is because independent variables are meant to proxy for risk 
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components, and therefore should capture the most representative stocks in the top and 
bottom 30%. 
In Chapter 4, concerning momentum anomaly, dependent variables are the return 
differentials between winner and loser portfolios and the risk-free rates. First of all, the 
sample of 290 stocks is grouped into 10 portfolios based on ranking their past returns. 
The 10 portfolios are denoted by P1 to P10, in which P1 is the losers and P10 is the 
winners. Dependent variables in Chapter 4 are the excess returns on the Winners (P10) 
relative to risk free investment, and the excess returns on the losers (P1) in relation to 
the risk-free asset. For the UK market, LIBOR 1-month is used as a proxy for the risk -
free rate. Table 2.4 summarises descriptive statistics and Figure 2.4 plots the variables. 
The next section will describe these tables and figures in turn.  
2.4.2. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables  
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 summarise the characteristics of dependent variables used in Chapter 
3 and the corresponding Figures 2.1 to 2.3 plot their monthly values. This chapter uses 
scatter diagrams to visualise dependent variables instead of using line charts because 
scatter diagrams could better present the extent to which value and momentum 
strategies generate abnormal returns. 
The first group of dependent variables are excess returns on 6 size/BM portfolios, which 
are the intersections between 2 size and 3 BM stock groups. The second set of Chapter 
3 dependent variables are excess returns on 9 Volatility/BM portfolios, being the 
intersections between 3 Volatility and 3 BM portfolios. Finally, the third group of 
dependent variables are excess returns on 9 Default/BM portfolios, formed from 3 
Default and 3 BM portfolios. These portfolios are constructed from a sample of 269 
non-financial companies in the FTSE350 as described in section 2.2. The portfolio 
returns are value-weighted, calculated monthly and rebalanced annually. 
Table 2.1 shows that the excess returns on 6 size/BM portfolios differ mostly due to 
whether they consist of Small or Big companies. The excess returns are positive for 
small stocks, slightly higher if companies are also high BM firms. On average, the 
monthly excess return on the Small/Low BM portfolio is 0.22%, ranging between -
18.78% and 15.57%. The Small/High BM excess returns deviate the most from the 
mean. They range from -28.88% to 23.79% and the standard deviation is 0.0633. The 
Small/High BM equities are also among the most volatile stocks.  
  
28 
On the contrary, big stocks tend to generate negative excess returns. The three 
portfolios, Big/High BM, Big/Medium BM and Big/Low BM, have excess returns of -
0.32%, -0.26% and -0.08%, respectively. Big equities are among the less volatile stocks. 
The stock returns also vary according to market conditions. As can be seen from Figure 
2.1, the periods which witness large fluctuations within one group of stocks are market 
slowdowns. For example, the Dotcom bust that saw the UK FTSE100 drop by more 
than 50% in 2003, and the recent financial crisis that led to the sharpest drop since the 
current index was created in 1984. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly Excess returns on 6 Size/BM portfolios 
The table summarises descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 dependent variables (Ri – Rf), in which Ri are size/BM portfolios and Rf is the LIBOR 3-month 
rates. To construct Ri, non-financial stocks are split into Big and Small portfolios based on their market capitalisation by the statistical median. At the same 
time, these stocks are also grouped into High BM, Medium BM and Low BM using a 40:20:40 breakpoint. Six size/BM portfolios are the intersections 
between two size and three BM portfolios. For example, the Small/Low portfolio consists of stocks that are in the Small group and also classified as Low 
BM stocks. All monthly excess returns are represented in decimal form. Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 explains the construction of these portfolios in more 
detail. 
Excess returns  No. of 
companies 
Mean SD Median Max Min 
Small/Low  52 0.0022 0.0533 0.0085 0.1557 -0.1878 
Small/Medium 22 0.0022 0.0583 0.0064 0.1587 -0.2521 
Small/High 60 0.0033 0.0633 0.0063 0.2379 -0.2888 
Big/Low 57 -0.0008 0.0411 0.0042 0.1248 -0.1851 
Big/Medium 31 -0.0026 0.0564 0.0040 0.1390 -0.2876 
Big/High 46 -0.0032 0.0508 -0.0004 0.1096 -0.1991 
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Figure 2.1: Plotting Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly excess returns on 6 
size/BM portfolios 
The figures plot monthly excess returns on 6 size/BM portfolios, (Ri –Rf), over a period from 
July 1990 to December 2012 (276 data points). Scatter diagrams are used to visualise dependent 
variables instead of line charts because they could present the extent to which value strategies 
generate abnormal returns. The risk-free asset (Rf) is the LIBOR 1-month rate. A trendline is 
added to show the performance of each portfolio over time. All monthly excess returns are 
represented in decimal form. The Y axis shows the value of monthly excess returns on each 
portfolio (in decimal), and the X axis represents years.  
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When assessing performance of Volatility/BM portfolios in Chapter 3, we carry out 
regression analysis on excess returns on 9 portfolios which are the intersections between 
3 volatility and 3 BM portfolios. The descriptive statistics of these dependent variables 
are presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2. 
In Table 2.2, it is unsurprising that highly volatile stocks are those with the highest 
standard deviations but their performance in the UK is also better than medium and low 
volatility stocks. Among the three volatility portfolios, the average returns on High 
Vo/Medium BM are the highest, approximately 0.34% higher than the risk-free asset. 
High Vo/High BM and High Vo/Low BM portfolios both generate positive excess 
returns of about 0.18% and 0.07% per month, respectively. The largest changes in 
monthly excess returns are within the High Vo/Medium BM stocks, which can reach a 
maximum of 50.95% and a minimum of -24.11%. From Figure 2.2, the plot diagram 
for High Vo/Medium BM excess returns shows that the high excess returns were seen 
in September 2010, which coincided with the period when the UK economy started to 
pick up after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Low volatility portfolios perform worst in terms of excess returns with the monthly 
excess returns are between -1.21% and -0.85%. Although having slightly lower standard 
deviations comparing to Medium Volatility companies, Low Volatility portfolios 
generate much lower excess returns. The return differentials are between 0.2% and 0.6% 
per month. In addition, it can be seen from Figure 2.2 that Low Vo/High BM portfolios 
are more volatile than Low Vo/Medium BM and Low Vo/Low BM. Average excess 
returns on the Low Volatility portfolios recorded a clear upward trend over time, with 
the excess returns on the Low Vo/Low BM increasing more quickly than those on other 
Low Volatility portfolios. 
One might notice that there are a smaller number of companies in medium volatility 
portfolios. It is because they account for about 20% of the total sample. The Medium 
Vo/Medium BM portfolio has even fewer firms as they consist of only 10% of the total 
sample. This, however, will not necessarily compromise the quality of the Chapter 3 
econometrics estimation since the analysis pays more attention to the performance of 
high and low Volatility stocks. The rest of this section, therefore, will not discuss the 
medium portfolios in great detail. 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly Excess returns on 9 Volatility/ BM portfolios 
The table summarises descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 dependent variables (Ri – Rf), in which Ri are Volatility/BM portfolios and Rf is the LIBOR 1-
month rates. To construct Ri, non-financial stocks are split into High Vo, Medium Vo and Low Vo based on firm-level standard deviation. The breakpoint 
used for dependent variables is 40:20:40. At the same time, these stocks are also grouped into High BM, Medium BM and Low BM using the 40:20:40 
breakpoint. Nine dependent variables are the intersections between three idiosyncratic volatility and three BM portfolios. For example, the High Vo/Low 
BM portfolio consists of stocks that are in the High idiosyncratic volatility group and also classified as Low BM stocks. All monthly excess returns are 
represented in decimal form. Section 3.3.2 of chapter 3 explains the construction of these portfolios in more detail. 
Excess returns No. of 
companies 
Mean SD Median Max Min 
High Vo/High BM 42 0.0018 0.0780 -0.0084 0.2362 -0.1886 
High Vo/Medium BM 24 0.0034 0.0985 -0.0131 0.5095 -0.2411 
High Vo/Low BM 43 0.0007 0.0872 -0.0129 0.3348 -0.2010 
Medium Vo/High BM 21 -0.0069 0.0551 -0.0122 0.2361 -0.1538 
Medium Vo/Medium BM 10 -0.0066 0.0638 -0.0086 0.3142 -0.1744 
Medium Vo/Low BM 23 -0.0066 0.0506 -0.0087 0.2386 -0.1247 
Low Vo/High BM 44 -0.0085 0.0444 -0.0143 0.1369 -0.1204 
Low Vo/Medium BM 20 -0.0121 0.0322 -0.0175 0.1705 -0.1453 
Low Vo/Low BM 43 -0.0091 0.0411 -0.0121 0.1254 -0.1657 
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Figure 2.2: Plotting Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly excess returns on 9 Volatility/BM portfolios 
The figures plot monthly excess returns on 9 Volatility/BM portfolios, (Ri –Rf), over a period from July 1990 to December 2012 (276 datapoints). Scatter 
diagrams are used to visualise dependent variables instead of line charts because they could present the extent to which value strategies generate abnormal 
returns. The risk-free asset (Rf) is the LIBOR 1-month rate. A trendline is added to show the performance of each portfolio over time. The Y axis shows 
the value of monthly excess returns on each portfolio (in decimal), and the X axis represents years.  
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In regard to excess returns on the Default/BM portfolios, Table 2.3 shows that 
High DEF stocks generate lower average returns in relation to the risk-free asset. 
Within the High DEF group, the excess returns are lower on High and Low , 
compared with the Medium  portfolios. On average, they yield monthly excess 
returns of -0.83%, -0.72% and -0.56%, respectively. High DEF stocks are also 
among those with the highest standard deviation. Their monthly excess returns 
range from as low as -35.53% to as high as 48.95%. 
In contrast, Low DEF stocks generate positive excess returns and they do not 
deviate from the mean as much as their High DEF counterpart. In particular, Low 
DEF/High BM returns are nearly 10% higher than the risk-free asset, while this is 
only around 0.2% in the cases of Low DEF/Medium BM and Low DEF/Low BM 
portfolios. Standard deviations of Low DEF portfolios are about 0.04, compared 
with 0.08 for the High DEF portfolios. This implies that the Low DEF stocks tend 
to be less volatile than High DEF. The largest changes are seen in the Low 
DEF/Medium BM portfolio, with a maximum value of 16.03% and a minimum 
value of -11.23% per month. 
It can be seen from Figure 2.3 that there is an upward trend in monthly excess 
returns on low DEF portfolios. Within the Low DEF group, the Low DEF/High 
BM portfolio experiences a downward trend at a much faster pace than the Low 
DEF/Low BM portfolio. The figure also shows that in the low DEF group, High 
BM stocks tend to be more sensitive to changes in market condition than Low BM 
stocks. The figure also confirms that the High DEF stocks tend to deviate more 
from the mean than the Medium DEF and Low DEF stocks do.  
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly excess returns on 9 Default/BM portfolios 
The table summarises descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 dependent variables (Ri – Rf), in which Ri are Default/BM portfolios and Rf is the LIBOR 1-month 
rates. To construct Ri, non-financial stocks are split into High DEF, Medium DEF and Low DEF based on their O-score. The breakpoint used for dependent 
variables is 40:20:40. At the same time, these stocks are also grouped into High BM, Medium BM and Low BM using the 40:20:40 breakpoint. Nine 
dependent variables are the intersections between the three DEF and three BM portfolios. For example, the High DEF/Low BM portfolio consists of stocks 
that are classified as having a high probability of default and are also in the Low BM group. All monthly excess returns are represented in decimal form. 
Section 3.4.4 of Chapter 3 explains the construction of these portfolios in more detail. 
Excess returns No. of 
companies 
Mean SD Median Max Min 
High DEF/High BM 43 -0.0083 0.0725 -0.0152 0.2939 -0.1812 
High DEF/Medium BM 22 -0.0056 0.0842 -0.0092 0.4895 -0.3553 
High DEF/Low BM 44 -0.0072 0.0736 -0.0086 0.2857 -0.1945 
Medium DEF/High BM 21 -0.0034 0.0632 -0.0027 0.2362 -0.1342 
Medium DEF/Medium BM 10 -0.0033 0.0554 -0.0014 0.2729 -0.2415 
Medium DEF/Low BM 23 -0.0027 0.0501 -0.0019 0.2103 -0.2010 
Low DEF/High BM 43 0.0099 0.0429 0.0045 0.1462 -0.1107 
Low DEF/Medium BM 21 0.0021 0.0327 0.0022 0.1603 -0.1123 
Low DEF/Low BM 42 0.0019 0.0322 0.0034 0.1348 -0.0902 
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Figure 2.3: Plotting Chapter 3 dependent variables – Monthly excess returns on 9 Default/BM portfolios 
The figures plot monthly excess returns on 9 DEF/BM portfolios, (Ri –Rf), over a period from July 1990 to December 2012 (276 data points). Scatter 
diagrams are used to visualise dependent variables instead of line charts because they could present the extent to which value strategies generate abnormal 
returns. The Risk-free asset (Rf) is the LIBOR 1-month rate. A trendline is added to show the performance of each portfolio over time. The Y axis shows 
the value of excess returns on each portfolio (in decimal), and the X axis represents years.  
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Table 2.4 summaries the characteristics of variables used in Chapter 4. They are the 
excess returns on 10 momentum portfolios, which are equally split based on their past 
6-month returns with a 6-month lag. The excess returns on the Winner and on the Loser 
portfolios are the dependent variables in the regression analysis in Chapter 4. Each 
portfolio consists of between 28-30 companies (split equally from a full sample of 290 
companies in the FTSE350), and the portfolios are rebalanced annually. 
On average, the monthly excess returns on the Loser stocks are much lower than those 
on the Winners (0.07% and 1.08%, respectively). This indicates that there is a 
momentum premium among the FTSE350 companies in the long run. The Loser 
portfolio, however, deviates from the mean at a lower rate than the Winners do. Their 
standard deviation is 0.0738, with the lowest observed value of -12.17% and the highest 
value of 27.21%. On the other hand, their Winners counterpart has a standard deviation 
of 0.0977. The observations range from -25.28% to 44.15%. 
Other portfolios that are between the Winners and the Losers in the performance ranking 
vary in terms of variable properties. The excess return averages unsurprisingly range 
from the Losers’ mean to the Winners’ mean. Standard deviations are between 0.0512 
(P8 portfolio) and 0.0854 (P3 portfolio). As Chapter 4 focuses on the Winners and the 
Losers only, portfolios P2 to P9 are less relevant and will not be discussed further. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.4, the excess returns on the Losers tend to be negative and 
more volatile during market downturn periods, such as during the 2008 financial crisis 
(2008-2010). Their values are more widely scattered than the values of the Winner 
excess returns. In contrast, the Winner returns tend to be positive and less volatile during 
the market downturns and achieve higher excess returns during market upturns, for 
example the post-2010 period. The initial analysis shows that the differing states of the 
economy and market conditions have a significant impact on the performance of 
momentum strategies in the UK, and therefore it is important to take these factors into 
account in explaining momentum anomaly in the study. The performance of these 
portfolios during different market conditions will be analysed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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Table 2.4: Monthly excess returns on 10 momentum portfolios (Chapter 4) 
The table summarises descriptive statistics for Chapter 4 dependent variables (R i – Rf), in 
which Ri are momentum portfolios and Rf is the LIBOR 1-month rates. To form Ri, a sample 
of 290 companies (including eligible financial and non-financial firms) is split equally into 
10 portfolios based on ranking past 6-month lagged return and hold for 6 months. The lowest 
past return is denoted by P1 and the highest past return is denoted by P10. That means P1 
(P10) consists of 10% of the stocks with the lowest (highest) returns over the previous 6 
months. Although 10 momentum portfolios are formed, the dependent variables in Chapter 4 
are the excess returns on P1 (the Losers) and P10 (the Winners). All monthly excess returns 
are represented in decimal form. Section 4.3.2 B of Chapter 4 explains the steps in which 
these 10 portfolios are constructed in more detail. 
Excess 
returns 
No. of 
companies 
Mean SD Median Max Min 
P1 30 0.0007 0.0738 -0.0121 0.2721 -0.1217 
P2 28 0.0010 0.0802 -0.0001 0.2979 -0.1509 
P3 29 0.0015 0.0854 0.0023 0.3342 -0.2037 
P4 29 0.0018 0.0719 -0.0327 0.3419 -0.2315 
P5 29 0.0024 0.0650 -0.0165 0.3726 -0.2511 
P6 29 0.0027 0.0667 -0.0226 0.3729 -0.2742 
P7 29 0.0042 0.0541 -0.0372 0.4125 -0.2119 
P8 29 0.0049 0.0512 0.0108 0.4307 -0.2367 
P9 29 0.0075 0.0742 -0.0236 0.4397 -0.2809 
P10 29 0.0108 0.0977 0.0117 0.4415 -0.2528 
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Figure 2.4: Plotting Chapter 4 dependent variables – monthly excess returns on 
Winners and Losers portfolios 
Chapter 4 dependent variables are excess returns on 2 momentum portfolios, the Winners and 
the Losers. Scatter diagrams are used to visualise these dependent variables instead of line charts 
because they could present the extent to which momentum strategies generate abnormal returns. 
The figures plot monthly excess returns on the 2 momentum portfolios, (Ri –Rf), over a period 
from July 1990 to December 2012 (276 data points). 2 momentum portfolios include the 
Winners (P10), consisting of firms in the top 10%, and the Losers (P1), consisting of firms in 
the lowest 10% of the sample. The risk-free asset (Rf) is the LIBOR 1-month rate. A trendline 
is added to show the performance of each portfolio over time. The Y axis shows the value of 
excess returns on each portfolio (in decimal), and the X axis represents years.  
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2.5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The section contains a description of each independent variable used in the thesis and 
the method with which they are constructed. The section also includes a variable 
correlation matrix and diagrams. 
2.5.1. Variable construction 
2.5.1.A. Chapter 3 variables 
(i) Market factor 
The market factor (Rm - Rf) is obtained from Prof Kenneth R. French’s website4. The 
market return data for the UK market are available under the section “Country 
Portfolios formed on B/M, E/P, CE/P and D/P”, in which data on all four valuation 
ratios (i.e. BM, E/P, C/P and D/P) are not required. According to Prof French’s 
description, the UK market portfolio includes all UK firms with BM data. Although the 
database also provides market returns on portfolios including only firms with all four 
ratios, using these data points will undermine the robustness of analyses of the UK 
market as a large number of UK firms do not provide D/P data or pay zero dividend. 
(ii) High-minus-Low 
The High-minus-Low (HML) variable is constructed to mimic the part of returns 
associated with the BM effect5. At the end of July of year t, all eligible stocks are split 
into 3 portfolios using the 30th and 70th percentile breakpoints (i.e. 30:40:30) based on 
their BM in June of the same year. The monthly value-weighted returns are rebalanced 
annually. The return differential between the top 30% BM stocks and the bottom 30% 
(i.e. HML) is used as a proxy for the BM factor. It is given by the following formula. 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 −  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
While there are different breakpoints used in the value anomaly literature, such as 
40:20:40 (in Dimson, Nagel and Quigley 2003), rankings on BM using the 30:40:30 
breakpoints are predominant in large markets. These were suggested by Fama and 
French (1993,1996, 2012) and followed by a large number of subsequent studies, such 
                                                 
4 Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
5 Although Prof.. French’s database also provides calculations of HML and SMB factors for non-US 
markets, the data are limited to large geographic segments, of which the UK is part of the European 
segment. Given the size and economic diversity of the European market, it is more accurate to construct 
the UK factors rather than using the European proxies. 
(2.6) 
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as Griffin and Lemmon (2002) for the UK, Ferguson and Shockley (2003), Zhang 
(2005) and Cooper (2006) for the US, to name a few. To avoid ambiguity, we use the 
30:40:30 breakpoints in the HML calculation to ensure that the stocks in the High and 
Low portfolios are the most representative of their style. 
(iii) Small-minus-Big 
The Small-minus-Big (SMB) variable is a portfolio-based risk factor associated with 
the size effect (i.e. market capitalisation). The formula is presented below. 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 −  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
Similar to the classification in Fama and French (1993), at the end of July of year t, 
stocks are split into 2 groups by the median. The 1 month allows the factor to capture 
underlying risks and also avoid possible biases caused by an asymmetric way of treating 
HML and SMB factors. The monthly portfolio returns are value weighted by the market 
value at the end of June, year t. The return differential between the small-cap stocks and 
the large-cap is meant to capture the size effect. 
(iv) Winner-minus-Loser 
The Winner-minus-Loser (WML) variable is meant to mimic the momentum factor of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in returns. 11-month past returns are used to classify the 
winners from the losers. The return differential between the top 30% stocks and the 
bottom 30% stocks means to capture the momentum effects. The monthly portfolio 
returns are calculated at July, year t with 1-month lag and value weighted by the market 
value at the end of June, year t. 
𝑊𝑀𝐿 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 −  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
It is worth mentioning that the WML factor is provided on Prof. French’s website but 
only for large geographic segments, of which the UK is part of the European segment. 
Similar to the HML and SMB variables in section 2.4.1.A, the WML variable for the 
UK market is constructed exclusively on the UK FTSE350 instead of using the 
European factor as a proxy. 
(v) Default risk 
Among others, Pope (2010) supports the use of factor mimicking portfolios constructed 
from default risk and suggests that this would help build more robust factor models of 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
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estimating expected returns. This lends support to our approach to constructing default 
risk factors in this thesis.  
Default factor (DEF) is constructed to mimic the part of returns associated with risk of 
bankruptcy.  
𝐷𝐸𝐹 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 −  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
At the end of July of year t, stocks are split into 3 groups at the breakpoints of 30:40:30 
based on their probability of bankruptcy, measured by O-scores at the end of December 
year t-1. The portfolio returns are value weighted and rebalanced annually. The monthly 
return differential between the top 30% O-score stocks and the bottom 30% O-score 
stocks means to capture the risk of default.  
O-score was first proposed by Ohlson (1980), a method that intends to capture the 
likelihood of a company going bankrupt. The O-score method is entirely based on 
accounting data when predicting the financial health of a company. O-scores are 
calculated by the following formula: 
𝑶 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =  −1.32 − 0.407 𝑙𝑜𝑔 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝑁𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
 + 6.03 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.43 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.076 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.72 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 > 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 2.37 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.83 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 0.285 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 0.521 
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1)
|𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1|
 
Ohlson’s (1980) O-score can take both positive and negative values, however firms with 
a negative O-score should simply be interpreted as having zero probability of default. 
As a general rule, any O-scores that are greater than 0.5 would suggest that the 
associated firm is likely to go bankrupt within 2 years. All input variables are greater 
than zero, except Working capital  and Net income which can be negative. The method 
is useful for assessing a company’s financial condition over time as well as 
benchmarking between companies. 
Another default factor (DEF’) is constructed in the same way as the above DEF 
variable, and used for robustness check purposes. The DEF’ uses Altman’s (1968) Z-
(2.10) 
(2.9) 
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score instead of O-score as a proxy for default risks. Accordingly, at the end of July of 
year t, stocks are split into 3 groups based on their probability of bankruptcy, measured 
by Altman’s (1968) Z-scores at the end of December year t-1. The portfolio returns are 
value weighted and rebalanced annually. DEF’ is the monthly return differential 
between the top 30% Z-score stocks and the bottom 30% Z-score stocks. The Z-score 
is calculated using the formula below: 
𝒁 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 = 0.012 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.014
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.033
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.006 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 0.999 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Z-score can take both positive and negative values. Although there are different ways 
of interpreting Z-score, this thesis follows a useful rule of thumb, according to which 
companies with Z-scores below 1.8 are likely to go bankrupt while those with Z-scores 
above 3 have a low likelihood of bankruptcy. All input variables are greater than zero, 
except Working capital, Retained earnings, EBIT, and Sales which can take negative 
values. 
2.5.1.B. Additional variables used in Chapter 4 
(i) Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) probability of corporate failure  
From a range of default risk proxies discussed in the literature, the measure of corporate 
failure risk proposed by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), henceforth CHS 
score, is a more accurate, complex but well represented empirical measure (Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi 2011, and Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis 2017). It includes not 
only accounting ratios but also market variables when forecasting the risk of 
bankruptcy. According to Charalambakis, Espenlaub and Garrett (2009), including both 
accounting and market information would lead to significant improvements in 
forecasting potential financial distress in UK companies. In their paper, Campbell et al. 
(2008) find that financially distressed firms generate anomalously low stock returns in 
the US. However, there have been a limited number of similar studies on the UK market, 
the area that this thesis aims to contribute to. 
Based on CHS scores, the CHS variable is constructed to mimic the part of returns 
associated with risk of corporate failure. Similar to DEF and DEF’ variables, at the end 
(2.11) 
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of July of year t, stocks are split into 3 groups at the breakpoints of 30:40:30 based on 
their probability of corporate failure, measured by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s 
(2008) CHS at the end of December year t-1. The portfolio returns are then rebalanced 
on an annual basis. The return differential between the top 30% CHS score stocks and 
the bottom 30% CHS score stocks means to capture the risk of corporate failure.  
The rest of this sub-section presents a full description of the CHS proxy for corporate 
failure, how the input variables are collected and the algorithm used to calculate CHS 
scores. To calculate CHS score, we follow three main steps: 
Step 1: Selecting predictive indicators 
The CHS method first assumes that the probability of failure in month t has its marginal 
distribution, Pt-1, following a logistic distribution and being given by:  
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
(1 + e−α−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1)
 
where Yit equals 1 if the firm goes bankrupt in month t and xi,t-1 is a vector of each 
explanatory variable i of the regression. We follow the study of Campbell et al. (2008) 
and include the following predictor variables in constructing the CHS probability of 
default6. 
NIMTA: Net Income over Market value of Total Asset, 
TLMTA: Total Liabilities over Market value of Total Asset, 
EXRET: Logarithm of gross excess return over value weighted FTSE350 return, 
RSIZE: Logarithm of firm’s market value over the total value of the FTSE350, 
SIGMA: Standard deviation of firm daily stock returns over a period of three 
months,  
CASHMTA: Cash and short-term investments over the market value of total 
assets, 
MTBV: Firm’s market to book value. 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 3 for mathematical formulae of constructing each variable, proposed by Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). 
(2.12) 
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All the above input variables are collected from the DataStream and Bloomberg 
databases. Details of the data source, variable definition and the DataStream Mnemonic 
code (DSMnemonic) are presented in Appendix 2 of the thesis. 
In the CHS study, NIMTA and SIGMA aim to measure prospective profitability while 
EXPET and RSIZE are market-based versions of stock return and market value. A ratio 
of cash and short-term investments over the market value of the total assets of a firm 
(CASHMTA) means to proxy for the firm’s liquidity position. Other ratios, namely 
TLMTA and MTBV, are widely used for the purpose of measuring firms’ financial 
health. Table 2.5 summarises descriptive statistics of these variables. 
It is worth noting that this chapter does not include the price-per-share variable as the 
original study did. This is because of the differences in the market index we examine. 
Unlike the NYSE and NASDAQ based on which Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi built 
their model, the London Stock Exchange does not have a minimum price-per-share 
requirement. Thus, UK firms are not likely to be de-listed for that reason7. Also, there 
is no reason to associate a low value of the share price with a distress situation. 
Therefore, price-per-share variable is not relevant in this analysis.  
Step 2: Running logit regressions on predictive variables 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where, Logitt-1 is the logit probability of financial distress; and xi,t-1 is a vector of the 
explanatory variable i listed in step 1. 
The CHS probability of bankruptcy is estimated from a dynamic logit model (see 
equation 2.13) using the above range of accounting and equity-related variables. The 
logit model predicts the probability of an event occurring by estimating a logistic 
function using several predictor variables. The dependent variable is the bankruptcy 
indicator provided by DataStream for the UK market. Among delisted firms, firms that 
were delisted due to bankruptcy are identified by their dead-delisted status in 
DataStream. 
                                                 
7 Campbell et al. (2008) explained that since NYSE and NASDAQ have a listing requirement of minimum 
$1 price per share, US firms with a low price per share would be at risk of being de-listed regardless of 
their performance. Thus, this variable could be one of the predictors of probability of failure in the US. 
(2.13) 
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Campbell et al. (2008) predict the probability of bankruptcy in 1 month, 6 months, and 
1, 2 and 3 years, and report the results in Table 4 (page 2913) of the paper8. They find 
that as they predict further into the future, the predictive power of CHS decreases. In 
this thesis, a 6-month lag is chosen because the method has a high predictive power and 
coincides with the way other explanatory variables, such as HML, SMB and WML, are 
built. This is also to allow for all company information being made available to investors 
before they make investment decisions. 
Following the procedure suggested by Campbell et al. (2008), we also run logit 
regressions of failure indicators on 6-month lagged variables. This is to estimate the 
conditional probability of bankruptcy of FTSE350 firms in 6 months. Model (2.13) 
results in a linear vector of predictive variables. A higher level of the Logit implies a 
higher probability of bankruptcy of failure. The vector parameters are reported in Table 
2.6.  
The logit model generates a logit value (also called the logit probability of financial 
distress), and the estimation results in Table 2.6 show that the logit probability is given 
in the following formula. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 = −4.0127 − 2.6719 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴 + 0.3361 𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴 − 1.8506 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 − 0.2017 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
+ 1.5289 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴 −  2.0152 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑇𝐴 + 0.4170 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 
Where, Logit is the logit value or logit probability of financial distress; the definitions 
of explanatory variables in the equation, such as NIMTA and TLMTA, are provided 
earlier in Step 1.  
Step 3: Calculating the CHS score 
The conditional probability of failure, the CHS score, is computed as follows. 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) =
1
(1 + e−𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑡−1)
 
The CHS score, or Pt-1(Yit=1 | Logiti, t-1), takes a value between 0 and 1. Companies that 
have CHS values of between 0 and 0.05 are considered to be relatively safe for 
investment while companies with a CHS score of between 0.9 and 1 are at risk of 
bankruptcy. 
                                                 
8 See Campbell, J.Y., Hilscher, J. and Szilagyi, J. 2008. “In Search of Distress Risk”. Journal of Finance 
Vol. 63 for a complete set of predictive horizons. 
(2.15) 
(2.14) 
  
49 
CHS scores are computed for all 290 firms in the full sample. These individual company 
CHS scores are then used to form the CHS variable - a portfolio-based default factor. 
As mentioned earlier, CHS portfolios are built in the same way that other portfolio-
based variables are constructed, which consists of three steps: (a) computing and 
ranking the CHS scores of each company on a monthly basis; (b) constructing CHS 
portfolios using the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint; and (c) rebalancing the portfolios 
annually.  
As it is complex and time-consuming to compute company CHS score, this thesis 
supplies in Appendix 5 a set of source code that can be used to compute CHS variables 
quickly and correctly. Appendix 5 also explains step by step the role of each procedure, 
so it is possible to replicate and/or update this code to achieve other research objectives. 
The code is written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming language, but 
it is possible to use other programming languages to generate CHS values following the 
procedure described in the Appendix. 
Despite recognising the advantages of CHS, we do not intend to engage in the debate 
on whether it is a better measure of default risk than its predecessors. As Hilscher and 
Wilson (2016) point out, due to the multidimensional nature of bankruptcy risk, one 
should not expect that one measure alone could capture all relevant factors. 
(ii) Business cycle variables 
Default spread - In this thesis, default spread (DES) is defined as the difference between 
the monthly average yields on corporate bonds and on long-term Government bonds 
(UK Gilt with a 15+ year maturity).  
𝐷𝐸𝑆 = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 − 𝑈𝐾 𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡 15 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
Studies in the US may use different proxies for firm default spread as an indicator for 
the state of the economy. For example, Avramov and Chordia (2006) use the spread 
between yield to maturity on low-graded and high-graded corporate bonds, while Hahn 
and Lee (2006) define DES as the yield differential between a Baa corporate bond index 
and a 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate. However, when carrying out an analysis 
on systemic risk in the US and European markets, Giglio, Kelly and Pruitt (2016) note 
that these approaches are not suitable for most European markets, the UK in particular, 
due to lack of data.  
(2.16) 
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By definition, default spread is meant to capture the hedging concerns of investors 
associated with variations in risk premiums (Jagannathan and Wang 1996). For the UK 
market, corporate bond and UK Gilts are usually used for such diversification purposes. 
Term spread – (TERM) is the difference between monthly average returns on long-
term and short-term Government bonds. In the case of the UK market, we use the return 
differential between 15+ year Gilt and 3-month yields. TERM and DES are widely used 
as proxies for the state of an economy since Merton (1973). Generally, TERM is used 
as an indicator of changes in market’s expectation about future interest rates, and DES 
is to capture the effect of shifts in investment opportunities on investors.  
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀 = 𝑈𝐾 𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡 15 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅 3𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 
Dividend yield – (DIV) refers to the monthly average value-weighted dividend yield of 
all stocks in the sample. It is also one of business cycle variables widely used in the 
asset pricing literature. 
𝐷𝐼𝑉 =  
∑  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 
Short-term Treasury Bill - The 3-month LIBOR rate of return is used to proxy for the 
short-term Treasury bill (T-Bill) for the UK market. As LIBOR is recorded on an annual 
basis, monthly T-Bill rates are calculated by converting the annual LIBOR to compound 
monthly rate of returns. 
2.5.2. Descriptive statistics 
This section starts with descriptive statistics for default risk indicators since they have 
not been reported explicitly for the UK in the literature. It then focuses on describing 
the key features of all regression explanatory variables used in the thesis analysis. 
2.5.2.A. Default risk component 
(i) CHS probability of corporate failure 
This section will provide a description of the CHS score and its composite variables 
through three main stages. 
Firstly, Table 2.5 summarises the key descriptive statistics of seven components that 
make up the CHS probability of bankruptcy as at 31st December 2012. In the table, there 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
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is evidence of a wide representation of firms with different sizes, operating performance 
(net income) and financial positions (e.g. cash and liabilities) in the FTSE350.  
On average, net income over market value of total asset ratios across firms, NIMTA, is 
rather high at 68.25 with a median value of 65.56. The firm with the highest NIMTA in 
the FTSE350 is Polymetal International Plc. (at 2,712), a precious metals producer 
operating in Russia and Kazakhstan, and the firm with the greatest loss in comparison 
to its market value is Thomas Cook Group, a leisure travel group (at -1,356). In terms 
of liabilities, both the highest and the lowest TLMTA ratios are firms in the financial 
sector, Phoenix Group Holding and BH Marco, respectively. This is unsurprising 
because liability ratios in the financial industry tend to vary largely. They can signal but 
do not always reflect firms’ financial positions as well as they do in the non-financial 
sector. In addition, the ratios between firms’ cash and short-term investments over 
market value of total assets range from 0.08 to 0.67 with a mean of 0.23. The low ratios 
of these most liquid assets imply a high risk of default in the short run. 
Regarding market-based variables, the large negative RSIZE shows that the size of the 
firms in our sample are considerably small in comparison to the total market value of 
the FTSE350 index. However, their market-to-book-value ratios differ greatly from 
each other, ranging from nearly -31 to +198. This suggests that our sample covers firms 
in various financial conditions. From the stock return standpoint, EXRET shows that on 
average the returns on individual stocks are slightly larger than those on the FTSE350 
index. The return differentials are however insignificant. Low SIGMA values suggest a 
low stock return volatility over the most recent 3-month period. The absolute value of 
the FTSE350 stock average returns is 0.11 per month, ranging from 0.02 to 0.67, with 
a standard deviation of only 0.08. 
Secondly, the next step is to run a logit regression on the above set of predictors and the 
results are summarised in Table 2.6. They show that out of 290 FTSE350 companies, 
there were 8 companies which were at high risk of default. In fact, 7 of them later went 
into financial distress, such as Northern Rock, being delisted in 2008, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, which was rescued by the government through a large bailout of 
£45bn in 2008. This shows an 87.5% accuracy, slightly lower than the 95.5% accuracy 
ratio reported by Campbell et al. (2008) for the US market. 
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As can be seen from the table, all predictive variables entering the logit regression with 
expected signs, and are statistically significant at a 1% or 5% level. The constant value 
is -4.0127 with a z-statistic of 18.22 in absolute terms. The estimated coefficient 
associated with NIMTA takes the value of -2.6719 (z-statistic is 4.12, statistically 
significant at a 1% level). The value of NIMTA is relatively high compared with other 
predictive indicators. This indicates that net income is one of the key indicators that 
could help investors to spot early signs of impending corporate failure. A company with 
lower net income over market value of total assets is more likely to experience financial 
distress, and a consecutive period of low or negative NIMTA signals default. Total 
liabilities over market value of total assets, TLMTA, can also contribute to identifying 
the risk of bankruptcy. The estimated TLMTA parameter takes the value of 0.3361 with 
a z-statistic of 8.53 (significant at a 1% level). Although having liabilities does not 
necessarily mean the company is under distress, a high ratio of liabilities over total 
assets means the company would struggle to repay its debts, and a long period of high 
TLMTA ratio could lead to default.  
Beside the above accounting ratios, it is equally important to include market-related 
variables. For example, one of the key indicators predicting the probability of corporate 
failure is gross stock excess return over the market return. For the UK market, this thesis 
defines EXRET variable as the logarithm of gross excess return over the value weighted 
FTSE350 return. It shows how stocks of a company perform against the whole market. 
The coefficient associated with EXRET variable is estimated to be -1.8506, with z-
statistic of 7.26 in absolute terms, which is statistically significant. A company whose 
stocks are being valued poorly by the market and/or is persistently underperforming the 
market tends to bear a higher level of diversifiable risk. The risk would be in the form 
of firm-specific reputational risk or operational risk. Since these risks can be mitigated 
through portfolio diversification, when investors are moving away from investing in 
these companies, they would then face further distress and even default if the problem 
persists. 
Firm size in relation to the market size is also considered to be a relevant predictive 
indicator of financial distress. It means that smaller firms are more likely to experience 
difficulties in raising finance, securing favourable deals or attracting talent. However, 
in the UK market there is evidence suggesting that size plays a less significant role in 
predicting probability of bankruptcy. The estimated coefficient associated with the 
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RSIZE parameter is only -0.2017, slightly significant at a 10% level with a z-statistic of 
2.48 in absolute terms. This finding is later confirmed in the subsequent chapters on the 
relationship between firm size and performance of individual stocks. 
Similarly, market-to-book value ratio, MTBV, has been referred to as one of the key 
indicators explaining common stock returns in the asset pricing literature. According to 
the literature, companies with high market capitalisation in relation to their book value 
are considered to be overvalued by the market and would potentially be a less profitable 
investment. In the context of corporate failure prediction, assessment of firms’ MTBV 
would shed light on how the market prices a company in the stock market. The 
coefficient associated with the MTBV variable is estimated to be 0.4170 (z-statistic is 
3.56, statistically significant at a 1% level). A company with a high MTBV ratio is 
considered to be overpriced by the market, and therefore at higher risk of default as this 
situation is unlikely to be sustainable. 
Another equity-related indicator that Campbell et al. (2008) proposed in the CHS 
regression relates to past stock returns. SIGMA is calculated by taking a square root of 
a sum of squared stock returns over a three-month period. Higher returns on equity may 
indicate that a company performs relatively well in comparison to their counterparts. 
The estimated coefficient associated with SIGMA takes the value of 1.5289 (z-statistic 
is 3.72, highly significant at a 1% level). The sign and magnitude of the coefficient 
suggests that the likelihood of failure is sensitive to past performance of stocks. 
However, the predictive ability is not as strong as many of the other indicators presented 
so far. One might relate SIGMA to momentum factor which is discussed later in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Although they are put in a different context, the findings in these 
chapters also suggest that past stock returns can contribute to predicting future stock 
performance, but the explanatory power is not consistently significant across the 
FTSE350 companies. 
Campbell et al. (2008) also suggested the inclusion of the CASHMTA variable which 
captures a company’s cash and short-term investment in relation to its market value of 
total assets. This is justifiable as CASHMTA is considered to be highly liquid assets 
which indicate the company’s ability to cover short-term debt. Thus, the variable has 
been widely used in accounting and finance as a key indicator of immediate financial 
distress. The estimated coefficient associated with CASHMTA is negative (at -2.0152) 
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and highly significant, indicating that companies with a low level of cash and short-
term investment in relation to their total assets are more likely to face default. 
Following Campbell et al. (2008), Table 2.6 reports McFadden’s R2 (also known as 
Pseudo R2), a commonly used measure of model fit in the bankruptcy prediction 
literature. The Pseudo R2 shows how a predictive model performs in relation to a model 
that only can capture the average default rate. According to McFadden (1974), a 
completely failed model would have a Pseudo R2 of zero. In table 2.6, the Pseudo R2 is 
equal to 21.35%, indicating a high level of predictive ability. It is lower than 31.6%, the 
Pseudo R2 reported by Campbell et al. (2008) for the US market. This indicates that 
there is still room for further improvement through including country-specific variables. 
For example, there are some UK stocks experiencing thin trading or no trading at all for 
a considerable period of time. Thus, variables such as stock liquidity could be a potential 
predictive indicator. 
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for CHS composite variables 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the key composite indicators making up the CHS 
proxy, including: Net income over market value of total assets (NIMTA), Total liabilities over 
market value of total assets (TLMTA), Logarithm of gross excess return over value weighted 
FTSE350 return (EXRET), Logarithm of firms’ market value over the total value of FTSE350 
(RSIZE), Square root of a sum of squared firm stock returns over a period of three months 
(SIGMA), Cash and short-term investments over the market value of total assets (CASHMTA), 
and Market-to-book value (MTBV). 
As at 31st December 2012. 
  Mean SD Median Max Min 
NIMTA 68.25 198.73 65.56 2,712.32 -1,357.53 
TLMTA 2,517 8,801 541 104,286 0 
EXRET 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.46 -0.53 
RSIZE -6.83 1.26  -7.07 -2.74 -8.60 
SIGMA 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.67 0.02 
CASHMTA 0.23 1.34 0.25 0.67 0.08 
MTBV 3.48 11.50 1.97 197.62 -30.89 
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Table 2.6: CHS predictions of default risk 
The table summarises estimated parameters of logit regressions of Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi’s (2008) bankruptcy indicator. The regression predictors are Net income over market 
value of total assets (NIMTA), Total liabilities over market value of total assets (TLMTA), 
Logarithm of gross excess return over value weighted FTSE350 return (EXRET), Logarithm of 
firms’ market value over the total value of FTSE350 (RSIZE), Square root of a sum of squared 
firm stock returns over a period of three months (SIGMA), Cash and short-term investments 
over the market value of total assets (CASHMTA), and Market-to-book value (MTBV). Z-
statistics are calculated based on the model standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable  Coefficient |z -statistic| 
Constant -4.0127 18.22*** 
NIMTA -2.6719 4.12*** 
TLMTA 0.3361 8.53*** 
EXRET -1.8506 7.26*** 
RSIZE -0.2017 2.48** 
SIGMA 1.5289 3.72*** 
CASHMTA -2.0152 4.01*** 
MTBV 0.4170 3.56*** 
Number of defaults 7  
Firm-month observations 79246  
Number of firms in the sample 290  
Likelihood ratio 𝜒2 1063.17***  
Pseudo R-squared 0.2135  
Thirdly, we computed CHS score using model (2.15) and its descriptive statistics are 
summarised in Table 2.7. The CHS score is reported alongside the O-score and Z-score. 
It is important, however, to note that these three default indicators are calculated using 
different methods, and therefore are not to be compared against each other. 
Interpretations of their score values are discussed in turn as follows. 
CHS scores reported in Table 2.7 show that the majority of FTSE350 companies are in 
a healthy financial position. On average, the CHS scores are at approximately 42%. 
Given that companies with a CHS score of between 0.9 and 1 are considered to be at 
risk, the CHS mean of 0.42 is relatively low. The standard deviation of CHS scores is 
also low, being at 0.53. This shows that most of the FTSE350 companies bear low 
default risk and they are not experiencing volatile performance. The CHS score ranges 
from almost zero to 0.98 with a median value of 0.47. Among a total sample of 290 
companies, there are 8 companies whose CHS scores are between 0.9 and 1. They are, 
therefore, classified as highly distressed companies. As mentioned earlier in this 
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section, of those 8 highly distressed firms, 7 companies (87.5%) in fact went bankrupt 
or required rescue by the government within the period within a 12-month lag.  
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for default risk indicators 
This table summarises descriptive statistics of three proxies for default risk component, 
Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, Altman’s (1968) Z-score and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s 
(2008) CHS score. Section 2.5.1 provides a full description of how each default indicator is 
constructed.  
  Mean SD Median Max Min 
CHS score 0.42 0.53 0.47 0.98 0.00 
O-score 0.16 1.81 0.09 1.05 -0.27 
Z-score 3.35 6.10 3.47 4.11 -2.14 
(ii) O-score 
O-score is computed entirely based on accounting data when predicting the financial 
health of a company. As the method is useful for benchmarking between companies, in 
this thesis O-scores are used to rank companies for DEF variable formation. Although 
accounting information is traditionally regarded as a fundamental predictive indicator 
of a company’s financial condition, the study finds that identifying high risk firms based 
on O-score is less accurate in comparison with using CHS. The O-score approach 
predicts 11 companies being in financial distress and likely to default within 2 years, 
but in fact only 7 of them later went bankrupt or were bailed out by the government. 
The accuracy ratio of the O-score method at a 2-year horizon is 63.6%, compared with 
87.5% achieved using the CHS approach (at a 12-month horizon). One of the reasons 
would be that the predictive accuracy tends to decrease with longer horizons. However, 
Campbell et al. (2008), among others, did find that the CHS method achieves a better 
predictive power than the O-score method. 
As can be seen from Table 2.7, on average O-scores across the sample are 0.16, with a 
standard deviation of 1.81. The relatively low standard deviation means that the 
financial conditions of FTSE350 companies are generally on a similar level. This 
confirms the previous observation by the CHS method. The O-scores range from -0.27 
to 1.05, and the median is 0.09. However, firms with a negative O-score should simply 
be interpreted as having a close-to-zero probability of default. Since the majority of the 
companies have an O-score that is lower than 0.5, it can be said that the UK market was 
relatively stable over the testing period between 1990 and 2012. 
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(iii) Z-score 
Another accounting model that is meant to predict default probability is the Z-score 
model first proposed by Altman (1968). As a rule of thumb, companies with Z-scores 
below 1.8 are likely to go bankrupt while those with Z-scores above 3 have a low 
likelihood of bankruptcy. The Z-score approach predicts 12 companies in distress, of 
which only 2 firms actually went into financial distress, while it misses 3 firms. The 
accuracy of the Z-score method is the lowest of the three predictive indicators. In Table 
2.7, the mean of the Z-scores is approximately 3.35, suggesting that most companies in 
the sample have either average or low probability of going into default. The values of 
the Z-scores range between -2.14 and 4,11, around the median of 3.47. These show that 
the majority of companies in the FTSE350 have a Z-score that exceeds 3, implying a 
low probability of default. 
There have been a number of studies suggesting that the Z-score approach was 
originally based on a small testing sample and the measure did not achieve a high 
predictive power (Amendola, Giordano, Parrella and Restaino 2017). However, Z-
scores are still used as a supplementary indicator in identifying potential financial 
distress (see Hilscher and Wilson 2016, and Delis, Hasan and Mylonidis 2017 for 
examples). In this thesis, Z-scores are primarily used for robustness check purposes. It 
is used to form a Default variable (DEF’) by sorting stocks into portfolios based on their 
Z-score, and the DEF’ is defined as the return differentials between the High and the 
Low Z-score portfolios. 
2.5.2.B. Characteristics of the independent variables 
This section will present descriptive statistics of all independent variables employed in 
the thesis. They include the FF three factors, Carhart’s momentum element, default 
factors (based on CHS, O-score and Z-score), and business cycle variables. The 
descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 2.8. They are discussed in turn as follows. 
The section starts by describing the main characteristics of the FF three factors. Firstly, 
the market variable, or market excess return (Rm - Rf), has a mean value of 0.76% per 
month, and a standard deviation at 0.0417. This shows that in the long run, well 
diversified investment would generate positive returns and the returns would tend to be 
higher than the LIBOR 1-month rate. The excess returns on the market range from -
12.64% to 11.30%. The period during which the market experienced particularly poor 
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performance in comparison with the risk-free asset was during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Overall, the market portfolio performs consistently better than the risk-free asset, except 
during recessions. Secondly, the HML variable, which is formed from High and Low 
BM portfolios, is a time-series variable whose values range between -0.0894 and 0.1141 
around a median of -0.0008. The mean of the HML variable is equal to 0.07% and 
standard deviation is at 0.0274. The positive value of the mean suggests that, in general, 
a BM effect exists among common stock returns in the UK.  The last FF factor is SMB 
which is meant to mimic the risk factor associated with the size effect in common stock 
returns. The monthly average value of the SMB variable is 0.47%, ranging from -
13.23% to 10.15%. It can be said that although there is a size effect in the market, the 
magnitude of the effect varies considerably over the 276-month testing period. 
In Table 2.8, it is noted that momentum variable, WML, has a relatively high mean 
(0.89%) but a standard deviation (0.0405), suggesting that the variable deviates greatly 
from its mean. The momentum variable can reach a peak value of 41.15%, but can also 
plunge to -18.06%. The WML variable is meant to mimic the risk factor associated with 
momentum effect in average stock returns. Therefore, including a momentum variable 
would contribute to identifying any risk patterns associated with past performance but 
which has not been captured by other factors. 
Table 2.8 also summarises the descriptive statistics of the default variable, proxied by 
3 different measures of default likelihood: DEF (based on O-score), DEF’ (based on Z-
score), and CHS (based on CHS scores). From the table, it is worth noticing that 
although the three variables are proxies for the same risk element, their characteristics 
differ significantly from each other. These would therefore be particularly beneficial for 
robustness checks as the three variables tend not to be correlated. Therefore, they are 
more likely to be able to capture the risk element missed by the other proxies, if any, in 
a regression analysis. The DEF variable has a mean value of -0.39% with a standard 
deviation of only 0.0126. It ranges from -4.56% to 4.01% over the period between 31st 
January 1990 and 31st December 2012. In terms of the DEF’ variable, the characteristics 
are largely similar. The DEF’ averages -0.15% per month, with a maximum value of 
3.36%, and a minimum value of -7.82%. The standard deviation of the variable is equal 
to 0.0123. One explanation would be that their based indicators, Z-score and O-score, 
are both accounting-based measures. In contrast, the CHS variable, which is constructed 
from accounting and market data, has a mean of 0.18%, ranging from a minimum value 
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of -1.32% to a maximum value of 3.36%. The standard deviation of the variable is at 
0.0237, higher than the previous default variables. This indicates that the risk element 
associated with the market tends to be more volatile and therefore more difficult to 
capture through accounting-only measures. Therefore, including the CHS variable 
would potentially improve the predictive power of the analysis in this thesis. 
The last group of explanatory variables the thesis employed in value and momentum 
anomaly analyses is business cycle variables. They are meant to capture changes in 
investment opportunities and the risk associated with these changes. The first variable 
of this group is default spread, DES, which averages 2.25% per month. The variable 
ranges from a minimum value of -1.45% to a maximum of 7.22%. The variable standard 
deviation is 0.0424, the highest among the 11 independent variables considered in this 
thesis. This indicates that the return differentials between corporate bonds and long-
term Government bonds varied considerably over the last 276 months. Term spread 
(TERM) is heavily dependent on the Government’s decisions on Government bond rates 
(both long- and short-term). Over the sample period, TERM has an average of 1.10%, 
ranging between -0.19% and 6.54%. Dividend yield variable (DIV) averages 5.26%, 
which is relatively high, with a standard deviation of 0.0368. This reflects diverse 
dividend policies among UK firms. On the contrary, the short-term Treasury bill rate 
(T-Bill), is relatively stable over the same period. The variable has a low mean of 0.45%, 
and does not deviate significantly from the mean (a standard deviation of only 0.0026). 
Although T-Bill has not been set at negative rates, the returns of investing in T-Bill, one 
of the safest assets in the market, are significantly lower than on other types of 
investment.
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Table 2.8: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
The table presents descriptive statistics of explanatory variables used in Chapters 3 and 4. The excess 
return on the market portfolio (also known as market premium), (Rm - Rf), is obtained from Prof Kenneth 
R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB variables are constructed similarly to the way 
Fama and French (1993) built these factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size effects in expected 
stock returns using the same breakpoints. The HML is the difference in monthly value-weighted returns 
of stocks in the top 30% BM and the bottom 30% BM ranking groups. The SMB is monthly return 
differentials between Small size stocks and Big size stocks by market capitalisation. The Small and Big 
companies are separated by the median. The WML variable is meant to mimic the momentum factor of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in returns. 11-month past returns are used to classify the Winners from the 
Losers. The WML is monthly return differentials between the top 30% stocks and the bottom 30% stocks 
by past returns. Default factor (DEF) is the difference in monthly value-weighted returns of stocks in the 
top 30% and the bottom 30% O-score ranking groups. For robustness check purposes, another default 
factor called DEF’, is formed using Z-score instead of O-score as a proxy for firms’ default risk. The 
DEF’ is the monthly return differentials between the top 30% and the bottom 30% Z-score stocks.  
In Chapter 4, instead of relying on the traditional O-score and Z-score, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 
(2008) proposed the use of CHS scores as a proxy for the probability of corporate failure. The formula 
for calculating CHS scores can be found in Section 2.5.1B earlier in this chapter. Next, the CHS variable 
is measured as monthly return differentials between the top 30% CHS score stocks and the bottom 30% 
CHS score stocks. DES is default spread, which is defined as the difference between the average yields 
on corporate bonds and long-term Government bonds. TERM is term spread, defined as return 
differentials between monthly average returns on long-term and short-term Government bonds. In the 
case of the UK market, we use the monthly return differential between 15+ year Gilt and 3-month yields. 
DIV is dividend yield, referring to the value-weighted average of dividend yields across the sample. T-
Bill or short-term Treasury bill is the LIBOR 3-month. All variables are computed on a monthly basis. 
Chapter 3 Mean SD Median Max Min 
(Rm – Rf) 0.0076 0.0417 0.0113 0.1130 -0.1264 
HML 0.0007 0.0274 -0.0008 0.1141 -0.0894 
SMB 0.0047 0.0361 0.0049 0.1015 -0.1323 
WML 0.0089 0.0405 0.0041 0.4115 -0.1806 
DEF -0.0039 0.0126 0.0017 0.0401 -0.0456 
DEF’ -0.0015 0.0123 0.0081 0.0336 -0.0782 
Chapter 4 Mean SD Median Max Min 
CHS 0.0018 0.0237 0.0106 0.0614 -0.0132 
DES 0.0225 0.0424 0.0117 0.0722 -0.0145 
TERM 0.0110 0.0220 0.0007 0.0654 -0.0019 
DIV 0.0526 0.0368 0.0623 0.1502 0.0063 
T-Bill 0.0045 0.0026 0.0043 0.0109 0.0004 
  
61 
2.5.3. Graphing independent variables 
This section provides visualisations of independent variables that are used in explaining 
value anomaly (in Chapter 3) and momentum (in Chapter 4). Together with variable 
descriptive statistics discussed earlier in Section 2.5.2, visualising the variables will 
provide a full picture of variables used in the thesis regression analysis. 
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.4.1, this chapter uses line graphs to display 
independent variables instead of using scatter diagrams. The reason is that for 
independent variables, line charts could capture the risk patterns and value changes 
over time which potentially explain the dependent variables. Nevertheless, scatter 
diagrams would be more suitable for visualising dependent variables as they draw 
attention to the magnitude of abnormal returns generated by value and momentum 
strategies. This is only for presentation purposes and should not in any way affect the 
regression analysis in the rest of the thesis. 
As can be seen from Panel A of Figure 2.5, the market, HML and SMB variables show 
characteristics of a stationary time-series. Their values over the period from 1990 to 
2012 vary around the mean, and seem to be more volatile during the 2008 financial 
crisis. Among the three FF factors, the HML variable has the lowest mean (0.0007) and 
deviates less from its mean (standard deviation is only 0.0274). All three FF variables 
were highly negative during the period between 2008 and early 2010. 
The WML factor is relatively volatile and unpredictable. It is noted that the WML was 
largely positive during the pre-1998 period, and turned to negative during the 1998-
2001 period before fluctuating within a clear trend. In the late 1990s, when the 
momentum effect became widely documented, it could be the case that the generated 
abnormal profit was less likely to persist. The WML variable also experienced a 
negative shock during the 2008 financial crisis but returned to positive in 2011. 
In regard to default variables, Chapter 3 includes two default factors, DEF and DEF’, 
which are based on ranking firms’ O-score and Z-score. Beside these proxies, Chapter 
4 uses an additional default variable called CHS which is based on CHS score - a more 
recent and well-developed indicator of corporate failure. Figure 2.5 shows that firms 
with a high risk of default tend to perform poorly in the long run. They mostly generated 
negative premiums, and became profitable just before the 2008 financial crisis before 
returning to negative values. 
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Unlike the default variable, the default spreads variable (DES) is meant to capture firm 
distress risk associated with corporate bonds. Thus, this would potentially capture 
different risk elements. Default factor is associated with companies’ accounting 
performance while default spreads are linked to performance of their corporate bonds. 
DES is defined as the yield differentials between corporate bonds and long-term 
Government bonds. In the UK, the Gilt 15+ year bonds are selected to be the proxy for 
long-term Government bonds. The DES factor is, therefore, heavily dependent on the 
Government’s decisions on the Gilt 15+ year bond yields, such as 15-year, 20-year and 
30-year bonds. The UK bond yield rates over 15+ year maturities were set at high rates 
during the period prior to 1994. They were between 98.2% and 124.7% per annum (or 
5.7% to 7.0% per month). Since January 1994, the Gilt 15+ year bond yields were kept 
at a much lower level of between 2.1% and 8.8% per annum (or 0.2% and 0.7 per 
month). These explain the sharp increase in DES values in 1994. However, the large 
default spreads started to decline in 1998-1999 when corporate bond yields decreased 
while the Gilt bond yields remained low. The 2008 financial crisis saw companies 
lowering their bond yields as they were facing financial difficulties. The post-crisis 
period witnessed a strong recovery of corporate bonds against the Gilt 15+ year bonds. 
Another business cycle variable is term spread, TERM, which refers to the return 
differentials between long-term and short-term Government bonds (i.e. between 15+ 
year Gilt and 3-month yields). As mentioned earlier, the Gilt 15+ year bond yields were 
set at a high rate before being cut by almost 85% to 0.53% per month in the beginning 
of 1994. Over that same period of time, the 3-month rates were relatively stable at 
around 0.44% per month. That explains the sudden drop in value of TERM in 1994. 
Dividend yield, DIV, is defined as the value-weighted average of dividend yields that 
all companies in the sample paid over the sample period. As can be seen from Panel B 
of Figure 2.5, DIV decreased significantly over the sample period (1990-2012). This is 
because since 1990, there were an increasing number of UK companies paying no 
dividend. Especially during the dotcom boom of 2000-2001, the proportion of FTSE350 
firms who did not pay any dividend was at a record high9.  
The last of 4 business cycle variables is the short-term Treasury bill, T-Bill, which refers 
to LIBOR 3-month rates. The diagram in Figure 2.5 shows that T-Bill was declining 
                                                 
9 “Many FTSE 350 companies paying no dividend”, The Financial Times, 7th October, 2012. 
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during the sample period, but the most noticeable cutbacks were in August 1992 which 
saw T-Bill fall by 0.1%, November 2008 when the LIBOR 3-month dropped from 
0.46% to 0.26% per month, and when it was cut further to 0.08% in March 2009. Since 
then, the T-Bill rates have been kept at a low level of between 0.04% and 0.07% per 
month.
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Figure 2.5: Graphing independent variables 
The figures below display visualisations of the independent variables used in Chapters 3 and 4. Line graphs are used to visualise independent variables because 
they could potentially show the risk patterns and changes in magnitude of independent variables. Independent variables are time series variables and constructed 
on a monthly basis. See notes in Table 2.8 for variable formation. The data covers a period between July 1990 and December 2012 (276 data points). The Y axis 
shows the values of the variable in question while the X axis represents time.  
Panel A: Chapter 3 independent variables 
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Figure 2.5 - Continued 
Panel B: Chapter 4 independent variables 
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2.5.4. Correlation matrix 
This section summarises the correlation between explanatory variables used in each 
chapter. The correlation between each variable pair is computed using the longest 
coinciding sample available for the pair. 
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent 
variables used in Chapter 3. In the panel, there is no evidence that explanatory variables 
are correlated. The majority of correlation coefficients are low and less than 0.50 in 
absolute terms. The only exception is the relationship between two default variables, 
DEF and DEF’. Their correlation coefficient is 0.86, suggesting that if one variable 
increases, it is likely that the other variable will also increase. As both variables aim to 
capture the same type of risk, it is unsurprising that they are highly correlated. If DEF 
and DEF’ indeed have the ability to identify firms with a high probability of default, 
they should report the same or largely similar conclusions as to which firms are likely 
to go bankrupt in the near future. In the thesis, DEF’ is an alternative proxy for DEF, 
and only used in robustness checks of the results from analysis on the DEF variable. 
Thus, although they are highly correlated, this should not affect the accuracy of the 
analysis. 
As can be seen from Panel A, the market variable has a positive correlation with BM 
and size effects, but is negatively correlated with momentum and default factors. The 
Pearson correlation coefficients between (Rm-Rf) and HML, and SMB are relatively low 
at 0.04 and 0.01, respectively. These show that BM and size effects have a positive 
correlation with movement of the market but the correlations are immaterial. The 
correlation coefficient between the market variable and WML is -0.16, suggesting that 
the momentum effect tends to be weaker during market upturns, and stronger during 
market downturns. Similarly, the correlation between default variables and the excess 
market returns are about -0.30. The weak and negative correlations indicate that the 
return differentials between High and Low default stocks tend to be larger during market 
downturns and smaller in market upturns. 
Default variables DEF and DEF’ are positively correlated with HML and SMB but 
negatively correlated with the WML variable. The correlation coefficient with the HML 
variable is slightly higher (at 0.25) than with the SMB variable (at 0.04). As explanatory 
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variables used in each regression of Chapter 3 are not correlated with each other, there 
is no evidence of estimation biases in the analysis. 
In terms of momentum anomaly, the results reported in Panel B of Table 2.9 show that 
the explanatory variables used in Chapter 4 analysis are not correlated. The correlation 
coefficients between the market factor and other variables are between 0.04 and 0.38 in 
absolute terms. The correlation is higher between business cycle variables and the 
market. This is because business cycle variables describe changes in investment choices 
in different market conditions. Therefore, there should be some market influence on 
changes in the business cycle variables. As the correlation coefficients are relatively 
low, there is no evidence of estimation errors caused by including business cycles in 
regressions on momentum premium.  
Another default variable used in this thesis is CHS, which appears to be more correlated 
to DES than to other variables. Since they both aim to capture the risk of a company 
falling into a distress situation, it is possible that they are correlated. However, the 
correlation coefficient is only 0.36, lower than the threshold of 0.5, so it is unlikely that 
this would cause an estimation issue. In addition, CHS is a proxy for the risk of 
bankruptcy while DES is meant to capture the distress risk associated with corporate 
bonds. As not all companies issue bonds, it is unlikely that the two variables overlap 
and therefore they can be included in the same model. 
It is worth noticing that WML variables are negatively correlated with the FF three 
factors and default variable but positively correlated with business cycle variables. 
Although the correlations are relatively weak, the sign of the correlation coefficients 
indicate that WML is likely to mirror the movement of the market. When the business 
cycle variables increase (typically during market upturns), WML tends to increase. 
To summarise, explanatory variables used in the regressions in Chapters 3 and 4 are not 
strongly correlated, and therefore it is unlikely that there would be multicollinearity 
issues. However, a formal test will be carried out to test the problem where it is 
necessary. 
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Table 2.9: Correlation matrix between explanatory variables 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients of explanatory variables in Chapter 3 (Panel 
A), as well as those in Chapter 4 (Panel B). See notes in Table 2.8 for variable definitions and 
formation. A student’s t-test of a null hypothesis of zero correlation is also conducted. The 
results are reported if it rejects the null. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Chapter 3 variables 
 (Rm - Rf) HML SMB WML DEF DEF’ 
(Rm - Rf) 1.00      
HML 0.04 1.00     
SMB 0.01 -0.06 1.00    
WML -0.16 -0.31 -0.09 1.00   
DEF -0.30 0.25 0.04 -0.11 1.00  
DEF’ -0.27 0.18 0.13 -0.16 0.86*** 1.00 
Panel B: Chapter 4 variables 
 (Rm - Rf) HML SMB WML CHS DES TERM DIV T-Bill 
(Rm - Rf) 1.00         
HML 0.04 1.00        
SMB 0.01 -0.06 1.00       
WML -0.16 -0.31 -0.09 1.00      
CHS -0.22 0.19 0.12 -0.26 1.00     
DES 0.31 0.07 0.28 0.15 0.36 1.00    
TERM 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.35 1.00   
DIV 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.13 0.10 0.25 1.00  
T-Bill -0.38 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.14 -0.33 0.04 1.00 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 highlights the key methodology and data sample that this thesis’s empirical 
analysis is based on. The chapter sets out a methodological framework including 
different approaches to the econometrics estimations of value premium (in Chapter 3) 
and momentum premium (in Chapter 4). It introduces and explains motivations behind 
the selection of each variable. The chapter also describes the sample statistics, such as 
descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and historical trends. 
As described in section 2.2, the full sample consists of 290 companies in the FTSE350, 
covering a period between 31st January 1990 and 31st December 2012 (276 months). 
This forms a dataset of 79,246 firm-month observations. Firms are required to have at 
least 12 months of data in order to be included in the sample. In line with previous 
studies, Chapter 3, which concerns value anomaly, excludes stocks of financial firms to 
avoid misleading inferences about their financial health. As a result, the sample size is 
reduced to 269 firms in Chapter 3. Data is collected from various official sources, such 
as DataStream Thomson Reuters, Kenneth R. French’s database, Bloomberg, the UK 
Debt Management Office database, and company financial statements. 
In terms of methodology, the thesis employs two approaches to assessing the 
associations between distress risk and performance of two investment strategies – value 
and momentum investment. The two methods are regression analysis and a portfolios-
based approach.  
The regression approach aims to explain value premium (in Chapter 3) and momentum 
premium (in Chapter 4), using a range of explanatory variables which are meant to 
capture different risk elements in average stock returns. In the thesis, explanatory 
variables are constructed on the basis of the following criteria: competence as a proxy 
for the intended risk factor, consideration of country-specific characteristics, 
consistency, and the avoidance of potential biases. Although further diagnostic tests 
might be required to validate those qualities, the set of initial selection criteria would 
enable regression models to effectively test the hypotheses set out in subsequent 
chapters.  
There are three CAPM-based models tested in this thesis. They are the FF three-factor 
model, the Carhart four-factor model and an augmented version of these two models 
which include a default risk variable. In Chapter 3, the dependent variables are the 
  
70 
excess returns on 6 portfolios consisting of stocks with different sizes and BM 
characteristics. This is to explain the return differentials between value and growth 
portfolios, or value premium. The chapter also addresses potential distress risk 
associated with idiosyncratic volatility by undertaking a regression analysis on 9 
portfolios, which are the intersections between 3 volatility portfolios and 3 BM 
portfolios. Additionally, 9 default/ BM portfolios are tested in order to assess the risk 
pattern associated with bankruptcy in average stock returns. The explanatory variables 
consist of the three FF factors, Carhart’s momentum factor, and a default factor. The 
default variable is constructed using a number of indicators of a firm’s probability of 
bankruptcy, including Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and Altman’s (1968) Z-score. The 
dependent variables in Chapter 4 are the excess returns on the Winners portfolio, and 
the excess returns on the Losers in relation to the risk-free asset. Beside the set of 
explanatory variables used in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 extends the list with 4 business cycle 
variables that have been recognised in the momentum literature for their ability to 
explain momentum to a certain degree. They are default spread, term spread, dividend 
yield and short-term Treasury Bill. The business cycle variables are meant to capture 
changes in investment choices in different market conditions.  
In Chapter 4, the third default variable, the CHS variable, is introduced. It is based on 
CHS scores - a recently developed proxy for corporate failure proposed by Campbell et 
al. (2008). Although adding alternative proxies for a variable should not fundamentally 
change the estimation results, it may provide evidence as to whether the variable in 
question can capture the relevant risk element. The CHS approach incorporates both 
accounting and market information. It involves running dynamic logit models and 
calculating conditional probability of default. Theoretical explanation of the procedure 
can be found in section 2.5.1.B. Since computing CHS scores is a complex and time-
consuming process, Appendix 5 of this chapter suggests a set of code written in VBA 
programming language to calculate CHS scores. They are the practical steps followed 
by this thesis, but it is also possible to use other programming languages to generate 
CHS values following the procedure described in this chapter. 
The second method is a portfolio-based approach, according to which the sample is split 
into a number of portfolios based on the similarity of their characteristics. These 
portfolios then form dependent variables in the regression analysis. The portfolio 
grouping method captures a risk element by assessing the performance of two (or more) 
  
71 
portfolios which react differently to this particular risk factor. The approach is also 
useful in comparing performance of stock with different characteristics, such as high 
versus low idiosyncratic volatility stocks.  
It is worth noting that the portfolio grouping method is used more for value anomaly 
analysis than it is for momentum analysis. Following the portfolio-based approach, 
Chapter 3 builds 6 portfolios which are intersections between 3 size and 3 BM 
portfolios; and 9 volatility and BM portfolios. This provides valuable insight into the 
differences in performance between Value companies (i.e. having a high BM ratio) and 
Growth companies (i.e. Low BM) from various dimensions, such as firm size and 
idiosyncratic volatility. However, it is unprecedented in the momentum literature to use 
the portfolio-based system. 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of Chapter 2 are devoted to describing the set of dependent and 
independent variables used in the thesis. They contain detailed descriptions of the 
construction of each variable, descriptive statistics and visualisation of all variables, and 
an analysis on the variable correlation coefficients. The initial analysis finds that:  
(i) Amongst dependent variables, the excess returns on 6 size/BM portfolios 
differ mainly because of the difference in firm size. On average, the excess 
returns are positive for Small stocks but tend to be negative for Big stocks. 
The returns are slightly higher if companies are also value firms. When 
sorting stocks into 9 volatility/BM portfolios, it is noticed that highly volatile 
stocks have the highest excess returns but are highly unpredictable. They 
tend to be more sensitive to changes in the market, and perform particularly 
poorly during market downturns. In contrast, low volatility portfolios are 
less volatile, are less likely to be impacted by market shocks but do not 
generate positive excess returns in the long run. When looking at the risk 
pattern associated with default probability in excess returns on 9 default/BM 
portfolios, the descriptive statistics reveal that low DEF stocks perform 
better than high DEF ones in many aspects. They generate positive excess 
returns and are less volatile compared with the high DEF stocks. In the low 
DEF group, the value stocks portfolio produces higher returns but is more 
sensitive to changes in the market than their growth counterpart. 
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(ii) In regard to independent variables, some are highly sensitive to the market, 
for example SMB, WML and default factors which had particularly low 
excess returns during the recent 2008 financial crisis. However, other 
variables such as DES, TERM and T-Bill are more influenced by the 
Government’s policy. Of the three proxies for default risk, the CHS variable, 
which is built from CHS score, exhibits higher predictive ability than DEF 
and DEF’, which are formed based on O-score and Z-score, respectively. In 
terms of magnitude, all three variables have a negative mean and their values 
are particularly low during market downturns in relation to the risk-free rate 
of return. 
(iii) Explanatory variables used in the thesis regression analysis are not 
correlated with each other. The only exception is the high correlation 
coefficient between two default variables, DEF and DEF’. This result is 
expected because both variables aim to capture the same type of risk. They 
are meant to proxy for firm probability of bankruptcy, so if DEF and DEF’ 
indeed can predict firms that are at risk of default, they should report the 
same or largely similar conclusions. Since the two default variables do not 
present in the same regression, their correlation does not impact the 
estimations. 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodological framework for the rest of this thesis, however, 
further explanations may be needed in each chapter to further explain how it is applied 
in testing specific hypotheses. 
Chapter 3: Stock Volatility, Default risk and the Book-to-Market 
Equity Premium 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Value stocks refer to stocks of firms with high ratios of book-to-market equity (BM); in 
other words, these stocks are trading on the exchange at a low price compared to their 
book values. Portfolios can also be classified using other accounting variables, such as 
earnings to price (E/P), cash flow to price (C/P), leverage and dividend yield, see 
examples in studies by Davis (1994) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985).  
Stocks, of which the above fundamental values are small, are characteristically known 
as growth stocks (Fama and French 1998). Bird and Whitaker (2003) and Bathala, Ma 
and Rao (2005) imply that normally growth stocks are expected to continue their 
outstanding performance and are unlikely to fall into distress over subsequent periods.  
A large number of researchers have investigated the differences in returns between the 
two groups of stocks; they tend to support that firms with relatively high BM ratios have 
higher average stock returns than firms with low book-to-market value. These return 
differentials are called the book-to-market equity premium or value premium. For 
examples, Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), and Davis, Fama and French (2000) 
find the book-to-market premium is robust in the US market, while Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991) give evidence of the premium in Japan, and Fama and French (1998, 
2012) confirm this in international markets. These positive return premiums have 
inspired both academia and practitioners to search for explanations. 
The most dominant trend of argument is the risk-based reasoning. Supporters for 
neoclassical finance theory believe that the value premium is a compensation for 
bearing higher risk. Consistent with this view, Fama and French (1993) propose a three-
factor model, henceforth the Fama-French three-factor model, consisting of the market 
risk, firms’ size (stock price times number of shares outstanding) and BM factors as 
proxies for undiversifiable risks. Other studies argue that the value premium is not 
explained by the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) and it therefore is known as an anomaly in stock markets. The existence 
and the reasons behind such an anomaly have been under debate for decades.  
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Black (1993) and MacKinlay (1995) suggest sample-specific explanation for value 
premiums, while DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) propose overreaction and agency costs explanations. Fama and French (1992, 
1995), Shumway (1996) and Chen and Zhang (1998) among others support risk-based 
reasons. Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that it is firms’ characteristics rather than risk 
that explain the value premium. A valid question remaining is thus whether value 
premium is explained by risk-based models, such as the CAPM and the Fama-French 
three-factor model, or it is simply caused by sample biases, market overreaction, firms’ 
characteristics or agency costs. 
Therefore, this chapter will first revisit the question whether BM and default risks - 
being two of the dominant measures of distress situations - together with size effect 
have the capability to explain BM premium. It also tests this hypothesis in an extended 
model using a momentum component. Moreover, the chapter aims to test the hypothesis 
that firms with high stock volatility are riskier and that these risk loadings could explain 
the return differentials between value and growth securities.  
Moreover, as little as the relationship between volatility and value premium is 
mentioned in existing literature, neither have the links between volatility and default 
risk been thoroughly established to explain value premium. Many researchers, including 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004), limit the scope of their studies at examining volatility at 
portfolio level for the purpose of finding which of the two BM stock groups is the 
riskier. However, the standard deviation of a population does not reflect the volatility 
level of individual BM stocks. A detailed motivation for explaining value premium 
through looking at volatility is discussed in section 3.2.3.  
The chapter selects the FTSE350 to test its hypotheses for the following reasons. First, 
the UK is one of the most important and largest stock markets in Europe and the world, 
in the sense that it has a very high trading volume and liquidity – these two aspects are 
key drivers when volatility is concerned in the test. The market capitalisation is about 
Great British Pound (GBP) 1,733,343 million, ranked second in Europe and fifth in the 
world10. Secondly, the UK market has a wide range of advanced and complete financial 
instruments. Investors are well-informed and the majority of market participants are 
typically institutional; in addition, its private investors have a high exposure to financial 
                                                 
10 World Federation of Exchanges, in December 2010 
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training and skills. As a result, these participants have the ability to look into the details 
in financial statements, from which they can extract information on the distress and 
volatility risk of firms. The UK’s financial statements also tend to be more transparent,  
and are published at regular and pre-set intervals. Thirdly, only the FTSE350 is focused 
on, as, where volatility is concerned, it is the case that the small stocks at the bottom of 
the FTSE All-Share are not traded regularly and suffer zero or near-zero volatility over 
prolonged periods. These would hence bias the chapter’s ability to test volatility’s role 
in explaining the return differentials. Therefore, including only the FTSE350 would rule 
out this possibility and provide a more informative result regarding volatility’s impact.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the existing literature 
and research gaps that this chapter aims to bridge; the sample and the methodology are 
described in section 3.3. Section 3.4 examines the existence of value premium in 
relation to distress risk, and discusses four common explanations (i.e. the market risk, 
BM, size and momentum factors). Next, section 3.5 looks into whether historic 
volatility of stock returns can explain BM premium and, if so, does it reflect distress. 
The final section concludes the study and provides possible implications of the results. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will serve the following purposes. First, it discusses the vast literature on 
the BM premium, default risk and volatility. It then explores where the gaps lie within 
existing methodological and empirical aspects, which would potentially be of interest 
to study. Finally, the section explains the motivation and proposes the tests for three 
main hypotheses that will be thoroughly addressed later in the rest of the chapter.  
3.2.1 The book-to-market value premium  
One of the earliest studies on value premium was done by Graham and Dodd (1934). It 
indicates that the performance of high-growth firms is unlikely to be sustainable over 
time. This is found to be true also for firms that have done poorly in the recent past 
(Bird and Whitaker 2003, and Abhyankar, Ho and Zhao 2008). These studies further 
explain that in the long run, investors’ views on the value of stocks would shift, and 
share prices would change accordingly. As a result, investors will aim to make a profit 
from a long position in value stocks and a short position in growth stocks to gain a value 
premium, also known as the BM premium. 
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Since then, many valuation indicators and markets have been examined in order to 
understand the existence of the BM premium. For example, Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991) base their studies on Cash-Flow/Price ratio. However, later research 
shows that firms’ cash flows are rather sensitive to an individual firm’s policies, for 
instance depreciation policy. Hence, more recent studies, such as Teo and Woo (2004) 
and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) among others, focus on analysing Earnings/Price and 
Book-to-Market ratios. They also suggest combining several indicators for the purpose 
of better identifying undervalued stocks. 
In developed markets, both Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) and Davis, Fama and 
French (2000) find the book-to-market premium is consistently large and positive in the 
US market, while Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) give evidence of the premium 
in Japan being at the rate of 0.40% per month. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) 
confirm the findings in six major security markets, including France, Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States during 11 years from 
1981 to 1992.  
Although testing in developed countries seems to be the main objective of researchers, 
value-premium researches in developing countries are also examined. For instance, a 
comprehensive study by Fama and French (1998) on 13 major markets finds a value 
premium of 7.68% per year on average. They further examine 16 emerging markets and 
show that value abnormal returns are more volatile in these markets but still remain high 
(16.91% annually). Another large study by Bird and Whitaker (2003) implements data 
of seven major European markets and finds that value strategies perform particularly 
well during the period of price correction following the booming periods. Once again, 
Fama and French (2012) update the findings in their previous study in 23 countries 
across four regions (North America, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific) and confirm that, 
except for Japan, there is a value premium that decreases with firm size. They also rule 
out the possibility that these results are driven by the integration between the four 
regions. Although their finding for the Japanese market is inconsistent with those in 
Chan et al. (1994), it is due to their sample excluding non-financial firms while the prior 
work covered all sectors. Generally, most studies tend to document the success of value 
strategies in their respective markets. 
However, the reliability of value-based strategies is far from certain. Contrary to the 
above studies, the study by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) indicates that although stocks 
  
77 
with low returns in the last 12 months tend to continue such poor performance in the 
short-term, in the long-term the opposite trend is followed. Other researchers, such as 
Asness, Krail and Liew (2000) and Yen, Sun and Yan (2004), support this view that 
although high BM firms generate higher returns than low BM firms over some periods, 
such value premium disappears in others. They attribute these results to country-specific 
reasons, such as short-selling restrictions, and testing methods. Thus, it is worthwhile 
to search for the reasons behind the existence (or the absence) of BM premium.  
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) support the explanatory power of the CAPM and 
document that value stocks fundamentally outperform growth stocks. The explanation 
is that the excess returns on value strategies are a reward for bearing such an extra risk. 
Consistent with this view, Chen and Zhang (1998) give evidence that high BM stocks 
are associated with poor recent performance, high financial leverage and uncertain 
future earnings. Also, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) provide evidence that value firms 
are riskier than growth firms, especially during recessions. It is because their returns are 
highly correlated with consumption growth in “bad” times when this correlation is least 
desirable. Consistent with this view, Petkova and Zhang (2005) show that conditional 
beta of value stocks11 is positively correlated with the market premium and they are, 
therefore, riskier in market downturn periods. However, they argue that besides the 
market risk factor, other fundamental variables of firms, such as BM and size, do 
explain value premium in a multifactor model. Section 3.3 of the chapter will go in-
depth into the validity of this argument.  
There are a number of well-discussed explanations for this anomaly that are summarised 
as follows. 
In the literature, there have been many models built upon a fundamental presumption 
that a higher return on assets is the compensation for taking extra risk. The value 
premium is, therefore, a form of risk-compensation and not an abnormality or market 
inefficiency. Hence, most naturally, models incorporating risks are considered – for 
example, the CAPM, Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM), the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross 1976), and Breeden’s (1979) 
Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) are all risk-based theories 
supporting risk explanations. Based upon the efficient market hypothesis in which the 
                                                 
11 In the paper, the conditional beta is defined as a ratio of the covariance between return on stock i and 
return on the market portfolio, divided by variance of the market portfolio. 
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market is efficient and should reflect a fair price for the securities, there are higher risks 
in taking these opportunities presented by the known value investing strategy. Fama and 
French (1993) support risk reasons for the BM and size effects; but despite the success 
of this model across international markets, they admit that there has not been any 
theoretical background behind the choice of those two factors. Nonetheless, Ferguson 
and Shockley (2003) find a theoretical rationale for Fama and French’s factors. They 
suggest that explanatory variables that are equity-only constructed and related to 
leverage and financial distress such as High-minus-Low (HML) and Small-minus-Big 
(SMB) should capture in part the risk missed by the CAPM beta. 
On the contrary, Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that it is firms’ characteristics, not 
risk, that explain value premium. They believe that the BM effect captured by the HML 
factor is indeed only part of firms’ characteristics. In other words, the value and growth 
characteristics of firms are mostly responsible for the value premium. It is, additionally, 
because firms sharing the same characteristics tend to fall into distress at the same time. 
Also, these low and high BM characteristics are associated with stock returns. Hence, 
the difference in returns between portfolios formed based on B/M ratio has been 
mistakenly attributed to risk while it is in fact due to distress and growth prospect 
characteristics. 
However, Davis, Fama and French (2000) point out that Daniel and Titman’s results 
seem to be biased as they used a rather short sample period. Extending Daniel and 
Titman’s 20.5-year sample, Davis et al (2000) find that the test on 68 years from 1929 
to 1997 yields statistically insignificant intercepts, while excluding that 20.5-year 
period, the estimation results in a significant intercept value. This implies that the Fama 
and French three-factor model might not seem to perform as well in a short period as it 
does in a longer period. Therefore, Daniel and Titman’s preference toward firm 
characteristics might be a result of a short sample testing rather than a failure of the risk-
based explanation. 
In related arguments, Black (1993) and MacKinlay (1995) also suggest a sample 
specific explanation. Their main argument implies that the abnormal return on value 
over growth stocks that has been observed in the US market is unlikely to occur in other 
markets. Nevertheless, a vast amount of subsequent studies find evidence of value 
premium in out-of-sample testing across the globe. Some of the largest scale researches 
are Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) and Fama and French (1998, 2012) to name but 
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a few. They find evidence that value premium exists not only in the US but also in more 
than 30 other countries. 
On the other hand, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) claim that data-selection bias is 
the explanation for value premium. This study gives evidence that the value premium 
is merely due to sources error. In particular, Compustat, which was used by many 
notable researches at the time, is a common data provider which back-fills its data prior 
to 1978, its founding year. Firms added into the Compustat database before 1978 were 
back-filled all the way from 1946, but firms added in 1978 were backfilled only from 
1973. Hence, firms that were delisted or did not meet Compustat’s criteria were not 
included in its database, while firms overcoming distressed conditions were accepted. 
The practice was documented to be in favour of high performing value stocks and, 
consequently, the success of the value premium strategies. On the contrary, Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) and Barber and Lyon (1997) noted the problem 
caused by Compustat is unlikely to generate biases, especially over a long period of 
time. They tested other samples, free from such a problem, and found that selection bias 
was not the reason behind the presence of the value premium anomaly. 
Lastly, DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
propose overreaction and agency costs explanations. They document the psychological 
sentiment in which investors tend to undervalue low market value stocks. Similarly, 
investors overvalue stocks with high market value in relation to their book value. 
Typical examples of this preference still continue today when the highly-demanded 
stocks of technology firms, such as Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, have low BM 
values, i.e. growth stocks with high market values. 
3.2.2 Probability of bankruptcy explanations 
Although this work is not the first to study the relationship between default probability 
and equity returns, it differs from previous studies in exploring the possibility that 
default probability can explain the movement of stock returns and value premium. In 
order to test that possibility, default probability is used as a proxy for firms’ default risk 
and tested alongside other risk factors in a risk-based regression. Moreover, the chapter 
uses only portfolio-based factors to capture risk patterns in capital asset pricing. This 
approach is strongly supported by recent research such as Ferguson and Shockley 
(2003), Simlai (2014) and Gubellini (2014). They explain further that if the asset pricing 
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model uses portfolio-based proxies only, it can explain the market anomalies well while 
other approaches of estimating equity risk will lead to estimation errors. 
Two of the most popular measures for the likelihood of bankruptcy in the literature are 
O-score suggested by Ohlson (1980) and Z-score proposed by Altman (1968). Using 
both of these measures, Dichev (1998) finds no evidence to support that firms with 
either high BM or high probability of bankruptcy provide high return opportunities as 
compensation for distress risk. The study documents that investing in firms with higher 
default probability even results in lower average returns. In addition, the results imply 
that default risk is a separate distress component and unlikely to relate to the distress 
pattern captured by size and BM factors. 
Also analysing O-score and Z-score of US firms, Griffin and Lemmon (2002), however, 
find that among value stocks, firms with a higher probability of bankruptcy yield higher 
returns on average while the opposite is true for growth firms. More importantly, the 
value premium is much larger in the group with highest default risk in comparison with 
the other groups (14.44% per annum compared to, for example, 3.87% in the group with 
lowest probability of default). The large difference between Dichev’s (1998) and Griffin 
and Lemmon’s (2002) findings is perhaps due to the sample size as the latter analyses 
a 32-year period while the former looks at a much shorter sample of 15 years. In 
addition, Griffin and Lemmon point out that the findings in the previous study are 
mainly driven by the extremely poor performance of high O-score and low BM firms. 
Nevertheless, Garlappi and Yan (2011) predict that the relationship between value 
premium and probability of bankruptcy might be a hump shape. While constructing a 
model testing the role of shareholders’ ability to help distressed firms to recover, they 
notice that value premium increases as probability of bankruptcy increases until the 
default probability reaches a certain point. Their observation is however drawn on US-
based firms only. Moreover, the proxy for default risk, the Expected Default Frequency 
(EDF) index provided by Moody, is a forward-looking measure. Hence, the actual 
relationship between equity returns and firm default likelihood is still under debate. 
More importantly, one question that many researches seem to be concerned about is 
what the main reasons behind the return differential between high and low O-score firms 
are. Some conclude that the risk-based models are unable to capture the anomaly and 
suggest that overreaction theory can. For example, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) argue 
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that high O-score firms tend be small firms which attract less attention from analysts 
and they are therefore more likely to be mispriced. Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008) argue 
that firms where shareholders can gain a greater benefit from renegotiation while the 
firm is in distress (i.e. high probability of bankruptcy) should generate lower returns. 
However, the opposite is true when this shareholder advantage is limited. 
Both O-score and Z-score are based on firms’ accounting and economic variables while 
some studies use indirect approaches to compute default probabilities. Examples are 
Shumway (1996) who chooses delisting due to distress reasons, Vassalou and Xing 
(2004) who employ Merton’s option pricing model (Merton 1974) and Garlappi et al. 
(2008) who use the EDF measure of Moody’s KMV by Merton (1974).  Although 
academics and practitioners are far from agreeing which method is superior, O-score 
and Z-score are more popular to academics due to their simplicity and consistency while 
Merton’s approaches are more favourable among traders. 
Non-accounting information also joins with accounting data in some studies but the 
reliability of their approaches appears to be questionable. Whittred and Zimmer (1984, 
p.295) consider if delays in financial reporting can add predictive ability to accounting 
data in identifying distress firms and conclude that the results “depend on strong 
assumptions”. Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) use corporate credit spreads as a proxy for 
probability of default and argue that their proxy outperforms other measurements, such 
as bond ratings, accounting related variables and estimated variables, in terms of 
capturing systematic risk. However, it could be worthwhile noticing that bankruptcies 
are not caused only by market judgment on firms’ bonds but mainly by their ability to 
meet debt obligations. More importantly, the paper did not consider cases when firms 
do not issue bonds or have less frequently traded bonds. These studies considered 
accounting data but they have their limitations.  
Hence, one contribution of this chapter lies within the comprehensive methodologies 
implementing probability of default into the conventional distress risk. The foundation 
of this method comes from a study by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) who reported that 
probability of bankruptcy sometimes contains information about distress risk. In this 
chapter, both forming factors and the portfolio grouping approaches will be included. 
Additionally, in order to check the robustness of results, we use Ohlson’s (1980) O-
score as well as Z-score ranking to construct those factors and portfolios. The factors 
are formed using different measurements for default risk. As both current business 
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performance and past income of firms are linked to the likelihood of bankruptcy, the 
measures are, therefore, expected to be able to capture the majority of firms’ default 
risk. This forms the chapter’s first hypothesis which examines the explanatory ability 
of default risk in asset pricing. 
Although the chapter aims to analyse default risk in relation to value premium in a more 
constructive way, it has a more ambitious goal which is to uncover another possible 
type of risk, volatility risk, as well as to bridge the gap in its literature. The next section 
will present the discussion on volatility, and the areas in volatility literature that need to 
be explored in a deeper level. 
3.2.3 The role of volatility in explaining value anomaly 
This section looks into the motivation for using volatility by reviewing the existing 
discussions in the literature on volatility and the research gaps that need to be explored 
further. 
A. Discussion on volatility and value premium 
It has long been observed that prices of financial assets fluctuate stochastically 
(Tauchen 2011), and this is often linked with the level of risk involved. According to 
Fama and French (1992), higher returns must imply some source of risk. Supporting 
this view, Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) continue to document that the value 
premium compensates for risks that haven’t been explained by the CAPM. An early 
research refers risk in the stock market as capital loss possibility and volatility of stock 
returns (McDonald 1975). The risk of capital loss has been widely proxied by 
probability of bankruptcy, while volatility gains only a little attention.  
Among the first studies mentioning the need of discussing volatility risk, Lorie (1968) 
explains that variability in rates of return on assets implies the lack of predictability 
which creates greater risk associated with these assets. He observes that in a particular 
group of pension fund assets, there is a strong correlation between historic variability 
and the future rate of return. Although volatility is not the only type of risk involved to 
financial assets, Lorie points out that it captures enough of the risk and should be a good 
place to start in analysing the risk and return relation. 
Regarding value anomaly, a study done by Arisoy (2010) exxamines the difference in 
volatility factors between value and growth stocks in France. On an international scale, 
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Fama and French (1998) briefly examine standard deviations of stock returns (as a 
proxy for volatility) and establish a link between volatility and BM premium. 
Nevertheless, their work only focuses on testing the relationship between volatility and 
value anomaly at a portfolio level. This chapter expands the test to the firm level and 
expects to produce more informative results12. 
Taking a closer look at the relation, a vast body of literature has found that there is a 
significant negative correlation between stock market return and stock volatility. 
Perhaps the first empirical research noticing that link was Black (1976). The underlying 
reason behind that negative correlation was later investigated further by Christie (1982) 
who attributed it to changing financial leverage caused by equity price changes. This is 
thus called the leverage effect. Since these early articles, different econometric 
techniques and volatility measurements have been adopted to check the validity of those 
findings. For example, Nelson (1991) built the Exponential General AutoRegressive 
Conditional Heteroskedastic model (E-GARCH) model to test the effect. Glosten, 
Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) use the variance of excess return as a stock volatility 
measurement. More recently, Kim, Morley and Nelson (2004) employ Markov-
switching with market volatility to capture the effect: they first develop a partial 
equilibrium model to estimate volatility feedback and by using the Markov-switching 
specification, they then construct a model explaining stock returns with the volatility 
feedback variable estimated in the first stage. 
However, some opponents argue that the relation does not persist. For instance, Brandt 
and Kang (2004) document that although there is a negative relation between 
conditional expected return and stock volatility, the unconditional mean appears to be 
positively correlated to the volatility. More damningly, Fink, Fink and He (2012) find 
no evidence of any significant correlation between expected stock returns and the 
idiosyncratic volatility. They argue that the correlation found in the previous studies is 
a result of using information that was not available for investors at the time of trading 
(i.e. forward-looking information) and that individual volatility should not be used to 
forecast future returns. 
Schwert (1990) finds that during the October 1989 stock market crash, high market 
volatility was associated with low stock returns. However, apart from this brief period, 
                                                 
12 Avramov and Chordia (2006) document that using a firm-level approach, their test avoids data biases 
and loss of information displayed in a portfolio-level testing method. 
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the percentage changes in market volatility was not the main reason behind other huge 
drops in stock prices as it was normally believed. The link between market volatility 
and stock return is still under debate. Re-examining this over a longer and more serious 
crisis will provide a stronger conclusion and shed light into future research. 
The first reason for a negative relationship between stock returns and volatility level is 
attributed to risk-based theory. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Ang, Hodrick, Xing and 
Zhang (2006), to name but a few, suggest that the changes in volatility of stock 
returns lead to changes in the expectation of future market returns or in the risk-return 
balance (i.e. higher risk, higher returns), which will induce changes in the investment 
opportunity as a result. They argue that if volatility of market return is a systematic risk 
(undiversifiable), its effects should present in returns of stocks. They found that stocks 
with high sensitivities to volatility (either aggregate volatility or idiosyncratic volatility) 
have lower average returns and the lower returns cannot be explained by aggregate 
volatility risk, size, BM, momentum and liquidity effects. Hence, in this chapter a 
different measurement – firm default risk – is used to see if it can explain the 
phenomenon. Section 3.3 will discuss the variable construction and testing 
methodology in detail. 
Additionally, from the macroeconomic point of view, Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich and 
Yaron (2014) find that volatility in the macroeconomy plays a significant role in 
explaining expected equity return and consumption return. Similarly, Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel and Xu (2010) imply that market return volatility may be an indicator which 
could be used to forecast GDP growth rate. Moreover, in the presence of volatility, the 
role of stock index returns in forecasting GDP is significantly reduced, suggesting that 
volatility outperforms and subsumes stock returns’ predictive ability. 
The second reason for the lower returns on highly volatile stocks comes from the 
behaviour theory. It is believed that investors in a market that experiences low stock 
volatility tend to be more optimistic about future stock returns. Supporting this view, 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) show that equity volatility contributes to explaining 
corporate bond yields, they argue it is because investors become more optimistic when 
stock price increases.  It appears that  a relationship exists between market volatility and 
the equity premium. 
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Lastly, the CAPM-type models usually have a common presumption that higher 
volatility is associated with higher returns. This risk-based explanation has been 
receiving significant support from both scholars and practitioners. According to Huang, 
Yang and Zhang (2013), as highly volatile stocks are more likely to be under financial 
distress, they are riskier than less volatile stocks and therefore carry a positive value 
premium. The relation is documented by many researchers to be especially significant 
during recessions. For example, Schwert (1989, 1990) shows that during the Great 
Depression (1929-1939), stock volatility level was unusually high, and he explains that 
it is because at the time, investors did not know if the market could survive. In addition, 
Hamilton and Lin (1996) indicate that it is economic recessions that drive fluctuations 
in stock return volatility and that volatility and market conditions are highly correlated. 
More recently, Gulen, Xing and Zhang (2011) provide further evidence of a strong 
relationship between stock return volatility, the level of risk taking and market 
downturns in international markets. Also, Wachter (2013) and Choi (2013) explain that 
during “bad” times, the possibility of poor outcomes causes high stock market volatility 
and significantly increases equity premium. 
A subject that has attracted even more attention in volatility literature is the volatility 
measurements and their possible connection with value premium. Some examples are 
Lakonishok et al (1994) who compare simple standard deviation of portfolios, and 
Arisoy (2010) who employs at-the-money straddles as a proxy for stock volatility risk. 
However, the more complicated at-the-money straddles can only serve as a volatility 
proxy in well-developed derivative markets. In terms of method, Campbell et al (2001) 
use a disaggregated approach on market, industry and firm-level volatility while Brandt 
and Kang (2004) employ Vector AutoRegression (VAR) which has the advantage of 
incorporating time-varying volatility without the requirement of exogenous predictors 
in testing the relationship between volatility and returns. Also, Tauchen (2011) proposes 
a two-factor structure in a general equilibrium in which stochastic discount factor (SDF) 
and stochastic volatility in consumption are the driving factors. The approach, however, 
requires certain assumptions to be held, such as the conditional lognormal distribution 
assumption.  
B. Gaps in volatility and value anomaly literature 
The chapter aims to bridge the gaps in literature on value premium and volatility in the 
following aspects. 
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(i) Analysing from a comprehensive economic approach 
As mentioned earlier, the existing literature on volatility is great in number but rather 
limited in scope. It is worth noticing that most of the studies have not gone any further 
than observing and explaining the correlation between stock return and stock volatility. 
Few have attempted to test the potential explanatory relationship between them. Indeed, 
Campbell et al (2011) have admitted there is a limitation in the existing research on 
volatility in the sense that volatility tends to be examined from description statistics 
rather than an economic model approach. In order to bridge this gap, this chapter 
therefore aims to capture the risk pattern in stock price volatility in its econometric 
models using individual volatility in a portfolio approach. 
(ii) The risk pattern in stock volatility in explaining value premium 
Additionally, the majority of studies on volatility focus on how historical volatility 
could forecast future index volatility and derivatives trading. The question whether 
variability of stock returns as a proxy for risk could explain value premium still remains.  
Furthermore, the risk pattern in stock volatility so far has not been distinguished from 
other types of risk when explaining expected stock returns. As discussed in the literature 
on volatility section, it is long accepted that highly volatile stocks are considered to be 
risky. However, existing studies tend to explain the return differential caused by 
volatility risk by measuring distress risk with a presumption that volatile firms are 
financially distressed firms rather than to attempt to capture volatility risk separately. 
For these reasons, besides common factors such as the market factor, BM, firm size, 
past returns and probability of bankruptcy, this study aims to examine the relationship 
between volatility level and value premium. 
(iii) The potential relation between volatility and default risk 
Although some studies have documented the difference in default probability among 
value versus growth stocks and observed the correlation between stock volatility and 
expected stock return, the question whether firms with high default probability will 
experience high levels of price changes and vice versa still remains. Naturally, concerns 
over a firm default likelihood could potentially make the the market expectation on its 
stock returns more volatile while highly volatile stocks might signal default risk. 
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This study will be one of the first studies to look at the potential relationship between 
stock volatility and its distress conditions. A recent working paper by Chen and Chollete 
(2006) began to analyse this aspect, however the work looks at the relationship between 
O-score and volatility in only one dimension, which uses the explanatory ability of 
default risk on portfolio sort by volatility. They also only consider default factors and 
the market beta in their regression on volatility portfolios. The present chapter will 
examine two dimensions. It first analyses the risk aspect of volatility and that of default 
risk in explaining value premium separately. The second dimension is exploring the 
explanatory power of the default factor together with the Fama and French (1993) three 
factors and Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1997) momentum component in capturing the 
movement in the return of inter-section portfolios between idiosyncratic volatility and 
B/M ratio. This will not only put all three related elements, default risk, volatility and 
value premium, under the same lens – but will also be able to consider BM, size and 
momentum effects at the same time. 
This will be discussed in detail in section 3.5.2 under Hypothesis 3. 
3.2.4 Hypotheses 
The main objectives of Chapter 3 are to answer three key questions on the presence of 
value phenomenon in the UK, what explains it and the role of each explanatory factor. 
In order to answer these questions, we set out three hypotheses as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Value premium is associated to the market risk, default risk or a firm's 
fundamental variables, such as size, B/M ratio and past returns. 
The first hypothesis ties with the fundamental question that many dominant studies still 
debate: Is the value investing strategy profitable? If it is, do the four factors – namely 
the CAPM’s beta, the Fama and French’s size and BM, and Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
momentum factor – have a significant explanatory power in capturing the value 
premium? 
The chapter also brings the debate a step further by examining the explanatory power 
of default risk in a more constructive and comprehensive way. It looks at default effect 
from two dimensions, which are the effect in portfolios and in risk factors. In particular, 
the former approach looks at the risk patterns in portfolios and the latter focuses on 
building explanatory variables which can explain returns on the portfolios. 
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Hypothesis 2: The historic volatility of stock returns explains the book-to-market 
premium. 
The second hypothesis bridges the gap in the value premium’s literature. While there is 
a need documented to examine volatility impact in asset pricing, the explanatory power 
of volatility risk, if any, in capturing expected stock returns empirically has not attracted 
much attention. Moreover, measures and approaches to volatility in the literature tend 
to be indirect, such as using option price changes. Thus, this chapter’s approach will be 
to examine directly stock price volatility when aiming to understand stock returns. 
Furthermore, this hypothesis looks at the risk pattern of volatility specifically for the 
purpose of explaining the return differential between High and Low BM stocks. In short, 
testing this hypothesis would provide an answer for the long-existing question of 
whether stock volatility could contribute to explaining value premium in a direct and 
more comprehensive approach. 
Hypothesis 3: Volatility and default risk are correlated. 
If there is a link between volatility and the premium, and also between default risk and 
the premium, one question that might arise is whether there is any relation between the 
two. This is because the economic meaning of volatility and distress conditions are 
somewhat related. Once a firm is in distress, investors expect their stocks to be more 
volatile than usual and at the same time, volatile stocks tend to signal a distress 
condition. Hence, if it is found that they are strongly correlated, further tests are still 
required to determine whether one of the two factors is redundant and can be omitted. 
However, if they are weakly correlated, it is not likely that one can substitute for the 
other. The examination method in testing this alone should provide insights into the 
validity of each factor in explaining expected equity returns. 
Since volatility and default risk are presented in different forms, risk patterns in 
portfolios and in factor loading respectively, identifying the link between them through 
simple correlation matrix analysis does not seem to be feasible. As an alternative, their 
relation is addressed by looking how much variation in return of stocks with different 
degrees of volatility is explained by their default risk.  
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3.3. CHAPTER CONTRIBUTION 
Chapter 3 examines the validity of value strategies in the UK market in a more recent 
set of data. More importantly, it focuses on seeking the underlying reasons for value 
premium and the role of distress risk in explaining the anomaly. Chapter 3 contributes 
to the value anomaly literature from both methodological and empirical aspects.  
Firstly, Chapter 3 employs a comprehensive range of approaches. There are two 
analysis approaches used in the chapter which are regression analysis based on 
constructing factor variables, and a portfolio-based system which assesses risk patterns 
that stocks in the same portfolio would share. These approaches can be used separately 
or to complement each other in one model, depending on the research objectives. In 
Chapter 3, a combination of these methods allows distress risk to be assessed from 
multiple dimensions. Therefore, this enables more underlying risk factors, which can 
explain value anomaly, to be identified. 
The chapter also uses a number of asset pricing models in the value anomaly literature 
to explain value premium. The testing models include the traditional CAPM, the FF 
three-factor model, the Carhart four-factor model and their augmented versions with a 
default factor added. This will allow a direct comparison between models in regard to 
variable explanatory power and the model goodness of fit. 
Secondly, the role of default risk in capturing value premium is investigated in more 
constructive ways. The first and more commonly used method is in constructing the 
default risk factor. The second approach is a portfolio-based method which identifies 
the risk pattern associated with default probability in the returns on inter-sectional 
portfolios. The description and advantages of these approaches are discussed in detail 
in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. In terms of proxies for default risk, the chapter uses two 
well-established indicators for firm default risk, namely O-score proposed by Ohlson 
(1980) and Z-score by Altman (1968). 
It is worth noticing that the thesis differs from previous studies in the way that it 
constructs default factor from default probability indicators that are more suitable for 
the UK market. Unlike studies undertaken in the US market13, the thesis does not 
support the use of corporate bond spread (i.e. yield spread between Moody’s Baa and 
                                                 
13 For examples, Petkova and Zhang (2005), Petkova (2006), and Shah and Kebewar (2013). 
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Aaa corporate bonds) and changes in credit rating as proxies for the default risk of UK 
firms. It is because the UK corporate credit rating system is not as well developed as 
the system in the US. Therefore, it may not be accurate to rely on corporate credit ratings 
to identify firms that are likely to be bankrupt in the future. Instead, we measure default 
risk based on firm probability of default, which is a relatively more indicative and 
reliable proxy in the UK. 
Thirdly, contributing to the extant literature on value anomaly, the study analyses the 
risk pattern associated with stock idiosyncratic volatility as another indicator of distress 
risk. Although volatility has long been documented as a relevant risk to stock returns, it 
has not been incorporated into the existing literature on value anomaly. Unlike previous 
studies on volatility, the present chapter employs a portfolio-based method that would 
allow the idiosyncratic risk pattern in stock volatility to be examined separately from 
other types of distress risk in average stock returns. This approach enables the chapter 
to capture potential distress risk at a firm level that has not been covered in the 
regression approach by default risk, as stock prices can be influenced by many factors 
other than the firm’s financial performance. 
Last but not least, for the first time, the empirical aspects of the volatility–default risk 
relation are analysed and their potential roles in explaining value premium are also 
carefully addressed. While both factors are separately documented to link to value 
anomaly, they have yet to be analysed in the same context. If a company is in a distress 
condition, one of the possible signals would be that their stock prices experience a 
number of highly volatile periods. At the same time, it is also possible that the stock 
volatility is caused by non-financial factors, such as changes in management or political 
announcements. These may in time put firms in distress situations but the risk has not 
been captured in accounting-based indicators. It is, therefore, beneficial to consider 
volatility risk and default risk in one analysis, and to test their relation in order to better 
understand value anomaly from the risk perspective. 
The next section will explain the data and methodological framework designed to test 
the chapter’s hypotheses. It also discusses initial findings on the presence of value 
premium in the UK, which motivates the study to seek for the underlying reasons behind 
the anomaly. 
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3.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Data 
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 provides a description of the sample and data used in Chapter 
3 as well as in the whole thesis. This section aims to summarise key elements of the 
data that are particularly relevant to the analysis in Chapter 3. The sample covers the 
period from 31st January, 1990 to 31st December, 2012 (276 months). The return for 
each month is the difference between the natural logarithm returns of stock prices of 
that month compared with the previous month. Monthly data of the FTSE350 are 
obtained from the DataStream Thomson Reuters database. 
The chapter focuses on the FTSE350 instead of the FTSE All share for particular 
reasons as follow. Since one of the main objectives of this chapter is to examine the 
explanatory ability of firm-level volatility risk on average stock returns, where the high 
volatility stocks (High Vo) are considered to be riskier than the low volatility stocks 
(Low Vo). The FTSE350 index excludes the FTSE SmallCap which consists of very 
low varying stocks, or ones that don’t vary at all for a long period of time due to thin 
trading. Those stocks would have very low volatility but without necessarily being a 
safer option. Excluding these ensures the results are not biased toward thin trading 
stocks. They also do not contribute to the explanatory factors this chapter is looking for 
in term of volatility. 
Firms must satisfy the following criteria to be included in the sample for year t. First 
they must have sufficient historical information for 6 months before the portfolio 
formation date (i.e. July of year t) to ensure that the accounting variables are identified 
before they are used to explain excess returns. In this case it is December of year t-1, 
also because it normally coincides with the fiscal year end of firms. However, firms 
need to be at least one year old as of December, 2012 to be considered. 
Fama and French (1992) show that a minimum of a 6-month lag is likely to be 
appropriate to ensure that investors have time to consider the financial reports, even 
where there are delays. In line with previous studies14, this study focuses on analysing 
non-negative B/M ratios and non-zero dividend firms.  
                                                 
14 See studies by Chan et al. (1991), Fama and French (1992, 1996), Drew and Veeraraghvan (2002) for 
examples. 
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Financial firms are also excluded from the sample15 because their capital structures 
seem to reflect a different meaning from those of non-financial companies. For 
example, the high leverage of financial firms might not imply a distress condition, 
which is otherwise the case for non-financial firms (Fama and French 1992). As this 
thesis focuses on distress risks, it is important that distress conditions are captured 
correctly.  
The firm sectors are classified based on FTSE ICB system (Financial Times Stock 
Exchange Industry Classification Benchmark, which used to be known as FTSE Global 
Classification System)16. The classification consists of 10 economic groups, 39 
industrial sectors and 102 industry sub-sectors. 
The screening process reduces the initial sample from 290 to 269 firms (the excluded 
firms are 17 financial firms, and 2 firms with no BM data). Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 – 
Research methodology – explains the sample collection, formation and characteristics 
in detail. 
The market factor is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website17 and the LIBOR 
1-month middle rate is used as a proxy for the risk-free asset. The two Fama and French 
factors, HML and SMB, are constructed in accordance to Fama and French (1993). The 
WML component is built following Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1997) approach. Although 
beside BM, the chapter also performs the test on E/P and DY for robustness check 
purposes, firms do not have to have data on all the three indicators to be included in the 
sample. As nearly half of the firms on the FTSE350 index do not have C/P data in 
DataStream, the robustness checks using C/P are omitted to avoid misleading results. 
3.4.2 Portfolio formation 
Although Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of Chapter 2 have described in detail the methods with 
which dependent and independent variables are constructed, this section briefly 
                                                 
15 A considerable number of studies have focused on non-financial companies, for 
instance Fama and French (1992), Akdeniz, Altay-Salih and Aydogan (2000), and (Yen 
et al. 2004). However, Barber and Lyon (1997 cited in Yen et al. 2004 p.21) have 
revealed that it is also appropriate to apply value strategies for financial firms. 
16 The ICB industry/sector codes are obtained from the Datastream database under the DSMnemonic 
code WC07040 
17 The author thanks Professor Kenneth R. French for making the data available on his website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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summarises them to provide an introduction to the empirical analysis that uses those 
variables. 
Dependent variables: Portfolio and dependent variable constructions are formed in a 
similar way to Davis, Fama and French (2000). In their study they form 25 portfolios 
(i.e. 5 size x 5 BM portfolios) for the purpose of identifying the difference in returns of 
stocks with very similar characteristics. We also apply this approach in this study but 
construct fewer portfolios due to the large difference in the number of firms listed in the 
US and the UK. 
Six portfolios – Small/Low, Small/Medium, Small/High, Big/Low, Big/Medium and 
Big/High – are constructed from the intersections between two Size and three BM 
portfolios. For example, the Small/Low portfolio consists of stocks that are in the Small 
size group and also in the Low BM group. More specifically, small and big firms are 
separated by the median at the end of June, year t. Also, firms’ B/M ratio at the end of 
December of year t-1 is used to sort stocks into high, middle and low book-to-market 
portfolios for the following year using the breakpoints of the top 40%, the middle 20% 
and the bottom 40%. It is worth noticing that non-US markets have significantly fewer 
listed firms in comparison with the US market. Thus, following Dimson et al. (2003), 
our test uses the 40:20:40 breakpoint for the UK market instead of the usual 30:40:30 
in order to select all stocks that can be representative of the value and growth portfolios. 
However, this line of explanation does not apply to the risk factor constructions later in 
this section. 
Separately, another 9 portfolios are formed based on individual firm volatility and B/M 
ratio. They are again intersections between three firm volatility and three BM portfolios. 
Firm-level volatility at the end of June year t-1 for one year beginning July year t-1 is 
ranked separately into three portfolios with similar deciles (40:20:40). The breakpoints 
for BM are also at the 40th and 60th percentiles. The decision to break volatility/BM into 
many smaller groups (9 instead of 6 portfolios) is driven from an idea of examining 
extreme effects. Value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated monthly from July year 
t until June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced every year. 
It is worth noticing that in this chapter all explanatory variables will be constructed 
using the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint as they are meant to proxy for the risk patterns that 
have not been captured by the CAPM rather than to measure the actual returns. They 
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are, therefore, expected to capture the most extreme positions which are the riskiest and 
the safest options associated with their corresponding type of risk in the market. 
Unlike other variables, volatility portfolios are formed without lags given the fact that 
stock prices are accessible without long delays. In addition, under normal business 
conditions, it appears to be more practical for investors to rely on one-year stock 
volatility to make their portfolio allocation decisions rather than on a longer horizon. 
Therefore, one-year volatility is used to rank volatility portfolios. It is also possible to 
use less-than-a-year analysis for more frequent portfolio rebalancing. Considering the 
fact that transaction costs would make frequent rebalancing too costly, this chapter 
limits its study to a one-year buy-and-hold strategy. 
Independent variables: From a range of independent variables listed in Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2, the explanatory variables used to test the relationship between value 
premium and distress risk in Chapter 3 include the following: the FF three factors (i.e. 
the market, HML, SMB), the Carhart momentum factor (WML), and default factors 
(DEF which is based on O-score, and DEF’ which is based on the Z-score indicator). 
As described earlier in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, the three FF factors are constructed as 
described in Fama and French (1993). The market variable (Rm - Rf) is the market excess 
returns on all UK firms with BM data. The data is obtained from Kenneth R. French’s 
database. The High-minus-Low (HML) factor is meant to mimic the risk patterns 
associated with the BM in asset returns. HML is computed as the difference between 
the monthly returns on the simple average return on the two High BM stock portfolios 
and those on the simple average return of the two Low BM stock portfolios. The Small-
minus-Big (SMB) variable is computed as the size effect representative, mimicking the 
risk factor associated to size in asset returns. SMB is the difference between the monthly 
returns on the simple average return on the three small stock portfolios and those on the 
simple average return of the three big stock portfolios. 
Winner-minus-Loser (WML) is constructed based on the stock’s 11-month past returns, 
following Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) approach. The monthly portfolio returns are 
calculated at July, year t with a 1-month lag and value weighted by the market value at 
the end of June, year t. The WML is the return differential between the top 30% and the 
bottom 30% stocks. 
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Lastly, the default risk (DEF) factor is constructed as the return differentials between 
the highest 30% and the lowest 30% default probability groups ranked by O-score. For 
robustness check purposes, the chapter also employs the DEF’ variable which is based 
on Z-score, an alternative indicator of default probability. Throughout the chapter, this 
breakpoint is used consistently when forming factors on a portfolio basis. More 
specifically, similar to Fama and French’s (1993) method of constructing the HML 
factor, each year’s value-weighted returns of each group are computed from July, year 
t-1 to June, year t and rebalanced annually. The difference in their monthly returns then 
forms the risk factors for that given period.  
3.4.3 Designing the tests 
The chapter aims to examine the above three hypotheses in section 3.2.4 using both 
time-series and cross-sectional approaches. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
is used to estimate the parameters in all regressions.  
The chapter first examines the validity of value strategies and the explanatory power of 
Fama and French’s three factors in capturing the value premium, if any, in the UK. 
Next, it tests the first hypothesis on the role of default risk and conventional risk factors 
(e.g. market risk, size, B/M ratio, and momentum effect) in explaining value anomaly. 
In order to test the role of default risk in explaining the abnormal value premium 
phenomenon, the chapter studies this from two dimensions: i) it constructs default 
factors (DEF) using default probability as the proxy; (ii) it uses Griffin and Lemmon’s 
(2002) portfolio approach to further check the robustness of the results.  
In terms of proxies, when considering default probability, besides using O-score as 
proposed by Ohlson (1980), another commonly used proxy, Z-score as proposed by 
Altman (1968) is used to ensure the findings are not driven by the choice of indicator. 
If the robustness check confirms the findings, the rest of the chapter will base its analysis 
on O-score for its wider application. Details of the formulae, construction and 
discussion will be detailed in section 3.4.5. 
It is worth noticing that in the literature, corporate bond yield is usually used as default 
risk proxies. While this approach is equally valid, this chapter is pioneering the use of 
the probability of bankruptcy to proxy for default risk in value anomaly literature. This 
approach includes an extensive and comprehensive range of firm’s accounting 
information. Furthermore, not every firm issues corporate bonds, hence our approach 
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will be expected to provide a more comprehensive picture of firms’ default risk. The 
DEF factor is constructed on the basis of portfolio return differentials between the 
highest and the lowest default probability stocks. 
In the second approach, Griffin and Lemmon’s (2002) 9 default risk/BM portfolios can 
be formed similarly to the way we built the volatility/BM portfolios described earlier in 
section 3.4.2. It is worth noticing that, unlike Griffin and Lemmon, this chapter 
constructs 9 intersection portfolios from the FTSE350 as this appears to be more 
suitable for non-US markets. In Griffin and Lemmon’s study, for each of the two size 
groups they sort 15 separate portfolios formed between three BM portfolios and five O-
score portfolios. This results a set of 30 intersection portfolios. However, this portfolio 
formation has the potential to cause econometric issues which may arise from the small 
size of regressed portfolios. 
Regarding hypothesis 2, as stock return volatility is not normally considered as a risk 
factor on its own, this chapter does not aim to construct a separate factor but rather to 
capture the risk pattern in return volatility in their intersection portfolios. 
To separately examine the relationship between value premium and volatility risk, the 
chapter constructs 9 intersection portfolios from three independent BM portfolios 
(High, Medium and Low BM) and three rankings on volatility (also High, Medium and 
Low volatility). This will enable to answer the question whether the risk pattern in BM 
and default likelihood conditions is reflected in stock returns. See section 3.3.2 for 
details of the intersection portfolio construction. Additionally, a number of asset pricing 
models, including the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor model and an 
augmented Fama and French’s model with default risk, are used to estimate the stock 
returns of the 9 portfolios cross-sectionally. 
Although there are several more complicated asset pricing models than the classical 
CAPM and Fama and French three-factor model, these two provide at least a useful 
starting point. Specifically, derived from the CAPM, there are, for example, several 
augmented models: ICAPM, CCAPM and their conditional versions. Among them, 
Merton (1973) documents that the CAPM can still explain a significant fraction of the 
movement of asset returns. For more details, Appendix 4 provides a summary of some 
alternative asset pricing models that are frequently used in the literature. Since the 
chapter does not intend to engage in the debate on the best possible asset pricing model, 
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it starts with the simple but long-standing CAPM and Fama and French’s model. 
Subsequently, for the purpose of testing a new candidate – default risk – the Fama and 
French three-factor model is augmented with this factor.  
Finally, to further examine hypothesis 3 of whether default risk and volatility are both 
related to characteristics that imply a distress risk in stock returns, the chapter seeks to 
capture their risk pattern by using O-score and volatility ranking that is reflected in stock 
returns. It also checks the robustness of the findings by employing other proxies for 
default probability, such as Altman’s (1968) Z-score. 
3.4.4 The Asset pricing models  
- The CAPM 
In order to explain value premium, there are two main asset-pricing models, namely the 
CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), and the three-factor regressions proposed 
by Fama and French (1993).  
According to the CAPM, systematic risk is related to expected returns, while 
unsystematic risk and firms’ characteristics are irrelevant. The basic form of the CAPM 
is: 
E(Ri) = Rf + im [E(Rm) – Rf ]                                                                                   (3.1) 
Where, E(Ri), E(Rm) are expected returns on asset i and the market, respectively;  
Rf  is the risk-free rate of returns, and im is the slope in the time-series regression: 
               im =                                                                                            (3.2) 
Where, cov(Ri, Rm) is covariance between returns on asset i and returns on the market; 
and var(Rm) is variance of returns on the market portfolio. 
In the study, the estimates of the CAPM time-series regression are reported as follows: 
               Ri,t - Rf,t = αi + i (Rm,t – Rf,t) + it                                                                                                (3.3) 
Where, Ri,t is returns on asset i at time t; Rft is returns on the risk-free asset at time t; Rm,t 
is returns on the market portfolio; and it is an error term. 
The null hypothesis is that all intercepts are equal to zero. 
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- The Fama and French three-factor models 
               Rit - Rft = αi +i (Rmt – Rft) + hi HMLt + si SMBt + it                                               (3.4) 
Where, High-minus-Low (HML) and Small-minus-Big (SMB) are the excess returns of 
high BM over low BM portfolios, and small over large portfolios, respectively; and it 
is an error term. 
- The Carhart (1997) four-factor models 
 Rit - Rft = άi +’i (Rmt – Rft) + h’i HMLt + s’i SMBt + w’i WMLt +it                                     (3.5) 
Where, the WML proxy for momentum component is measured by the difference in 
returns between stocks of firms in the highest 30% past 11-month group and those in 
the lowest 30% past-11-month performers; and it is an error term. 
- The Augmented models 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt + SMBi SMBt + DEFi DEFt +it                     (3.6) 
and, 
Rit - Rft = θ’i +’mi (Rmt – Rft) + ’HMLi HMLt + ’SMBi SMBt + ’WMLi WMLt+’DEFi DEFt +’i t (3.7) 
Where, DEF stands for default risk measured by the difference in returns between stocks 
of firms with a high probability of bankruptcy and those with a low probability of 
defaulting, and it is an error term. 
3.4.5 O-score and Z-score 
Developing from the conditional logit model, Ohlson (1980) uses maximum likelihood 
methodology to estimate the logarithm of probability of outcomes in equation (3.8) and 
build an O-score based on nine dependent variables, including six main accounting 
ratios, 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝑁𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
 and two dummy variables in formula (3.9) 18. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝛽) =  ∑ log 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 , 𝛽) +
𝑖∈𝑆1
∑ log(1 − 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 , 𝛽))
𝑖∈𝑆2
 
Where, Xi = vector of predictors for ith observation  
                                                 
18 See Griffin and Lemmon (2002, p.2320) for a mathematical form of the Ohlson’s (1980) O-score 
calculation. 
(3.8) 
  
99 
 = vector of unknown parameters 
P(Xi, ) = probability of bankruptcy for any given Xi and  
S1 and S2 are the sets of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy firms. 
𝑶 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =  −1.32 − 0.407 𝑙𝑜𝑔 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝑁𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
+ 6.03 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.43 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.076 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.72 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 > 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 2.37 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.83 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 0.285 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 0.521 
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1)
|𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1|
 
 
Unlike Ohlson, Altman (1968, p.594) proposes the use of Z-score with fewer 
independent variables and including only accounting ratios; the formula is as follows. 
𝒁 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =  0.012X1 +  0.014X2 +  0.033X3 +  0.006X4 +  0.999X5 
Where,  𝑋1 = 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋2 = 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋3 = 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋4 = 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
𝑋5 = 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
3.4.6 Volatility measurement of stock returns  
The chapter computes an individual firm’s share price standard deviation as proxy for 
its volatility. Standard deviation (σX) measures the variability of X, in other words, it 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
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measures how much Xi is deviated from the mean. The formula of the sample standard 
deviation is as follows. 
𝜎𝑋 = √
∑ ( 𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑁 − 1)
 
Where, σX is the standard deviation of variable X over a period of N; ?̅? is the mean of 
variable X over the whole period.  
Volatility is subtly computed. First, for a 1-year buy-and-hold strategy, historical 
volatility is considered for the 1 month straight before portfolio formation. This allows 
for investors to have the most up-to-date information and provides enough time for the 
information to be widely known. Within that month, monthly volatility is calculated 
based on daily stock returns over a 1-month period from 1st June to 31st June year t.  
3.4.7 Data descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 269 non-financial FTSE350 firms that have been listed for at 
least one year and have sufficient data on market capitalisation, and at least one of the 
four key ratios (BM, E/P, DY or C/P). Table 3.1 summarises some of the main features 
of the sample. It shows that the sample covers a wide range of firm sizes. While the 
largest firm reaches more than GBP 81 billion in value, the market value of the smallest 
firm is only about GBP 0.377 billion. However, their market value is nearly GBP 6.5 
billion on average with a median of GBP 1.6 billion, which is equivalent to a medium 
sized business. This indicates that the majority of firms in the sample are large- and 
medium-sized businesses. 
In terms of market value ratios, the BM ranges from -0.06 to 3.84 while the median is 
at 0.37, showing that there are a greater number of growth stocks (i.e. low BM) than 
value stocks (high BM) in the FTSE350. Moreover, on average, firms in the sample 
have a BM ratio of about 0.5 suggesting that growth firms in the UK have a relatively 
low book value, only about half of their market value. Furthermore, summary statistics 
of the other key market value ratios, E/P, DY and C/P, confirm these observations. 
  
(3.11) 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics of the sample as of 31st December 2012. It reports 
firm size, BM, E/P, DY and C/P ratios of the 269 firms in the sample. The statistics include the 
mean, standard deviation (SD), median, maximum and minimum values of these measures 
across the sample. 
 Market value 
(£million) 
BM E/P DY C/P 
Mean 6,495.28 0.50 0.08 2.74 0.13 
SD 13584 0.48 0.04 1.82 0.11 
Median 1,636.01 0.37 0.08 2.62 0.10 
Max. 81,310.19 3.84 0.29 11.95 0.69 
Min. 377.38 -0.06 0.001 0 -0.22 
3.4.8 Value premium and robustness checks 
The chapter first checks if the value anomaly exists in the UK market in recent times. 
Besides the commonly used BM indicator, it also uses E/P and DY to rank stocks into 
value and growth portfolios for robustness check purposes. The results are reported in 
Table 3.2.  
As can be seen from the table, value stocks do generate a higher return than growth. On 
average, the value premium is about 0.09% a month when using BM as the indicator 
and it is 0.06% in the case of E/P and DY ratios. More importantly, the results show 
that although there is value premium in the UK, it is statistically insignificant. The 
findings are consistent with those found by Dimson et al. (2003) for the UK market. 
The robustness checks also indicate that using different indicators does not affect our 
results. 
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Table 3.2: Value premium and Robustness checks 
Table 3.2 reports the performance of value strategies using three commonly-used indicators for 
value and growth stocks, namely BM, E/P and DY. The less-popular ratio, C/P, is omitted due 
to insufficient data. The table summarises average monthly value-weighted returns on value and 
growth portfolios (in percentage). Value consists of the highest 40% BM (E/P or DY) stocks, 
Medium are the middle 20% and Growth includes the lowest 40% BM (E/P or DY) stocks. The 
t-statistics test the significance level of the portfolio rate of return in question. 
 BM E/P DY 
Value 0.59 0.52 0.47 
Growth 0.40 0.46 0.41 
Value-Growth 0.09 0.06 0.06 
[t-statistics] [0.49] [0.47] [0.42] 
3.5 DISTRESS RISK EXPLANATIONS 
3.5.1 Book-to-market equity and size premium 
This section considers the presence of the value premium and size premium. Table 3.3 
reports the average monthly 1-year buy-and-hold returns for each size and book-to-
market portfolio. 
The value premium exists more in the small portfolios than in the big ones. On average, 
the results indicate a 0.11%/month of return differential for small stocks, and -0.25 for 
big stocks. This makes sense economically because small value firms are more likely 
to be distressed firms, and therefore bearing higher risks. Thus, any small firms that 
have survived for 20 years could have a higher returns rate. Clearly, big growth firms 
are more profitable than big value firms. The return differentials between value and 
growth stocks are, however, statistically insignificant in both size-groups. The finding 
is not the same as one documented in Dimson et al. (2003) which reports a strong value 
premium in the UK from 1955-2001. The difference in sampling could largely explain 
this difference. While Dimson et al. (2003) look at all firms traded in the London Stock 
Exchange, including financial firms and SmallCap stocks, this chapter sees the need to 
exclude them in its sample (discussed earlier in section 3.4.1). 
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Table 3.3: Six Size/BM portfolios 
Table 3.3 summarises the monthly value-weighted returns of 6 intersection portfolios (in 
percentage) formed by 3 book-to-market value and 2 size rankings, and value and size 
premiums. In particular, Value consists of the highest 40% BM stocks, Medium are the middle 
20% and Growth includes the lowest 40% BM stocks. Small and Big stocks are separated by 
the medium. t-statistics show the mean significance of corresponding abnormal returns. *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Size 
BM group Small Big Small-Big t-statistic 
Value 0.75 0.10 0.65 1.96* 
Medium 0.64 0.16 0.48 1.51 
Growth 0.64 0.35 0.29 1.27 
Value Premium 0.11 -0.25   
[t-statistic] [0.48] [-1.00]   
Regarding size premium, it is much higher among the value stocks than growth stocks, 
i.e. 0.65% and 0.29%, respectively. Obviously by definition, small value firms have a 
lot more potential for growth than big cap value firms. Also, the size effect is only 
slightly significant among value stocks (t-statistic value of 1.96, significance at 10% 
level). Both value and size premiums are mostly insignificant, implying that investors 
correctly price stocks in the UK market; in other words, the market is fairly efficient. 
Table 3.4 now investigates the value premium and whether the differences in firm level 
volatility risk captured by BM and volatility are reflected in stock returns. There are 9 
portfolio returns calculated as the intersection of three volatility groups by three BM 
portfolios. The three volatility groups are high volatility (High Vo), medium volatility 
(Med Vo), and low volatility (Lo Vo). Within the low volatility group (considered to be 
the safer group) there does not exist a value premium. The returns on the Value/Low 
Vo portfolio is 0.43%, being lower than Growth/Low Vo stocks by 6 basis points (at 
0.49%). In contrast, among the High Vo group, the positive premium exists although it 
is relatively small at 0.01% per month.  
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More volatile risky choices do not perform better than the lower volatility portfolio. 
This result is consistent for both the value and the growth group (0.16% and 0.15% 
versus 0.43% and 0.49%, respectively). As a preliminary check, this study found no 
evidence suggesting that high volatility stocks generate a higher return than low 
volatility stocks. Within the low volatility group, investing in the value stocks, which 
are more likely to be in distress, brings lower returns than growth firms. The opposite 
is true for high volatility portfolios. In short, the safer the choice is, made by volatility 
grouping, the more profits growth and value stocks bring (the tendencies are 0.15% – 
0.24% – 0.49% and 0.16% - 0.27% - 0.43%). 
Table 3.4: Nine Volatility/BM portfolios 
This table presents the monthly value-weighted returns of 9 intersection portfolios (in 
percentage) formed by 3 book-to-market values and 3 volatility rankings, and the potential 
abnormal returns. In particular, Value consists of the highest 40% BM stocks, Medium are the 
middle 20% and Growth includes the lowest 40% BM stocks. Low Vo, Medium Vo and High 
Vo stand for low, medium and high volatility stocks using the same breakpoints. t-statistics test 
the mean significance of corresponding abnormal returns. *, **, and *** denote the significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Volatility risk 
BM group Low Vo Medium Vo High Vo Low Vo-High Vo t-statistic 
Value 0.43 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.71 
Medium 0.78 0.24 0.31 0.47 1.18 
Growth 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.34 0.97 
Value 
Premium 
-0.06 0.03 0.01   
[t-statistic] [-0.24] [0.09] [0.02]   
3.5.2 The Fama and French three-factor model 
Table 3.5 reports time series estimations on the returns on six portfolios ranked by size 
and BM from 1990 to 2012. The Fama and French (1993) three factor model is 
employed to examine whether it has any ability to capture the size and BM patterns in 
stock returns. The factor loadings are calculated from monthly value weighted 
  
105 
portfolios by regressing excess returns on the market portfolio (RM), book-to-market 
(HML) and size (SMB) effects. 
As can be seen from Table 3.5, the coefficients of the market factor (Beta) are found to 
be significant at a 1% confidence level with the exception of the Big stocks with a high 
BM value portfolio. Perhaps the market factor does not affect the big stocks as much as 
the smaller ones, even though they are value stocks too. Overall, the CAPM betas appear 
to remain important in explaining stock returns. When the model captures variations in 
returns well, the intercept should be indistinguishable from zero. In our case the big 
stock portfolio has statistically insignificant intercepts; that implies that the pricing 
errors are low. However, for small portfolios, pricing errors are negatively more 
significant as they move across BM groups. The results of negative regression intercepts 
are consistent with those in the Fama and French study (1993). 
The HML factor is important for value stocks at a 1% level and not for growth stocks. 
This indicates the significant explanatory power of the book-to-market effects in 
explaining high BM stock returns while it is not the case for growth groups. The positive 
signs of coefficients associated with the book-to-market factor loading reaffirm the 
results of previous studies, such as Dimson et al. (2003) and Phalippou (2007). 
The coefficient associated with the size factor is -0.230, significant at a 5% level, for 
small growth stocks but not for the big ones of the same group (-0.006 with t-statistic 
at -0.06). Similar results are observed within the high BM group. This factor is often 
hard to find an economic interpretation for, as even Fama and French admitted the short-
fall of the factor bearing no link with economic theories. They also found size effects 
have a negative relation to the average returns of stocks. 
From Table 3.5, Adjusted R2s are relatively low and tend to be lower as they move 
toward big and low BM groups. This confirms the results discussed earlier that the Fama 
and French three-factor model seems to capture better the movement of small-cap 
stocks and high BM stocks.  
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Table 3.5: Three-factor regressions for six portfolios sorted by size and BM 
The table presents time-series estimation results of Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor 
model on 6 intersection portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market and 2 size rankings. In 
particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-
to-market value stocks while Small and Big stocks are separated by the medium. The excess 
return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK 
market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their 
factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns using the same 
breakpoints. The table reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote 
the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for the degree 
of freedom. 
 Small Big  Small Big 
 α  t(α) 
HBM -0.002 0.002  -0.51 0.68 
M -0.007 -0.003  -1.77* -0.68 
LBM -0.008 -0.002  -2.16** -0.56 
 β  t(β) 
HBM 0.480 0.059  5.60*** 0.78 
M 0.723 0.517  8.05*** 5.62*** 
LBM 0.596 0.400  6.61*** 4.29*** 
 h  t(h) 
HBM 0.442 0.591  3.42*** 5.13*** 
M -0.179 -0.256  -1.31 -1.84* 
LBM 0.028 0.098  0.21 0.69 
 s  t(s) 
HBM -0.176 -0.120  -1.83* -1.39 
M -0.029 -0.225  -0.29 -2.17** 
LBM -0.230 -0.006  -2.26** -0.06 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.16 0.10    
M 0.19 0.11    
LBM 0.15 0.06    
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3.5.3 Carhart four-factor model 
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model is an extension of the FF three-factor model, 
including a momentum factor. Following Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) approach to 
building the momentum component, the WML is constructed based on stocks’ 11-
month past returns. The monthly portfolio returns are calculated at July, year t with a 1-
month lag and value weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t. The WML 
is the return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks. The 
estimation results on the four-factor model are reported in Table 3.6. 
Using the Carhart (1007) four-factor model on size/BM excess returns, the estimation 
results show that the explanatory power of the FF model has been improved slightly. 
The intercepts are lower in terms of magnitude and significance. For the value stock 
(i.e. high BM equity), the constant terms are about 0.001 (t-statistics are -0.37 for Small 
stocks and -0.42 for Big stocks). Similarly, regressions on the excess returns on Big 
stocks (including value, growth and medium BM companies) produce insignificant 
constant terms. They range from -0.002 to -0.001 (t-statistics are between -0.71 and -
0.42). On the contrary, the constant in regression on the Small/Low BM portfolio excess 
returns remains high at -0.010 (t- statistic is -2.58, statistically significant at 5% level). 
Unlike in the FF three-factor model, regression on the Small/Medium BM excess 
returns produces an intercept that is no longer statistically significant. This implies that 
perhaps some risk elements missed in the three-factor model have been priced in the 
four-factor model. 
With regard to model explanatory variables, the magnitude of coefficients associated 
with these decreases slightly. The sign and significance of market beta, HML and SMB 
coefficients largely remain unchanged in the presence of the momentum component. 
The market betas are positive and statistically significant in most cases. Also, the 
coefficients are larger within small stocks than big stocks. The estimated market beta is 
0.479 (significant with a t-statistic of 5.54) for the Small/High BM portfolio and is 0.591 
(highly significant with a t-statistic of 6.56) for the Small/Low BM portfolio. However, 
these coefficients are only 0.061 (statistically insignificant) and 0.397 (significant at 
1%) for Big/High BM and Big/Low BM, respectively. 
Coefficients associated with the BM effect are positive and highly significant in 
regressions on value portfolios but insignificant for growth stocks. In regressions on the 
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value stocks, the estimated coefficients h’ take the value of 0.445 (t-statistic is 3.43) and 
0.588 (t-statistic is 5.10) for Small/High BM and Big/High BM, respectively. For 
growth portfolios, the BM variable is positively correlated to excess returns on both the 
Small and Big portfolios. The BM effect is however not dominant among these groups 
of stocks. The coefficients associated with BM factor are statistically insignificant, 
being at only 0.029 and 0.099 for Small growth and Big growth portfolios, respectively. 
Among Medium BM stocks, there is some BM effect shown in Big/Medium BM stocks 
but it has a limited effect on Small/Medium BM portfolio returns. 
Similar to what was observed in the above BM effect testing, the size effect is more 
noticeable among Small stocks but less in the Big portfolio. The estimated coefficients 
associated with the SMB variable are negative and statistically significant in regressions 
on Small/High BM and Small/Low BM excess returns. In these regressions, they take 
the values of -0.179 (t-statistic of -1.85) and -0.227 (t-statistic of -2.4). The results 
suggest that it is important to take into account differences in market values when 
explaining the movement in average returns of small size companies. Also, investing in 
smaller stocks could gain a higher size premium while returns on big stocks are less 
sensitive to the size effect. In the original study, Fama and French (1992, 1993) have 
noticed this relationship in the US, and the findings in this chapter confirm that their 
conclusions on the roles of BM and size effects are also valid in the UK market. 
In terms of the momentum factor, the results in Table 3.6 indicate that there is a 
momentum effect among Small/Low BM stocks but the explanatory power of the 
momentum variable is less significant in explaining excess returns on other portfolios. 
In the table, the estimated coefficients w’ are largely positive (negative) in regressions 
on excess returns on the Small (Big) portfolios. This suggests that investing in big 
companies is less likely to lead to a large momentum premium whilst investing in 
smaller firms would do so. 
The higher Adjusted R2s in the Carhart regressions imply that the momentum variable 
has contributed to capturing more of the movement in average stock returns. The 
Adjusted R2s are between 0.17 and 0.26 in comparison with under 0.06 and 0.19 in the 
FF three-factor model. The low goodness of fit of both models suggests that there are 
potentially risk elements that have not been captured by these classic models.  
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Table 3.6: Four-Factor Regressions for Six Portfolios Sorted by Size and BM 
The table presents time-series estimation results of Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model on 6 
intersection portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market value and 2 size rankings. In particular, 
HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market 
value stocks while Small and Big stocks are separated by the medium. The excess return on the 
market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML 
and SMB are constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which 
are meant to mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns using the same breakpoints. 
The WML component is built based on stocks’ 11-month past returns, according to which WML 
is the return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks. The table reports 
estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1%.  
 Small Big  Small Big 
 ά  t(ά) 
HBM -0.001 -0.001  -0.37 -0.42 
M -0.006 -0.002  -1.26 -0.71 
LBM -0.010 -0.001  -2.58** -0.43 
 β’  t(β’) 
HBM 0.479 0.061  5.54*** 0.82 
M 0.731 0.519  8.07*** 5.65*** 
LBM 0.591 0.397  6.56*** 4.20*** 
 h’  t(h’) 
HBM 0.445 0.588  3.43*** 5.10*** 
M -0.173 -0.254  -1.29 -1.81* 
LBM 0.029 0.099  0.24 0.69 
 s’  t(s’) 
HBM -0.179 -0.122  -1.85* -1.41 
M -0.028 -0.222  -0.26 -2.13** 
LBM -0.227 -0.006  -2.24** -0.05 
 w’  t(w’) 
HBM -0.010 -0.063  -0.50 -0.98 
M 0.085 -0.073  1.31 -1.02 
LBM 0.108 -0.084  1.98* -1.26 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.25 0.20    
M 0.26 0.24    
LBM 0.21 0.17    
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3.5.4 SMB, HML, WML and factor loading on default risk 
In this section, the Fama and French (FF) three-factor model and Carhart four-factor 
model also control for the risk of a firm going bankrupt measured by O-score as 
suggested by Ohlson (1980). First of all, default risk is added in the conventional FF 
three-factor model and the findings are discussed in section 3.5.4.A. In order to have a 
direct comparison of the default risk for the three- and four-factor models, we also 
control for the DEF factor in a regression on Carhart’s four factors in section 3.5.4.B. 
The results of these sections are reported in Panels A and B of Table 3.7, respectively. 
3.5.4.A. Default risk and the FF three-factor model 
In this section, an augmented model is formed by adding a default component to the FF 
model. The default factor, DEF, is meant to mimic the risk patterns in stock returns that 
have not been captured by Fama and French’s three factors. Panel A of Table 3.7 
summarises the estimated coefficients of time-series regressions on 6 intersection 
portfolios formed between 2 size portfolios (Small and Big) and 3 BM portfolios (High, 
Medium and Low). 
As can be seen from the table, the regression intercepts are negative and insignificant 
in most cases. Exceptions are in the regression on the Big/High BM portfolio which 
results in a positive intercept, and the regression on the Small/Low BM group which 
produces a statistically significant intercept. These confirm findings reported earlier in 
this chapter that value and size premiums do not exist in all groups of stocks. In 
particular, the value premium is more noticeable within Small stocks while the size 
effect is more dominant in value stocks. 
The coefficients associated with the market factor are positive and statistically 
significant at a 1% level in most cases, except for the Big/High BM portfolio. The 
market beta in regression on the Big/High BM stock returns is only 0.041 (t-statistic is 
0.62, statistically insignificant). This indicates that unlike other portfolio groups, the 
Big and Growth companies among the FTSE350 are less likely to be affected by the 
overall movement of the market. For other portfolios, the coefficients δm are highly 
significant, for example the market beta in regression on Small/Low BM is as high as 
0.622 with a t-statistic of 6.55, which is of a 1% statistical significance. 
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In line with Griffin and Lemmon’s (2002) findings, the results in Panel A show that 
HML and SMB variables are important in explaining the movement of average stock 
returns in the UK. The coefficients associated with the HML factor are positive and 
highly significant in regressions on High BM portfolios. The estimated coefficients are 
0.339 (t-statistic is 3.31) for Small/High BM stocks and 0.715 (t-statistic is 5.21) for 
Big/High BM groups. The magnitude and significance of the HML coefficients, δHML, 
decrease in the Medium BM portfolio and become statistically insignificant in the Low 
BM group. These indicate that the BM effect is more noticeable among High and 
Medium BM stocks. 
In terms of the size effect, the estimated coefficients δSMB show that the SMB variable 
plays an important role in explaining returns on the Small/Low BM and the Big/Medium 
BM stocks but less important in regression on the Big/Low BM and High BM portfolio 
returns. The values of δSMB in the regressions on the Small/Low BM and Big/Medium 
BM portfolio returns are -0.221 (t-statistic of -2.18, significant at a 5% level), and 0.249 
(t-statistic of 1.98, significant at a 10% level), respectively. However, the coefficients 
are only between 0.002 and 0.140 in absolute terms and statistically insignificant in the 
case of other portfolios. 
From Panel A, it can be said that beside the Fama and French three factors, the default 
risk proxied by O-score does play an important role in explaining expected stock 
returns. Generally, firms with a high probability of bankruptcy or under distress would 
be less likely to yield a high stock return. The results in Panel A indeed confirm that 
default risk has a negative relationship with expected stock returns in the UK market. 
Additionally, most of the coefficients associated with DEF are statistically significant, 
especially among small stocks. The coefficients range from -0.092 (t-statistic equal to -
0.93) to -0.210 (t-statistic is -2.37, significant at a 5% level). Furthermore, when 
comparing with the FF regressions, the constant terms from the regressions are less 
significant. The Adjusted R2s in models augmented with the default variable are also 
higher. In Table 3.5, the highest Adjusted R2 is 19%. However, the highest Adjusted R2 
in Table 3.7 is 39%. The results suggest that the presence of the DEF factor in the FF 
three-factor model contributes to capturing more of the movement in average stock 
returns in the UK. 
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Table 3.7: Time-series regressions with default risk on 6 size/BM portfolios 
Panel A: Augmented Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (model 3.6) 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt + SMBi SMBt + DEFi DEFt +i 
The table presents time-series estimation results of the above regression on 6 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market and 2 size rankings. In particular, HBM, M and LBM 
denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks while 
Small and Big stocks are separated by the medium. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is 
obtained from Prof.. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are 
constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to 
mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns using the same breakpoints. Distress factor 
(DEF) is the difference in value-weighted returns of stocks in the top 30% O-score and the 
bottom 30% O-score ranking groups. It is worth noticing that while these 6 portfolios are formed 
using the breakpoint 40:20:40 to adapt to the smaller size of non-US markets, portfolio-based 
factors use the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint instead because they proxy for risk factors rather than 
measuring actual returns. The panel reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted 
for the degree of freedom. 
 
 Small Big  Small Big 
 θ  t(θ) 
HBM -0.001 0.004  -0.39 0.82 
M -0.007 -0.002  -1.05 -0.55 
LBM -0.006 -0.002  -2.01** -0.51 
 m  t(m) 
HBM 0.356 0.044  5.52*** 0.67 
M 0.617 0.545  7.68*** 5.71*** 
LBM 0.622 0.389  6.55*** 4.10*** 
 HML  t(HML) 
HBM 0.339 0.715  3.31*** 5.21*** 
M -0.220 -0.278  -1.89* -1.92* 
LBM 0.031 0.111  0.25 0.88 
 SMB  t(SMB) 
HBM -0.106 -0.140  -1.66 -1.44 
M 0.002 0.249  0.09 1.98* 
LBM -0.221 -0.015  -2.18** -0.10 
 DEF  t(DEF) 
HBM -0.114 -0.108  -2.34** -1.88 
M -0.100 -0.092  -1.04 -0.93 
LBM -0.210 -0.203  -2.37** -2.01* 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.45 0.39    
M 0.39 0.36    
LBM 0.42 0.41    
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Table 3.7 – Continued 
Panel B: Augmented Carhart (1997) four-factor model (model 3.7) 
Rit - Rft = θ’i +’mi (Rmt – Rft) + ’HMLi HMLt + ’SMBi SMBt + ’WMLi WMLt+’DEFi DEFt +’i  
The table presents time-series estimation results of the above regression on 6 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market value and 2 size rankings. In particular, HBM, M and 
LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks 
while Small and Big stocks are separated by the medium. The excess return on the market, Rm 
- Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are 
constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to 
mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns using the same breakpoints. Following 
Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) approach, Winner-minus-Loser (WML) is constructed based on 
stocks’ 11-month past returns. The monthly portfolio returns are calculated at July, year t with 
a 1-month lag and value weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t. WML is the 
return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks. The distress factor (DEF) 
is the difference in value-weighted returns of stocks in the top 30% O-score and the bottom 30% 
O-score ranking groups. It is worth noticing that while these 6 portfolios are formed using the 
breakpoint 40:20:40 to adapt to the smaller size of non-US markets, the portfolio-based factors 
use the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint instead because they proxy for risk factors rather than 
measure actual returns. The panel reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and 
*** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for 
the degree of freedom. 
 
 Small Big  Small Big 
 θ’  t(θ’) 
HBM -0.001 0.005  -0.41 0.85 
M -0.005 -0.003  -1.00 -0.61 
LBM -0.004 -0.004  -1.87* -0.65 
 ’m  t(’m) 
HBM 0.351 0.041  5.46*** 0.62 
M 0.610 0.543  7.62*** 5.68*** 
LBM 0.619 0.386  6.41*** 4.03*** 
 ’HML  t(’HML) 
HBM 0.335 0.712  3.29*** 5.20*** 
M -0.218 -0.273  -1.86* -1.87* 
LBM 0.030 0.111  0.22 1.38 
 ’SMB  t(’SMB) 
HBM -0.109 -0.143  -1.68 -1.47 
M 0.003 0.251  0.12 2.01* 
LBM -0.225 -0.016  -2.21** -0.12 
 ’WML  t(’WML) 
HBM -0.021 -0.056  -0.24 -0.33 
M 0.113 -0.102  1.71 -1.25 
LBM 0.216 -0.103  1.98* -1.27 
 ’DEF  t(’DEF) 
HBM -0.112 -0.102  -2.30** -1.71 
M -0.089 -0.091  -1.01 -0.90 
LBM -0.205 -0.200  -2.32** -1.97* 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.46 0.41    
M 0.42 0.38    
LBM 0.44 0.43    
  
114 
3.5.4.B. Default risk and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
The augmented Carhart model includes all the FF three factors, a momentum 
component and an additional default factor. In Panel B of Table 3.7, the estimated 
results are largely similar to those reported in Panel A for the augmented FF three-factor 
model. However, the magnitude of estimated coefficients are reduced in the presence 
of the momentum variable. The momentum factor also shows an ability to improve the 
overall performance of the model, especially contributing to explain the movement of 
the Small/Low BM portfolio. 
As can be seen from the table, the constant terms remain negative and insignificant in 
most cases. The magnitude of the intercepts are however slightly smaller in absolute 
terms than those in the augmented FF three-factor model. Although the constant term 
in regression on Small/Low BM remains statistically significant, its magnitude and 
significance decrease to a 10% significant level. 
In the presence of the momentum variable, the coefficients associated with other 
explanatory variables keep both their sign and significance. The magnitude is again 
marginally smaller than previously observed in the three-factor model. The market betas 
are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level, except for Big/High BM (δ’m is 
equal to 0.041, t-statistic is 0.62). In other cases, the market betas range from 0.351 for 
Small/High BM to 0.619 for Small/Low BM, and t-statistics are between 4.03 to 7.62. 
Similar to the results in Panel A, the BM variable shows the ability to explain more 
movement of High BM and Medium BM stocks whilst it is not the case for Low BM 
stocks. In contrast, the size effect is more noticeable among Small/Low BM and 
Big/Medium BM portfolios. In terms of the distress factor, the results in Panel B 
confirm that default risk plays an important role in explaining the movement of Small 
portfolios, mainly within value and growth stocks. Among the Big stocks, the default 
variable however can only capture the default risk pattern in average returns on the 
Big/Low BM portfolio. 
In comparison with the augmented FF three-factor model, the results in Panel B indicate 
that the momentum variable does contribute to explaining the movement of Small/Low 
BM stock returns. In the regression on the Small/Low BM portfolio returns, the 
coefficient associated with the WML variable, δ’WML, is equal to 0.216 (t-statistic is just 
under 1.98, statistically significant at a 10% level). This means that small and growing 
  
115 
companies, such as start-ups, tend to continue their good performance and are therefore 
a profitable investment in the long run. This tendency is however less observable in 
other groups of companies. For these groups, the momentum effect is less significant in 
capturing the risk patterns in portfolio returns. The estimated coefficients δ’WML for 
those portfolios range between -0.021 and 0.216, statistically insignificant, with t-
statistics of between -0.24 and 1.71. Although adding the WML variable does improve 
the estimation quality, the improvement is not substantial. The Adjusted R2s increase to 
around 2 percent, comparable to those reported for the augmented Fama-French three-
factor model. 
Overall, the results in Panels A and B show that default risk plays an important role in 
explaining the movement of average stock returns. Its explanatory power is particularly 
noticeable in regressions on returns on Small stocks. This implies that small companies 
are more likely to suffer default risk than their big counterpart. Among Big stocks, it is 
Low BM stocks that bear a higher distress risk than High BM stocks. This indicates that 
big and over-priced companies have a higher probability of going bankrupt than big and 
growing firms. 
The next section will discuss the robustness tests which aim to ensure that these 
findings are not sensitive to the choice of indicator or methodological approach. 
3.5.5 Robustness checks 
This section uses two approaches to check the robustness of the findings reported in 
section 3.5.4. Firstly, regressions are re-run on another commonly used proxy for 
default risk, which is Z-score. Secondly, an additional analysis is carried out using the 
portfolio-based approach to capturing default risk. This method was suggested by 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) for the UK market, and will be implemented alongside the 
first approach in order to check the validity of findings in this chapter.  
The results from the first approach are summarised in Table 3.8, of which Panel A 
reports the results of robustness checks using the FF three-factor model and the results 
of the test using the Carhart four-factor model are summarised in Panel B. In the table, 
the results indicate that when using Z-score instead of O-score as a proxy for a 
corporation’s probability of bankruptcy the overall outcome is largely unchanged.  
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 3.8, the constant terms are statistically 
insignificant. They range from -0.005 to -0.001 with t-statistics of between -0.93 and -
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0.40. These once again confirm the findings that value and size premiums in the UK 
market are insignificant. The market factor remains the key explanatory variable in 
explaining the average stock returns. The coefficients associated with the excess market 
return variable, δ’m, are positive and highly significant. It is worth noticing that in the 
regression on Big/High BM stocks, the estimated market beta is higher and becomes 
statistically significant when Z-score is used as an indicator for default risk. This may 
be due to the way Z-score is calculated. Besides the accounting information that O-
score relies on, Z-score also includes firm size in measuring the probability of corporate 
failure. Therefore, the market risk elements become perhaps more important in 
explaining the movement of Big/High BM portfolio returns than they are when O-score 
is employed. 
The results in Panel A also show that when Z-score is used as an alternative indicator 
of bankruptcy probability, the BM effect remains a key factor in capturing the 
movement of returns on the High BM and Medium BM portfolios but less significant 
among the Low BM stocks. Compared with the results reported previously in Table 3.7, 
most of the coefficients associated with the HML variable are lower in absolute terms 
but the differences are immaterial. Similarly, the size effect becomes slightly less 
noticeable in the regressions that use Z-score to measure default likelihood among 
FTSE350 companies. Despite these changes in magnitude, the significance of the 
coefficients associated with the size factor is unchanged. The coefficients δ’SMB are 
statistically significant at a 10% level in regressions on the Small/Low BM and 
Big/Medium BM portfolios. They are -0.189 (t-statistic is -1.97) and 0.214 (t-statistic 
is 1.87), respectively.  
Consistent with the previous results, default probability is negatively related to the 
expected stock returns. This indicates that in the long run companies with a higher 
likelihood of going bankrupt tend to have lower average stocks returns. In addition, 
Small and High BM firms and Big stocks with Low BM are among those most sensitive 
to default risk. In regressions on the excess returns on the two portfolios, the estimated 
coefficients associated with default risk, δ’Z-score, are -0.213 and -0.221 (t-statistic values 
of -2.10 and -2.17, and significant at a 10% level), respectively. However, the constant 
term from the regression on the Small/Low BM stocks is no longer significant, 
suggesting that the regression model is able to explain more of the differentials in stock 
returns. 
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In summary, the three factors in the FF model together with the default factor continue 
to play an important role in pricing expected stock returns of FTSE350 companies. 
Although using an alternative default factor results in sign changes for some 
coefficients, the magnitude and significance of explanatory variables do not change 
substantially.  
As reported in Panel B of Table 3.8, a similar robustness check is carried out on the 
augmented Carhart four-factor model. It is to test whether the findings reported in Panel 
B of Table 3.7 are robust. In this test, Z-score (instead of O-score) is used as an indicator 
of bankruptcy probability. 
Overall, the estimated coefficients in the augmented Carhart model are consistent 
regardless of which default indicator is used. In the regressions on excess returns on 6 
size/BM portfolios, the intercepts range from -0.006 to -0.002, with t-statistics being 
between -0.97 and -0.31 (statistically insignificant). The market factor remains an 
important variable in explaining the returns on these 6 portfolios. The market betas (δ’m) 
are slightly higher in the model using Z-score, and statistically significant across all 
portfolios. One improvement observed in the estimations is that using a different proxy 
for default risk leads to an improvement in the market factor ability to explain Big/High 
BM excess returns. In the regression, the coefficient associated with the market variable 
is equal to 0.117 (t-statistic is 2.21, significant at a 10% level) in comparison with just 
0.041 (t-statistic is 0.62, statistically insignificant) in the model using O-score (reported 
in Panel B of Table 3.7). It may be due to the fact that besides accounting information 
Z-score also takes into account company market value. Therefore, this slight 
improvement may imply that incorporating market information in measuring default 
risk could enhance distress risk analysis. This lends support to the thesis’s approach 
which aims to incorporate both accounting and market information in measuring 
distress risk in average stock returns. 
In terms of BM and size effects, the coefficients associated with these factors keep the 
same sign and magnitude in models using different default probability indicators. The 
δ’HML are about 0.3 to 0.5 in regressions on the High BM portfolio excess returns. Their 
t-statistics range between 3.07 and 3.78 (highly significant at a 1% level). For Medium 
BM stocks, the coefficients are lower in absolute terms and only statistically significant 
at a 5% level. The magnitude and significance of the BM effects are much smaller in 
the Low BM portfolios (i.e. the Growth portfolio) than in the above portfolios. The 
  
118 
coefficients δ’HML are 0.043 (t-statistic is 1.36) in the regression on Small/Low BM 
stocks, and 0.074 (t-statistic is only 0.89) in the case of the Big/Low BM portfolio. In 
the two regressions, the estimated δ’HML are statistically insignificant, indicating that the 
BM effect is less noticeable among growth companies. The robustness check also 
confirms that the size factor can explain more of the movement in Small/Low BM and 
Big/Medium BM stock returns, but less for other portfolios. The estimated coefficients 
δ’SMB remain significant in regressions on these two portfolio returns (t-statistics are 
about 2.80, significant at a 5% level). The coefficient values are, however, just under 
0.090 and not significant for other portfolios. 
Similar to the results in Panel B of Table 3.7, the results in Table 3.8 show that the 
momentum factor could capture some risk elements in the Small/Low BM portfolio but 
less in other groups of stocks. The coefficient δ’WML associated with the momentum 
variable is estimated to be highly positive at 0.174 with a t-statistic of 2.77 (significant 
at a 10% level) for small and growth stocks. This indicates that small and fast-growing 
companies are likely to continue their past performance whilst this tendency is less 
noticeable in other company types.  
In terms of the distress factor, using Z-score instead of O-score to form default variables 
does not change the results of the analysis. As can be seen from Panel B of Table 3.8, 
the coefficients associated with the default factor are negative and significant in 
regressions on both High BM and Low BM excess returns. Unsurprisingly, the results 
confirm that companies in financial distress generate lower excess returns. Moreover, 
the default risk does play an important role in explaining their long-term average 
returns. The coefficients δ’Z-score are -0.201 for Small/High BM stocks and -0.169 for 
Big/High BM. These values are slightly lower, at -0.122 and -0.148, for Small/Low BM 
and Big/Low BM, respectively. All estimated default coefficients are statistically 
significant irrespective of the choice of default indicators. 
The results in Panel B also confirm that adding the WML variable to the FF three-factor 
model marginally improves the explanatory power of the FF model. The regression Adj-
R2s increases slightly from nearly 0.50 in the augmented FF model to around 0.52 in 
the model including a momentum variable. 
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In summary, results from the first approach indicate that using a different proxy for 
default risk does not materially change the chapter findings that the default factor plays 
an important role in explaining return differentials responsible for value anomaly.
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Table 3.8: Time-series regressions with default risk measured by Z-score on 6 
size/BM portfolios 
Panel A: Augmented Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt + SMBi SMBt + Z-scorei Z-scoret +i 
The panel checks the robustness of the outcome in Table 3.7 using an alternative indicator of 
firms’ default probability: Z-score, proposed by Altman (1968). It presents time-series 
estimation results of the above regression on 6 intersection portfolios formed by 3 book-to-
market value and 2 size rankings. In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the 
middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks while Small and Big stocks are 
separated by the medium. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof 
Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to 
the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size 
effects in expected stock returns. The distress factor (Z-score) is the difference in value-
weighted returns of stocks in the top 30% Z-score and the bottom 30% Z-score ranking groups. 
It is worth noticing that while these 6 portfolios are formed using the breakpoint 40:20:40 to 
adapt to the smaller size of non-US markets, portfolio-based factors use the usual 30:40:30 
breakpoint instead because they proxy for risk factors rather than measure actual returns. The 
panel reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
 
 Small Big  Small Big 
 θ  t(θ) 
HBM -0.003 -0.001  -0.43 -0.40 
M -0.002 -0.002  -0.51 -0.56 
LBM -0.005 -0.001  -0.93 -0.42 
 m  t(m) 
HBM 0.434 0.215  3.21*** 1.99* 
M 0.412 0.533  3.02*** 4.11*** 
LBM 0.388 0.501  2.89*** 3.72*** 
 HML  t(HML) 
HBM 0.301 0.423  3.13*** 3.21*** 
M 0.200 0.157  2.02** 2.01** 
LBM 0.085 0.099  0.56 0.58 
 SML  t(SMB) 
HBM 0.097 0.135  0.72 1.07 
M 0.102 0.214  1.37 1.87* 
LBM -0.189 -0.072  -1.97* -0.81 
 Z-score  t(Z-score) 
HBM -0.213 -0.221  -2.10* -2.17* 
M -0.154 -0.101  -1.37 -1.36 
LBM -0.176 -0.214  -1.22 -2.32* 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.47 0.41    
M 0.40 0.51    
LBM 0.52 0.39    
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Table 3.8 - Continued 
Panel B: Augmented Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
Rit - Rft = θ’i +’mi (Rmt – Rft) + ’HMLi HMLt +’SMBi SMBt + ’WMLi WMLt+’Z-scorei Z-scoret +’i  
Panel B checks the robustness of the outcome in Table 3.7 using an alternative indicator of 
firms’ default probability: Z-score, proposed by Altman (1968). It presents time-series 
estimation results of the above regression on 6 intersection portfolios formed by 3 book-to-
market value and 2 size rankings. In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the 
middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks while Small and Big stocks are 
separated by the medium. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof 
Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to 
the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size 
effects in expected stock returns. The WML component is built based on stocks’ 11-month past 
returns, according to which WML is the return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 
30% stocks. The distress factor (Z-score) is the difference in value-weighted returns of stocks 
in the top 30% Z-score and the bottom 30% Z-score ranking groups. It is worth noticing that 
while these 6 portfolios are formed using the breakpoint 40:20:40 to adapt to the smaller size 
of non-US markets, portfolio-based factors use the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint instead because 
they proxy for risk factors rather than measure actual returns. The panel reports estimated 
coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
 
 Small Big  Small Big 
 θ’  t(θ’) 
HBM -0.002 -0.003  -0.31 -0.40 
M -0.003 -0.004  -0.62 -0.66 
LBM -0.006 -0.004  -0.97 -0.65 
 ’m  t(’m) 
HBM 0.462 0.117  3.18*** 2.21* 
M 0.524 0.350  3.15*** 4.36*** 
LBM 0.551 0.442  3.20*** 4.74*** 
 ’HML  t(’HML) 
HBM 0.321 0.548  3.07*** 3.78*** 
M -0.200 -0.191  -2.83** 2.70** 
LBM 0.043 0.074  1.36 0.89 
 ’SMB  t(’SMB) 
HBM -0.062 -0.083  -1.45 -1.93 
M 0.074 0.212  1.85 2.88** 
LBM -0.194 -0.086  -2.79** -1.96 
 ’WML  t(’WML) 
HBM -0.025 -0.076  -1.23 -1.62 
M 0.096 -0.102  1.98 -1.96 
LBM 0.174 -0.107  2.77* -1.98 
 ’Z-score  t(’ Z-score) 
HBM -0.201 -0.169  -2.85** -2.46* 
M -0.056 -0.074  -1.38 -1.86 
LBM -0.122 -0.148  -2.16* -2.41* 
 Adj R2    
HBM 0.52 0.55    
M 0.47 0.58    
LBM 0.50 0.49    
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The second approach to identifying the risk patterns associated with default likelihood 
is the portfolio-based approach using the default variable as base portfolios. The general 
approach was described in Chapter 2, and it has also been used particularly in the UK 
context by Griffin and Lemmon (2002). In this section, the chapter utilises the portfolio-
based approach in value anomaly testing, aiming to capture default risk in average 
returns on 9 intersection DEF/BM portfolios. The 9 portfolios are the intersections 
between 3 default portfolios and 3 BM portfolios. According to Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002), any potential risk patterns in expected stock returns of going into default are 
meant to be captured in separate groups of stocks with similar distress characteristics.  
The robustness check in this section uses a combination of both portfolio-based and 
regression approaches. The regression estimations will be carried out on the FF three-
factor model as well as the Carhart four-factor model and the results are shown in Panels 
A and B of Table 3.9, respectively. 
From Panel A of the table, it is found that the FF model can explain more of the value 
premium in the High DEF/Low BM portfolio than in other groups. The regression 
intercept is equal to -0.121 (t-statistic is -2.31, significant at a 10% level). The market 
factor also shows a strong and consistent explanatory ability in explaining the 
movement of stock returns. The estimated market betas are positive and highly 
significant across all 9 portfolio groups. They range from 0.359 (for Low DEF/High 
BM stocks) to 0.534 (for High DEF/Low BM stocks). These suggest that companies 
which are overpriced by the market but in severe financial distress are the group that is 
most sensitive to changes in the market. On the contrary, value firms with a low risk of 
default are more resilient and their performance is less likely to be affected by the 
market factor. 
Additionally, the results in Panel A confirm that other explanatory factors, including 
BM, size, and default probability, are also important risk characteristics in explaining 
the value premium. The majority of the coefficients associated with these variables are 
statistically significant. Similar to the findings in section 3.4.4, estimation results of the 
robustness check show that the coefficients associated with the HML variable δ’HML are 
highly significant in regressions on the excess returns on High DEF portfolios, and those 
on High BM portfolios. The coefficients take the values of between 0.166 and 0.205 (t-
statistics are 2.52 and 3.12, respectively) for the former group of portfolios, and between 
0.174 and 0.205 (t-statistics are 3.01 and 3.12, respectively) for the latter. The BM effect 
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is less significant for other portfolios and becomes statistically insignificant among Low 
DEF/Low BM stocks. 
In the panel, there is evidence that the risk patterns associated with the size effect 
contribute to explaining return differentials between value versus growth stocks as well 
as those between High and Low default risk stocks. The size factor is more noticeable 
among Low BM stocks. The coefficients δ’SMB are negative and statistically significant 
in regressions on the excess returns on the High DEF/Low BM and Medium DEF/Low 
BM portfolios. They take the values of -0.134 (t-statistic is -2.45, and significant at 5%) 
and -0.112 (t-statistic is -2.23, significant at a 10% level), respectively. This may be due 
to the fact that in the FTSE350, the majority of Low BM (or growth) companies have a 
high market capitalisation value. Thus, the size premium reduces among growth stocks. 
In terms of the risk patterns associated with firm default probability, the results in Panel 
A indicate that the return on Low DEF stocks is more sensitive to the size effect than 
High and Medium DEF portfolios. The coefficient associated with the SMB variable is 
estimated to be 0.112, statistically significant at a 10% level for the stocks that are less 
likely to be in financial distress, but the coefficient takes the value of only 0.078 (t-
statistic of 0.52, insignificant) in regressions on excess returns on stocks of medium and 
high distress companies. The results suggest that default risk would contribute to 
explaining average stock returns.  
Next, Panel B of Table 3.9 reports the estimated coefficients of Carhart four-factor 
regressions on excess returns on the 9 DEF/BM portfolios tested above. Similar to the 
findings reported in Table 3.7, the market, BM and size effects, together with the 
distress factor play an important role in capturing the risk patterns in average stock 
returns while the momentum effect is only observable in some growth stocks. 
Additionally, by sorting portfolios based on default risk, the analysis in this section 
finds that the momentum factor could also capture the movement of returns on stocks 
where there is less distress. Moreover, the results in Panel B confirm that adding the 
momentum variable could marginally improve the model’s goodness of fit in 
comparison with the three-factor model. 
As can be seen from Panel B, the value of constant terms varies from 0.002 to 0.098, 
with t-statistics being between 0.13 and 1.42, statistically insignificant. The traditional 
market factor remains highly significant across the estimations. In addition, the 
estimated market betas are higher in the regressions on the High DEF and/or Low BM 
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portfolios than these on the Low DEF and/or High BM groups. Thus, it seems that 
companies in high financial distress, especially those that have low BM, are more 
sensitive to the movement of the market than firms that are financially stable and/or 
have a high B/M ratio.  
Moreover, the coefficients associated with BM effect are highly significant across 
regressions on stocks sorted by DEF and BM. The only exception is in the regression 
on Low DEF/Low BM portfolio, where the coefficient δ’HML is equal to 0.068 (t-statistic 
is only 1.35 and statistically insignificant). This shows that there is little evidence of 
any BM effect among growth firms which are financially successful. Earlier in Section 
3.4.4, the results in Panel B of Table 3.7 also suggest that the BM effect is less 
noticeable in growth stocks. In regressions on other portfolios, the coefficients 
associated with the HML variable take the value of between 0.125 and 0.234. t-statistics 
are between 2.61 and 2.92, and statistically significant at the levels 1% to 5%.  
On the other hand, the size effect is less significant among stocks sorted by DEF and 
B/M ratio. The coefficients δ’SMB are relatively low in absolute terms and only 
significant at a 10% level in regressions on excess returns on the High DEF/Low BM 
and Medium DEF/Low BM portfolios. Their estimated values are -0.102 (t-statistic of 
-1.88) and -0.109 (t-statistic of -2.01) in these 2 regressions, respectively. This implies 
that the size effect plays a less important role in capturing default risk in average stock 
returns. It can however contribute to explaining movement in returns of growth stocks. 
Using the Carhart four-factor model in explaining returns on the intersection DEF/BM 
portfolios could improve the estimations. The additional momentum variable shows 
some ability to explain more of the movement in Low DEF stock returns. The 
coefficients associated with the WML variable are estimated to be between 0.111 and 
0.163, statistically significant, in regressions on the returns on low default probability 
companies. To some extent, adding a momentum factor also improves the model 
goodness of fit, and contributes to achieving slightly higher Adjusted R2s. 
Overall, the findings reported in Table 3.9 are consistent with previous studies which 
pointed out that stocks with different default probabilities behave differently. The 
results once again confirm the findings discussed so far in this chapter that besides size, 
BM and momentum effects, probability of bankruptcy does play an important part in 
explaining expected stock returns in general and the return differentials between high 
and low BM stocks in particular. 
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Table 3.9: Time-series regressions on 9 DEF/BM portfolios 
Panel A: Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt +SMBi SMBt + i 
Panel A presents time-series estimation results of Fama-French regressions on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 default probability and 3 book-to-market value rankings using 
breakpoints of 40%, 20% and 40%. In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, 
the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks while High DEF, Medium DEF 
and Low DEF stand for high, medium and low O-score stocks. The excess return on the market, 
Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB 
are constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant 
to mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns. The panel summarises estimated 
coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
 
 High 
DEF 
Medium 
DEF 
Low 
DEF 
High 
DEF 
Medium 
DEF 
Low DEF 
 θ t(θ) 
HBM 0.052 0.077 0.101 1.26 1.35 1.98 
M -0.014 -0.011 0.004 -0.68 -0.62 0.02 
LBM -0.121 -0.078 -0.031 -2.31* -1.82 -0.41 
       
 m t(m) 
HBM 0.462 0.459 0.359 3.52*** 3.02*** 2.98*** 
M 0.511 0.505 0.405 3.61*** 3.60*** 3.46*** 
LBM 0.534 0.507 0.436 4.28*** 3.78*** 3.15*** 
   
 HML t(HML) 
HBM 0.205 0.202 0.174 3.12*** 3.08*** 3.01** 
M 0.178 0.139 0.133 2.87** 2.77** 2.49* 
LBM 0.166 0.121 0.092 2.52** 2.21* 1.78 
   
 SMB t(SMB) 
HBM 0.078 0.108 0.112 0.52 1.59 2.12* 
M -0.021 0.101 0.109 -0.31 1.77 2.07 
LBM -0.134 -0.112 -0.101 -2.45** -2.23* -1.89 
       
 Adj R2  
HBM 0.50 0.62 0.60    
M 0.48 0.51 0.49    
LBM 0.51 0.45 0.42    
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Table 3.9 - Continued 
Panel B: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θ'i +'mi (Rmt – Rft) + 'HMLi HMLt +'SMBi SMBt + 'WMLi WMLt +'i 
Panel B presents time-series estimation results of Carhart regressions on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 default probability and 3 book-to-market value rankings using 
breakpoints of 40%, 20% and 40%. In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, 
the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-to-market value stocks while High DEF, Medium DEF 
and Low DEF stand for high, medium and low O-score stocks. The excess return on the market, 
Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB 
are constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant 
to mimic BM and size effects in expected stock returns. The WML component is built based on 
stocks’ 11-month past returns, according to which the WML is the return differential between 
the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks. The panel summarises estimated coefficients and their 
t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of 
fit R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
 
 High 
DEF 
Medium 
DEF 
Low 
DEF 
High 
DEF 
Medium 
DEF 
Low DEF 
 θ' t(θ') 
HBM -0.055 0.062 0.098 -1.22 1.43 1.42 
M -0.012 -0.031 0.002 -0.51 -0.72 0.13 
LBM -0.072 -0.068 -0.043 -1.30 -1.35 -0.77 
       
 'm t('m) 
HBM 0.456 0.461 0.342 3.45*** 3.33*** 2.98*** 
M 0.542 0.502 0.403 4.52*** 4.02*** 3.21*** 
LBM 0.533 0.511 0.434 4.37*** 3.87*** 3.41*** 
   
 'HML t('HML) 
HBM 0.234 0.163 0.157 2.92*** 2.81** 2.79** 
M 0.207 0.125 0.137 2.88** 2.75** 2.78** 
LBM 0.132 0.136 0.068 2.61** 2.78** 1.35 
   
 'SMB t('SMB) 
HBM 0.022 0.096 0.056 0.63 1.65 1.25 
M -0.019 0.098 0.052 -0.42 1.67 1.23 
LBM -0.102 -0.109 -0.101 -1.88* -2.01* -1.85 
       
 'WML t('WML) 
HBM -0.022 -0.047 0.163 -0.57 -1.01 2.82** 
M -0.026 -0.066 0.111 -0.64 -1.23 2.05* 
LBM -0.043 -0.010 0.156 -0.71 -0.72 2.73** 
 Adj R2  
HBM 0.61 0.65 0.63    
M 0.52 0.55 0.53    
LBM 0.64 0.66 0.51    
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3.5.6 Conclusion 
Testing on the FTSE350 index over a 23-year period from 1990 to 2012, the chapter 
finds evidence that the default probability is an important factor beside size, BM and 
momentum effects in explaining value premium and should be considered in asset 
pricing modelling. Additionally, the results suggest that small and growth companies 
are among the more profitable investment in the long run as they tend to continue their 
good performance. Furthermore, in the presence of a default factor, the Carhart four-
factor model performs only slightly better than FF three-factor model. In the Carhart 
model, the additional momentum variable contributes to explaining more of the 
movement of Small/Low BM portfolio returns but this is less noticeable for other 
portfolios. 
Using a comprehensive set of proxies including Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score, the chapter confirms that the default risk measured by probability of 
bankruptcy has a negative relationship with expected stock returns. It also exhibits a 
significant explanatory power in capturing well the movement of stock returns. More 
specifically, default risk plays an important role in explaining the movement in returns 
of smaller stocks. The distress factor has a negative and significant impact on average 
returns on the Small portfolio. This suggests that small companies are more likely to 
suffer default risk than their Big counterpart. Among Big companies, Big/Low BM 
companies tend to bear a higher distress risk than Big/High BM firms. Hence, large and 
over-priced companies are more likely to be at a higher risk of going into default than 
large and growing firms.  
The results in this section are found to be robust and are not driven by the choice of 
default risk proxies (O-score or Z-score), or analysis approaches (a regression approach 
or a portfolio sorting method). Although the estimation results can vary slightly, they 
keep the same sign and magnitude in the large majority of cases. 
The next section will extend the analysis to including individual stock volatility in the 
list of risk factors that would potentially explain return differentials generated by value 
investment strategies. 
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3.6 THE VOLATILITY EXPLANATIONS 
3.6.1 Volatility and value premium 
Table 3.10 reports time series estimations on the returns on 9 portfolios ranked by three 
volatility and three BM portfolios over the 23-year sample period up to December 2012. 
Firstly, the time-series analysis relies on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
to capture the performance of extreme high and low volatility (Vo) groups. The 
explanatory factors are calculated from monthly value weighted portfolios by regressing 
excess returns on the market portfolio, book-to-market and size effects. The results are 
summarised in Panel A of Table 3.10. Next, similar estimations are carried out using 
the Carhart four-factor model in order to establish a direct comparison of volatility risk 
in time-series three- and four-factor regressions. The four-factor model results are 
reported in Panel B of the table. Finally, since the idiosyncratic volatility factor only 
concerns firm-level risk, this section also reports cross-sectional estimation results of 
the above tests in order to identify the relationship between firm-level volatility risk and 
the rest of the market. These results are summarised in Table 3.11. 
In Panel A of Table 3.10, stocks are sorted into 3 BM portfolios and 3 idiosyncratic 
volatility portfolios. The estimation regressions on the 9 intersection portfolios show 
that the market variable has an important effect on stock returns. This is similar to what 
has been previously reported in Section 3.5.2 which was based on size/BM ranking. The 
coefficients associated with market factor are all significant at a 1% level, confirming 
the importance of the market beta in explaining the movement of average stock returns. 
In other words, the CAPM beta remains a well-performing factor. The beta negative 
sign, however, differs from what was found in the Fama and French (1993) regressions. 
It could be interpreted in the way that the higher the market systematic risk is, the lower 
expected returns on volatility/BM portfolios are. Also, there is a possibility that the 
more diversified our portfolios are, the fewer firm-level volatility effects these 
portfolios suffer. 
The HML factor is now seen to play a more significant role in capturing the risk patterns 
in returns on both value and growth portfolios. The coefficients associated with the 
factor, δHML, are statistically significant at a 1% level. It is worth noting that unlike the 
estimations on size and BM portfolios in previous studies done in major markets 
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including the UK, such as Fama and French (1998), the FF three-factor model run on 
volatility and BM portfolios results in negative δHML for the High BM portfolios and 
positive coefficients for the Low BM portfolios. In addition, the estimated coefficients 
δHML in regressions on the High Vo portfolio returns have higher absolute values than 
those on Low Vo portfolios. These suggest that highly volatile stocks are more sensitive 
to the HML variable than low volatile stocks. 
As can be seen in Panel A, SMB effects show a stronger impact on the average returns 
of Medium and Low volatility groups. The estimated coefficients associated with the 
SMB variable δSMB are -0.148 (t-statistic is -2.42, statistically significant at a 5% level) 
in the regression on Medium Vo/High BM stocks and -0.099 (t-statistic is -1.75, 
statistically significant at 10% level) in the Medium Vo/Low BM portfolio regression. 
However, among Low Vo portfolios, only the regression on Low Vo/Medium BM 
portfolio generates a significant δSMB which takes the value of -0.153 (t-statistics is -
2.35, significant at a 5% level). Nevertheless, for High volatility portfolios the size 
effect is not noticeable. In regressions on these stock returns, the δSMB takes values of 
between -0.65 and 0.89, which are statistically insignificant. It is also worth noting that 
the sign of coefficients δSMB is largely negative for Low BM stocks.  
In terms of model performance, using the portfolio-based formation approach 
significantly improves the regression Adjusted R2s. Within the High volatility 
portfolios, the FF three-factor model captures the most variation in excess returns on 
value stocks, followed by the growth group. The Adjusted R2s are lower toward the 
lower volatility groups. Overall, the approach using Vo/BM ranking shows a higher 
explanatory ability in capturing BM effects than the traditional size/BM portfolio 
formation system. 
In Panel B of Table 3.10, the estimation results of the Carhart four-factor model show 
that when stocks are split into 9 Vo/BM portfolios, the three FF factors remain important 
in explaining the average stock returns, whilst the additional momentum effect is less 
noticeable. The constant terms in the time-series regressions are small and statistically 
insignificant across the board. Their estimated values are between 0.48 and 0.74 in the 
regressions on the High Vo and Medium Vo portfolios, and between -0.92 and -0.50 in 
the regressions on Low Vo stocks. On the other hand, the coefficients associated with 
the market variable, Rm, are negative and highly significant in all 9 regressions.  Their 
estimated values range from 0.521 to 1.216 in absolute terms, with t-statistics being 
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between 11.07 and 18.26, statistically significant at a 1% level. This once again 
confirms the important role of the market beta in capturing the risk patterns associated 
with default and BM risk in common stock returns. 
Similar to the results from the FF three-factor model, the HML variable has significant 
explanatory power in explaining value anomaly as well as the return differentials 
between the High and Low volatility stocks. In Panel B, the estimated coefficients 
associated with the BM factor, δ’HML, take the values of between -0.425 and -0.372 (t-
statistics of between -4.15 and -3.06, statistically significant at a 1% level) in regression 
on the Value portfolio excess returns. For the Growth stocks, the coefficient δ’HML is 
0.357 (t-statistic is 4.21, significant at 1% level) in the regression on the High Vo/Low 
BM portfolio returns, while it is higher at 0.427 (t-statistic is 4.82, also highly 
significant at 1% level) in the Low Vo/Low BM portfolio estimations. The BM effect 
is however not significant among Medium BM stocks.  
In terms of the size effect, the results in Panel B of the table show that Medium Vo/High 
BM, Medium Vo/Low BM and Low Vo/Medium BM are the three groups of stocks that 
are more exposed to the size effect than the other portfolios. This implies that firm size 
is not necessarily a key predictor of highly volatile stocks. The value of coefficients 
associated with the size variable, δ’SMB, is between only -0.008 and 0.031 (t-statistics are 
from -0.37 to 0.75, statistically insignificant) in regressions on excess returns on the 
High Vo portfolios. The size effect is most noticeable among Medium Vo/High BM 
companies. The coefficient takes the value of -0.178 (the t-statistic is -2.68, significant 
at a 5% level). This suggests that value and less volatile stocks are more sensitive to the 
size effect than other groups. Also, among those companies, stocks of smaller firms 
tend to generate higher average excess returns. 
On the contrary, the momentum variable does not display significant explanatory power 
in capturing the movement in average returns on portfolios sorted by Vo/BM. The 
coefficients associated with the WML variable are estimated to be between -0.1 and -
0.061 for High Vo stocks, and slightly higher ranging between -0.103 and 0.117 for the 
Low Vo portfolios. The t-statistic values show that they are statistically insignificant in 
all 9 regressions. 
The regression Adjusted R2s are to some extent similar to those reported in the FF three-
factor model, suggesting that when explaining return differentials between High and 
Low Vo stocks, the momentum factor is not one of the key elements in the estimations. 
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Table 3.10: Time-series regressions on 9 portfolios sorted by volatility and BM 
Panel A: Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt +SMBi SMBt + i 
Panel A presents time-series estimation results of Fama-French regressions on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market and 3 volatility ranking breakpoints of 40:20:40. In 
particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-
to-market value stocks while High Vo, Med Vo and Low Vo stand for high, medium and low 
volatility stocks. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. 
French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to the way Fama 
and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size effects in expected 
stock returns. The panel reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted 
for the degree of freedom. 
 High Vo Med Vo Low Vo High Vo Med Vo Low Vo 
 θ t(θ) 
HBM 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.97 0.12 -1.92* 
M 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.89 0.23 -2.19** 
LBM 0.005 0.001 -0.003 2.08** 0.51 -1.80* 
       
 m t(m) 
HBM -1.154 -0.887 -0.681 -20.91*** -16.33*** -14.53*** 
M -1.404 -1.004 -0.807 -18.23*** -13.94*** -14.00*** 
LBM -1.344 -0.924 -0.712 -23.27*** -18.49*** -16.45*** 
   
 HML t(HML) 
HBM -0.848 -0.427 -0.350 -10.12*** -5.19*** -4.92*** 
M -0.171 -0.073 -0.143 -1.46 -0.67 -1.63 
LBM 0.420 0.271 0.298 4.79*** 3.57*** 4.54*** 
   
 SMB t(SMB) 
HBM 0.041 -0.148 0.048 0.65 -2.42** 0.90 
M 0.077 0.071 -0.153 0.89 0.87 -2.35** 
LBM -0.043 -0.099 -0.048 -0.65 -1.75* -0.98 
       
 Adj R2  
HBM 0.71 0.57 0.50    
M 0.57 0.43 0.46    
LBM 0.67 0.56 0.51    
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Table 3.10 - Continued 
Panel B: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θ'i +'mi (Rmt – Rft) + 'HMLi HMLt + 'SMBi SMBt + 'WMLi WMLt +'i 
Panel B presents time-series estimation results of Carhart (1997) regressions on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 book-to-market and 3 volatility ranking breakpoints of 40:20:40. In 
particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% book-
to-market value stocks while High Vo, Med Vo and Low Vo stand for high, medium and low 
volatility stocks. In terms of explanatory variables, see Panel A for the description of (Rm – Rf), 
HML and SMB. The WML component is built based on the stocks’ 11-month past returns, 
according to which the WML is the return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 30% 
stocks. This panel reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for 
the degree of freedom. 
 High Vo Med Vo Low Vo High Vo Med Vo Low Vo 
 θ' t(θ') 
HBM 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.49 0.50 -0.92 
M 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.72 0.49 -0.51 
LBM 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.73 0.48 -0.50 
       
 'm t('m) 
HBM -1.020 -0.621 -0.521 -17.42*** -12.16*** -11.07*** 
M -1.216 -0.872 -0.545 -18.26*** -14.52*** -11.12*** 
LBM -1.202 -0.714 -0.564 -18.01*** -14.01*** -11.38*** 
   
 'HML t('HML) 
HBM -0.425 -0.215 -0.372 -4.72*** -3.06*** -4.15*** 
M -0.112 -0.096 -0.101 -1.71 -0.89 -1.36 
LBM 0.357 0.212 0.427 4.21*** 3.02*** 4.82*** 
   
 'SMB t('SMB) 
HBM 0.018 -0.178 0.031 0.51 -2.68** 0.86 
M 0.031 0.027 -0.162 0.75 0.72 -2.21* 
LBM -0.008 -0.164 -0.076 -0.37 -2.27* -1.10 
       
 'WML t('WML) 
HBM -0.061 -0.081 -0.103 -0.62 -0.71 -1.23 
M -0.066 -0.007 0.000 -0.68 -0.36 0.15 
LBM -0.100 0.108 0.117 -1.15 1.42 1.56 
       
 Adj R2  
HBM 0.75 0.61 0.52    
M 0.58 0.50 0.63    
LBM 0.69 0.62 0.65    
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Next, Table 3.11 reports cross-sectional regression results from the CAPM, the FF 
model, the Carhart model and the augmented models controlling for default risk for both 
approaches. The estimation results are reported in turn in Panels A to D of the table. In 
contrast to the CAPM, the FF model seems to be able to capture the majority of the risk 
patterns in returns of stocks sorted by size and BM. As can be seen from Panel B, the 
three FF factors are highly significant in regressions on the 6 size/ BM portfolio returns. 
The regressions on the FF model result in higher Adjusted R2s (increasing from 0.60 in 
the CAPM to 0.65). F-test results also show that the explanatory variables are jointly 
significant.  
However, in regressions on 9 volatility/BM portfolio returns the size factor appears to 
lose its explanatory power while the market and BM effects remain significant. The 
coefficients γm and γHML are estimated to be -0.99 (t-statistic of -48.04) and -0.11 (t-
statistic of -3.63), respectively. Both variables are highly significant at a 1% level in the 
regressions explaining the value premium in 9 portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic 
volatility and B/M ratios. However, the coefficient associated with size effect, γSMB, is 
estimated to be 0.34 (t-statistic is 15.3, statistically significant at a 1% level) in 
regressions on 6 size/BM portfolio excess returns, while taking the value of only -0.03 
(t-statistic is -1.21, statistically insignificant) in estimations from 9 volatility/BM 
portfolio regressions. 
Although sorting stocks into 6 size/BM portfolios seems to result in higher Adjusted R2s 
than using volatility and BM, the regression intercept is only statistically significant 
different from zero at a 1% level in the size/BM approach. This indicates that there is 
some level of estimation error remaining in the equation. Similar results are found in 
the CAPM regressions on excess returns on portfolios sorted by size and BM. In 
regressions on 6 size/BM portfolio returns, the Adjusted R2s increase from 0.60 (in the 
CAPM model) to 0.65 in the FF three-factor model, while Adjusted R2s remain at 0.51 
in regressions on 9 volatility/BM portfolio returns. These suggest that although the two 
pricing models can capture more of the movement in excess returns on stocks sorted by 
size and BM, the estimation errors associated with these models are lower in regressions 
on stocks sorted based on volatility and B/M ratios. 
Estimation results from augmented models of the FF model and the Carhart model are 
summarised in Panels C and D of Table 3.11. The results show signs of model 
improvement in explaining average stock returns. As can be seen from Panel C of the 
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table, when including the DEF factor, the regression results in less significant constant 
terms and higher Adjusted R2s. In size/BM regressions, the intercept decreases from -
0.009 (t-statistic is -10.7, significant at a 1% level) in the FF model to just -0.001 (t-
statistic is -2.2, significant at a 5% level) in the augmented FF model. A similar result 
is observed in the volatility/BM portfolio regressions. In both cases, the model goodness 
of fit increases, and the improvement in estimating the volatility/BM portfolio returns 
is more noticeable. The resulted Adjusted R2 in the volatility/BM estimation is 0.68 in 
the augmented FF model, in comparison with only 0.51 in the traditional FF model. 
These indicate that stocks with similar volatility and BM characteristics tend to behave 
more similarly, and their return anomaly is likely to be captured more easily than those 
sorted by size and BM. In addition, the augmented model shows an improvement in 
capturing the movement of volatility/BM stock returns.  
In terms of the default factor, the results in Panel C show that there is evidence 
supporting that default risk plays an important role in explaining cross-sectional stock 
returns, especially in explaining value anomaly. The estimated coefficients associated 
with the DEF variable take negative values and are highly significant in cross-sectional 
regressions on stocks formed by both size/BM and volatility/BM criteria. The 
coefficients γDEF are estimated to be -0.20 (t-statistic is -6.1) and -0.31 (t-statistic is -
10.9) in regressions on 6 size/BM and on 9 volatility/BM portfolio returns, respectively. 
Both are statistically significant at a 1% level. These indicate that the default variable 
can contribute to capturing the risk patterns associated with firm default likelihood in 
stock returns. The variable also plays an important role in explaining the return 
differentials between value and growth portfolios, small and big, as well as high and 
low volatile stocks.  
The augmented Carhart model with an additional DEF variable displays a slightly 
stronger ability to capture the risk elements missed by the CAPM and the FF model. 
The results in Panel D of Table 3.11 show that besides the traditional three FF factors 
which remain the key drivers of value anomaly, the default factor also plays an 
important role in explaining cross-sectional stock returns. Similar to the results reported 
earlier for the augmented FF model, estimations using the Carhart model result in highly 
significant coefficients associated with the market and BM factors. The market beta 
takes the values of 0.82 (t-statistic of 27.0, highly significant at a 1% level) in 
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regressions on size/BM portfolio returns and -1.17 (t-statistic is -32.1, significant at a 
1% level) in volatility/BM portfolio estimations. 
However, the size effect is significant only in size/BM regressions but less noticeable 
in volatility/BM portfolio regressions. The estimated coefficient γSMB takes the value of 
0.01 (t-statistic is 2.0, significant at a 10% level) in the former, and a value of 0.02 (t-
statistic is only 1.5, statistically insignificant) in the latter. This suggests that firm size 
does contribute to explaining the difference in returns between the 6 size/BM portfolios. 
In other words, there is a link between firm size, size premium and value premium. 
However, this relationship is not observed among stocks of different idiosyncratic 
volatility. 
In contrast, adding a momentum factor does not significantly improve model 
performance in the cross-sectional context. As can be seen from the results in Panel D, 
there is little evidence suggesting that the momentum variable, WML, could explain the 
difference in cross-sectional returns on common stocks. The coefficients associated 
with the variable are less than -0.01 (t-statistic is -1.6) in regressions on 6 size/BM 
portfolio excess returns, and are 0.03 (t-statistic is 1.8) in the 9 volatility/BM 
regressions. In both cases, the coefficients γWML are statistically insignificant. 
Although the model goodness of fit is slightly highly for the augmented Carhart four-
factor model, the improvement is marginal in comparison with the augmented FF 
model. The Adjusted R2 increases from 0.67 to 0.69 in regressions on the 6 size/BM 
portfolio returns, and from 0.68 to 0.72 in the case of volatility/BM portfolios. In 
summary, together with the FF three factor model, the default risk variable shows a high 
explanatory power in explaining value premium, size premium and return differentials 
between High and Low idiosyncratic volatility stocks. The results confirm the findings 
reported earlier in Table 3.10 for the time-series analysis. In other words, the findings 
concluded in this section are robust in both time-series and cross-sectional analyses.
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Table 3.11: Cross-sectional regressions 
Panels A and B present the FF and CAPM cross-sectional regressions using the excess returns on 6 intersections of size/BM portfolios formed by 3 BM and 2 
size rankings, and on 9 Vo/BM portfolios sorted by 3 volatility and 3 BM portfolios. Panel C (and D) reports the estimation results of a model consisting of the 
three (and four) factors and default risk on 6 size/BM and 9 Vo/BM portfolios. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof Kenneth R. French’s 
website for the UK market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to the way Fama and French (1993) proposed, which are meant to mimic BM and size 
effects in expected stock returns. The WML component is built based on the stocks’ 11-month past returns, according to which the WML is the return differential 
between the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks. DEF is the difference in value-weighted returns of stocks in the top 30% O-score and the bottom 30% O-score 
groups. The table reports estimated coefficients and their t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness 
of fit measure R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. F-statistics test the joint significance of the explanatory variables. 
Panel A: The CAPM: Rit - Rft = γ0,i + γm,i (Rmt – Rft) + i,t 
  γ0 γm t(γ0) t(γm) Adj-R2 F-statistic 
6 Size/BM -0.008 1.01 -8.6*** 49.1*** 0.60 2410 
9 Vo/BM 0.001 -1.01 0.06 -49.80*** 0.51 2480 
Panel B: The Fama and French three factor models: Rit - Rft = γ0,i + γm,i (Rmt – Rft) + γHML,i HML + γSMB,i SMB + it 
  γ0 γm γHML γSMB t(γ0) t(γm) t(γHML) t(γSMB) Adj-R2 F-statistic 
6 Size/BM -0.009 0.97 0.16 0.34 -10.7*** 49.5*** 5.5*** 15.3*** 0.65 1018 
9 Vo/BM -0.000 -0.99 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -48.04*** -3.63*** -1.21 0.51 836 
Panel C: Regressions on 3 factors and Factor loadings on Default risk: Rit - Rft = γ0,i + γM,i (Rmt – Rft) + γHML,i HML + γSMB,i SMB + γDEF,i DEF + it 
  γ0 γm γHML γSMB γDEF t(γ0) t(γm) t(γHML) t(γSMB) t(γDEF) Adj-R2 F-statistic 
6 Size/BM -0.001 0.88 0.27 0.01 -0.20 -2.2** 36.2*** 6.1*** 2.1* -6.1*** 0.67 2515 
9 Vo/BM 0.001 -1.02 -0.32 0.02 -0.31 0.01 -49.0*** -11.5*** 1.0 -10.9*** 0.68 2106 
Panel D: Regressions on 4 factors and Factor loadings on Default risk: Rit - Rft = γ0,i + γm,i (RMt – Rft) + γHML,i HML + γSMB,i SMB + γWML,i WML + γDEF,i DEF + it 
  γ0 γm γHML γSMB γWML γDEF t(γ0) t(γm) t(γHML) t(γSMB) t(γWML) t(γDEF) Adj-R2 F-stats 
6 Size/BM -0.001 0.82 0.34 0.01 -0.00 -0.19 -1.1 27.0*** 8.3*** 2.0* -1.6 -5.4*** 0.69 2601 
9 Vo/BM 0.002 -1.17 -0.41 0.02 0.03 -0.24 1.3 -32.1*** -9.1*** 1.5 1.8 -6.7*** 0.72 2315 
Note: For presentation purposes, in this table coefficients associated with one explanatory variable are denoted by the same symbol across 4 models even though they take different values in different models.
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3.6.2 The relation between stock volatility and default risk 
This section aims to test hypothesis 3 that there is a relationship between the change in 
volatility of stocks and their distress conditions. There are two approaches used to test 
the hypothesis: time-series and cross-sectional regressions. Section 3.6.1 has 
collectively discussed cross-sectional regression results, thus this section will dedicate 
to the time-series analysis. 
To investigate whether default risk can explain the risk pattern reflected in the level of 
stock volatility, the chapter estimates time-series regressions on 9 intersection portfolios 
formed by three BM portfolios and three volatility rankings using an augmented model 
consisting of the three FF factors and default probability. The estimation results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 3.12. A further analysis is carried out on these portfolios 
using an augmented Carhart four-factor model. The model consists of the three FF 
factors, a momentum variable WML, and a default factor DEF. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Panel B of Table 3.12. 
In Panel A of Table 3.12, the majority of the constant terms are insignificant, except in 
regressions on low BM portfolios. The intercepts are 0.004 and 0.003 (both being 
statistically significant at a 10% level) in regressions on High Vo/Low BM and Medium 
Vo/Low BM, respectively. This suggests that the augmented FF model could describe 
more of the return differentials between stocks with different idiosyncratic volatility 
levels in Growth groups. In line with the findings in the cross-sectional analysis, the 
market and BM factors consistently play an important role in explaining average stock 
returns, while a size effect is only noticeable in some Growth and/or Low volatility 
stocks. The market betas range from -1.330 to -0.771 (t-statistics of between 10.12 and 
18.01, highly significant at a 1% level). Similarly, the coefficients associated with the 
BM variable, δ’HML, are statistically significant in regressions on the excess returns on 
both High and Low volatility portfolios. The BM effect is less but remains significant 
among Medium volatility stocks. These indicate that the market and BM effects 
contribute considerably to capturing the risk patterns associated with idiosyncratic 
volatility risk and BM risk in average stock returns. In terms of the size factor, the 
explanatory ability of the SMB variable is more noticeable in the Medium Vo/Medium 
BM, Low Vo/Medium BM, and Medium Vo/Low BM portfolios. The coefficients, 
δ’SMB, are statistically significant at a 10% level and take the values of 0.098, 0.121 and 
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-0.100, respectively. The weaker size effect on other portfolios suggests that firm size 
does not necessarily lead to stock volatility, and that the size effect is less noticeable 
among stocks of growth companies. 
The coefficients associated with the DEF factor are, however, statistically significant in 
most cases. Particularly, high volatility portfolio returns tend to be more sensitive to the 
default factor. Their coefficients are positive and range from 0.512 to 0.719 (t-statistics 
are 3.57 to 4.03, significant at a 1% level). This suggests that highly volatile stocks are 
more likely to go bankrupt than low volatility groups. Medium volatility portfolios are 
also relatively sensitive to company default likelihood. For example, the coefficient, 
δ’DEF, takes the value of -0.201 (t-statistic is -2.01, significant at a 10% level) in the 
regression on excess returns on Value and Medium volatility stocks. Nevertheless, the 
size effect does not contribute to explaining the average returns on stocks with Low 
idiosyncratic volatility. 
In addition, higher estimated Adjusted R2s in regressions on the High and Medium 
volatility portfolios indicate that the augmented FF model that controls for default risk 
has the ability to capture more of the movement in returns of high and medium volatility 
stocks than those of the low volatility stocks.  
Next, Panel B of Table 3.11 will summarise the results of a similar time-series analysis 
which uses an augmented Carhart model instead of the augmented FF model. Similar 
to the findings reported in the cross-sectional analysis, adding a momentum factor does 
not lead to a significant improvement in model performance. The WML variable also 
does not have a strong explanatory power in explaining return differentials between 
value versus growth companies nor between High and Low volatility stocks.  
As can be seen from Panel B, market effect remains important in regressions on excess 
returns on all 9 volatility/BM portfolios. The value of market betas ranges from -1.255 
to -0.748, with t-statistics being between -17.08 and -8.69, statistically significant at a 
1% level. The coefficients associated with the BM factor δ’HML are also highly 
significant. The BM effect is particularly strong among value stocks. When sorting 
stocks by firm-level volatility, both High and Low volatility portfolios are highly 
affected by the BM factor. This means the HML variable could contribute to capturing 
the risk patterns associated with the BM effect in stocks with different idiosyncratic 
volatility levels. 
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Similar to the results reported in the cross-sectional analysis and those seen in the 
augmented FF model, the size factor plays a less important role in explaining the time-
series average returns on portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility and B/M ratio. The 
estimated coefficients associated with the SMB variable are low and statistically 
insignificant in regressions on High and Low volatility stocks. Their absolute values are 
between 0.026 and 0.034 in the regressions on the former, and between 0.027 and 0.041 
in the regressions on the latter portfolio. Medium volatility stocks are, however, more 
sensitive to changes in firm size than other groups. The coefficient δ’SMB is estimated to 
be 0.060 (t-statistic of 2.44, statistically significant at a 10% level) for the Medium 
Vo/Medium BM portfolio. It takes the value of -0.071 (t-statistic of -2.52, also 
significant at a 10% level) in the regression on the Medium Vo/Low BM portfolio 
returns. It is worth noting that the negative sign of δ’SMB in regressions on Low BM 
portfolios suggests that among growth companies, smaller firms tend to generate higher 
excess returns in the long run. 
In terms of default risk, the time-series regressions on 9 volatility/BM portfolio returns 
show that High volatility stocks exhibit a higher risk of going into default and the 
opposite is true for Low volatility stocks. The coefficients associated with the default 
factor δ’DEF are positive and highly significant in regressions on the High volatility 
portfolios. They take the values of 0.501, 0.427 and 0.703 (t-statistics of 5.12, 4.83 and 
6.72, and all are statistically significant at a 1% level) in regressions on excess returns 
on Value, Medium BM and Growth stocks, respectively. On the contrary, in regressions 
on Low volatility portfolios, the estimated parameters δ’DEF are negative and smaller in 
absolute terms than those seen in the regressions on the High volatility stocks. This 
suggests that Low volatility stocks are likely to bear a lower risk of going bankrupt. 
However, the tendency is less noticeable among the Low volatility stocks. 
Overall, the three FF factors and the default variable are important explanatory variables 
in capturing the risk patterns associated with the BM and idiosyncratic volatility effects 
in average stock returns. Among those variables, though, the explanatory power of the 
size factor is less consistent. The results are confirmed in both time-series and cross-
sectional estimations. In addition, the momentum variable might contribute to 
improving the goodness of fit of the traditional FF model and its augmented version, 
but the improvement is immaterial. 
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Table 3.12: Factor loading on Default risk in 9 Volatility/BM portfolios 
Panel A: Augmented Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θi +mi (Rmt – Rft) + HMLi HMLt +SMBi SMBt + DEFi DEFt +i 
The panel presents time-series estimation results of the above regression on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 volatility and 3 book-to-market rankings using breakpoints of 40:20:40. 
In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% 
book-to-market value stocks while High Vo, Med Vo and Low Vo stand for high, medium and 
low volatility stocks. The excess return on the market, Rm - Rf, is obtained from Prof. Kenneth 
R. French’s website for the UK market. HML and SMB are constructed similarly to the way 
Fama and French (1993) built their factors, which are meant to mimic BM and size effects in 
expected stock returns. The default factor (DEF) is the difference in value-weighted returns of 
stocks in the top 30% O-score and the bottom 30% O-score ranking groups. It is worth noticing 
that while these 9 portfolios are formed using the breakpoint 40:20:40 to adapt to the smaller 
size of non-US markets, the portfolio-based factors use the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint instead 
because they proxy for risk factors rather than measuring actual returns. The panel summarises 
estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted for the degree of freedom. 
 HBM M LBM HBM M LBM 
 θ t(θ) 
High Vo 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.52 0.76 1.92* 
Med Vo 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.51 0.54 1.91* 
Low Vo 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.33 -0.48 -1.51 
       
 m t(m) 
High Vo -1.330 -1.278 -1.175 -18.01*** -17.15*** -15.01*** 
Med Vo -1.153 -1.016 -0.862 -16.41*** -13.94*** -10.76*** 
Low Vo -1.042 -0.859 -0.771 -12.56*** -11.73*** -10.12*** 
   
 HML t(HML) 
High Vo -0.752 -0.597 -0.084 -9.54*** -5.20*** -2.92* 
Med Vo -0.112 -0.093 0.076 -3.06** -2.17 2.11* 
Low Vo -0.656 -0.476 0.185 -6.17*** -4.01*** 3.54*** 
   
 SMB t(SMB) 
High Vo 0.039 0.071 -0.051 0.71 1.02 -0.91 
Med Vo -0.056 0.098 -0.100 -0.88 2.34* -2.42* 
Low Vo 0.040 0.121 -0.039 0.82 2.78* -0.67 
       
 DEF t(DEF) 
High Vo 0.512 0.515 0.719 3.57*** 3.74*** 4.03*** 
Med Vo -0.201 -0.204 0.010 -2.01** -2.12** 0.21 
Low Vo -0.056 -0.031 -0.038 -1.01 -0.50 -0.52 
 Adj R2  
High Vo 0.62 0.58 0.60    
Med Vo 0.57 0.55 0.52    
Low Vo 0.34 0.42 0.31    
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Table 3.12 - Continued 
Panel B: Augmented Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Rit - Rft = θ'i +'mi (Rmt – Rft) + 'HMLi HMLt + 'SMBi SMBt + 'WMLi WMLt +'DEFi DEFt +'i 
Panel B presents time-series estimation results of the above regression on 9 intersection 
portfolios formed by 3 volatility and 3 book-to-market rankings using breakpoints of 40:20:40. 
In particular, HBM, M and LBM denote the highest 40%, the middle 20% and lowest 40% 
book-to-market value stocks while High Vo, Med Vo and Low Vo stand for high, medium and 
low volatility stocks. In terms of explanatory variables, see Panel A for the description of (Rm 
– Rf), HML, SMB and DEF. The WML component is built based on stocks’ 11-month past 
returns, according to which the WML is the return differential between the top 30% and the 
bottom 30% stocks. The panel summarises estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. The goodness of fit R2s are adjusted 
for the degree of freedom. 
 HBM M LBM HBM M LBM 
 θ' t(θ') 
High Vo 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.23 0.44 0.63 
Med Vo 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.43 0.59 0.62 
Low Vo 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.61 -0.60 -0.42 
       
 'm t('m) 
High Vo -1.216 -1.255 -1.160 -15.42*** -17.08*** -13.54*** 
Med Vo -1.103 -1.012 -0.782 -13.27*** -11.45*** -9.34*** 
Low Vo -1.015 -0.748 -0.761 -11.44*** -8.69*** -8.77*** 
   
 'HML t('HML) 
High Vo -0.543 -0.423 -0.083 -6.25*** -5.14*** -2.68* 
Med Vo -0.102 -0.025 0.068 -2.88** -1.78 2.66* 
Low Vo -0.541 -0.317 0.174 -6.20*** -4.68*** 3.08*** 
   
 'SMB t('SMB) 
High Vo 0.026 0.032 -0.034 1.56 1.61 -1.66 
Med Vo -0.048 0.060 -0.071 -1.92 2.44* -2.52* 
Low Vo 0.027 0.030 -0.041 1.52 1.72 -1.87 
       
 'WML t('WML) 
High Vo -0.015 -0.038 -0.070 -1.23 -1.66 -2.50* 
Med Vo 0.027 0.023 0.051 1.50 1.46 1.93 
Low Vo 0.042 0.036 0.063 1.89 1.64 1.98 
       
 'DEF t('DEF) 
High Vo 0.501 0.427 0.703 5.12*** 4.83*** 6.72*** 
Med Vo -0.200 -0.195 0.008 -3.79** -3.54** 0.16 
Low Vo -0.034 -0.021 -0.025 -1.65 -1.42 -1.23 
       
 Adj R2  
High Vo 0.71 0.72 0.75    
Med Vo 0.60 0.64 0.70    
Low Vo 0.53 0.50 0.49    
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3.7 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION 
The results in Chapter 3 confirm findings from previous studies in the UK that value 
stocks outperform their growth counterpart. However, the value premium is statistically 
insignificant, at approximately 0.06% - 0.09% per month. The finding remains largely 
unchanged when using alternative indicators to BM (for example, E/P and DY) to 
classify stocks as value or growth. A size effect also exists in the UK market although 
the size premium is much higher among value stocks than it is in growth stocks (0.65% 
versus 0.29%, respectively). Perhaps it is because small value firms tend to have more 
room for growth than big cap value firms.  
Additionally, the chapter explores certain areas in the literature that are of interest to 
study by taking individual stock volatility into account in explaining value premium 
anomaly. The volatility has long been documented as a relevant risk to stock returns, 
yet not incorporated into the study of the value premium. Chapter 3 finds no evidence 
supporting investment in highly volatile stocks. Even within the low volatility group, 
investing in value stocks, considered to be more likely to face financial distress, would 
bring lower returns than investing in growth firms. 
The first conclusion from the chapter regression estimations is that, unlike commercial 
marketing reasoning, the safer an investment is in the FTSE350 the better profit it would 
generate. Over the course of an examination period from 31st January 1990 to 31st 
December 2012, although the value premium is statistically insignificant, value stocks 
outperform growth stocks in the long run. This result is consistent when looking at both 
the BM rank of risk, where value stocks are considered to be riskier than growth stocks, 
and looking at the volatility measure. In this index, the big stocks with a high BM value 
are much less prone to being affected by the market factor, while this factor plays an 
important role for other stocks. This could imply a diversifying option during market 
downturn periods.  
Secondly, the chapter finds that the three FF factors play important roles in explaining 
return differentials between the value and growth portfolios. The market beta is 
statistically significant at a high level consistently across all regressions in the thesis. 
This confirms the central role of the market factor in asset pricing. On the other hand, 
the HML factor has a significant explanatory power in explaining high BM stock returns 
while it is not the case for the growth portfolio returns. The results in Chapter 3 show 
that the size effect can contribute to explaining returns on both the value and growth 
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portfolios but the effect is more noticeable among the small stocks. The results suggest 
that it is important to take into account differences in companies’ market capitalisation 
with the average stock returns of small sized companies. In addition, investing in 
smaller stocks could gain a higher size premium, which might not be the case for big 
stocks because their returns are less sensitive to the size effect. The findings in Chapter 
3 confirm those in Fama and French (1992, 1993) which recognised the roles of BM 
and size effects in explaining common stock returns in the US. 
In regard to the momentum factor, the chapter finds that the momentum variable WML 
has a significant explanatory power in regressions on Small/Low BM stock returns 
while the momentum effect is less noticeable for other portfolios. The sign of estimated 
coefficients associated with the WML parameter indicates that investing in smaller 
companies is more likely to lead to a high momentum premium which may not be the 
case when investing in big firms. 
Thirdly, using both methods of factor constructing and portfolio formation and a range 
of default risk measures, the chapter finds that the default factor plays an important role 
in explaining the risk pattern in stock returns. Using the portfolio-based system, the 
analysis finds evidence suggesting that companies with a high default probability tend 
to have a negative effect on the expected stock returns. These are typically under distress 
and less likely to generate high stock returns. The results from regression approaches 
confirm that default risk has a negative relationship with expected stock returns in the 
UK market. Most of the coefficients associated with default variables are statistically 
significant, and more noticeable among small stocks. The result indicates that small 
companies are more likely to suffer default risk than the big firms. Within the big stocks, 
low BM stocks tend to suffer a higher distress risk than high BM stocks. This means 
big and over-priced companies are more likely to go bankrupt than big and growing 
firms. More importantly, in the presence of the default factor, other explanatory 
variables remain important in the models. Alternative measures of default risk do not 
seem to affect the empirical findings.  
In summary, the above findings show that there is no evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis 1 that value premium in the UK can be explained by the market risk, default 
risk and firms’ fundamental variables, such as size, B/M ratio and past returns.  
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To test hypothesis 2, Chapter 3 uses both regression and portfolio-based approaches to 
assess the role of idiosyncratic volatility in explaining average stock returns. The 
estimations on 9 volatility/BM portfolio returns are also undertaken from time-series as 
well as cross-sectional dimensions. The results indicate that while the market and HML 
factors show an ability to capture the risk patterns associated with firm-level volatility 
in stock returns, size and momentum factors have a lower explanatory power. While the 
HML factor is significant both statistically and in absolute terms, the SMB effect is 
noticeable only among Medium and Low volatility stocks and the WML factor is not 
significant in all estimations.  
Lastly, in the test of hypothesis 3 on the relation between volatility and default, it is 
confirmed that the link between them is positive in the highly volatile group of stocks. 
In other words, stocks that are highly volatile tend to suffer a statistically significant 
higher default probability. The opposite is true for low volatility stocks. In the presence 
of the default factor, both time-series and cross-sectional analyses reveal that the market 
and BM factors continue to play an important role in explaining common stock returns, 
while the size effect is only noticeable in some growth and/or low volatility stocks. 
Once again, Carhart’s WML factor does not contribute to explaining the return 
differentials between stocks with different BM and volatility levels. The default variable 
is statistically significant in most cases. More specifically, the high volatility portfolio 
returns tend to be more sensitive to the default factor. The findings are not affected by 
the choice of default proxies. 
One of the most important observations in Chapter 3 is the relative improvement of the 
pricing models used in this chapter in explaining value premium. In comparison with 
the traditional FF model, adding a WML variable has contributed to capturing more of 
the movement in average stock returns. The improvement is however immaterial. The 
Adjusted R2s in Carhart four-factor regressions are between 17% and 26%, slightly 
higher than those in the FF three-factor model (which are between 6% and 19%). In the 
presence of the default risk factor, both the FF and Carhart models achieve much better 
goodness of fit measures. The FF augmented model with an additional default variable 
has higher Adjusted R2s, increasing from between 6% and 19% to between 39% and 
45%. Adding a default variable to the Carhart model also considerably enhances the 
model as Adjusted R2s increase from the range of 17% and 26% to between 38% and 
46%. This suggests that there is room for further model enhancement in future research. 
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Chapter 4: Firm Distress Condition and Momentum Investment 
Strategies 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the idea of momentum trading strategy is dated back to Levy (1967), it has 
been developed and tested empirically by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), according to 
whose theory investors could earn significant abnormal returns from buying past well 
performing stocks (winners) and selling past poorly performing stocks (losers). Over 
more than two decades, the abnormal returns have been observed in many markets; 
however, the question of what has driven momentum profits in those markets is still 
unresolved. Among others, Fama and French (1996) show that momentum profitability 
cannot be explained by either the standard CAPM or the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. Since then, both scholars and practitioners have been seeking for the 
underlying reasons behind this intriguing anomaly. If the investment method of 
following the winners actually works, a question raised is whether this implies market 
inefficiency. 
Another branch of market efficiency literature concerns the role of firms’ financial 
distress risk in explaining momentum anomaly. This arises from both behavioural 
finance and risk-based theories. The former suggests investors’ misvaluation of 
distressed firms while the latter considers financial distress conditions as extra risks 
which could potentially explain the anomaly. Also, a risk-based study by Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008) shows that, similar to the US, there is no link between financial distress 
risk and size and BM effects in the UK. In other words, there is no evidence that default 
risk has already been captured by the Fama and French’s three factors. This leaves open 
a possibility that if momentum is driven by risk, distress risk could add value to the 
classical Fama and French’s model in explaining the anomaly. 
Therefore, the roles of business cycles and default risk in explaining momentum 
profitability are jointly tested for the first time in this study. Whereas there are vast 
studies on the links between momentum and business cycles and a few on momentum 
and default risk, there have yet to be any efforts testing the explanatory relationship of 
the two factors in explaining momentum anomaly. Perhaps this is due to a possibility 
that some risk patterns in default risk may vary with business cycles. Rather than going 
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around the problem, the thesis aims to find out whether business cycles and firm default 
risk reinforce or subsume each other in explaining momentum.  
This chapter makes the following main contributions. Firstly, the chapter contributes to 
fulfilling the need for more research in the UK, focusing on the link between momentum 
and firm distress conditions. The last empirical study addressing momentum in the UK 
was on a dataset up to 2002, before the 2008 financial crisis when distress risk might be 
more visible. Secondly, unlike previous studies, the chapter proposes the use of a more 
recent and reliable proxy of firm’s default probability generated from Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) probability model, henceforth the CHS model, which 
uses not only accounting but also equity market variables. Lastly, although there is 
evidence that momentum strategies perform differently over business cycles and that 
momentum anomaly could be explained by firm distress risk, there have not been any 
attempts to collectively examine the explanatory ability of the two elements in capturing 
momentum. This chapter aims to bridge this particular gap in the literature.  
The results in the present study confirm that there is a significant momentum premium 
in the UK for up to 12-month investments. The results hold even when different 
investment horizons and seasonality have been taken into account. This confirms the 
findings of previous studies in the UK that momentum strategies generate positive 
returns if investing for less than one year but the returns were only significant for 
holding periods of up to 6 months. In addition, the chapter finds that the momentum 
abnormal returns are large and statistically significant in market upturns, particularly 
noticeable during economic expansions. In contrast, the strategies perform poorly 
during market downturns and lead to large losses during recessions. 
In search for reasons behind the momentum anomaly in the UK, we find that default 
risk plays an important role in explaining the anomaly. The variable could capture much 
of the movement in returns on the past poorly performing stocks but become less 
significant in explaining the winner returns. When business cycles are taken into 
account, the role of the distress variable remains important for loser stocks but 
insignificant for the winner group.  
In terms of other explanatory variables, traditional variables such as the market beta and 
HML consistently show a significant explanatory power, whereas size and momentum 
variables seem to capture more movement of the winners’ returns but become less 
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important in explaining the losers’ returns. Moreover, business cycle variables such as 
default spread and dividend yield could explain more of the returns on the winners but 
not the returns on the losers, while term spread and short-term T-Bill do not play a 
significant role in the models. Robustness check results show that the chapter findings 
are not sensitive to the choice of proxies and are relatively free from multicollinearity 
biases. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature 
review, the research gaps and the chapter’s main hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the 
data and methodology. Section 4.4 reports and discusses the main findings, and section 
4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 LITERATURE 
This section does not try to review the vast discussion on momentum investment 
strategy. It focuses rather on the main arguments on the possible relationship between 
firm distress condition and the performance of momentum strategies. Section 4.2 starts 
by presenting the theoretical framework motivating momentum trading, it then briefly 
discusses the performance of the strategy especially during “bad” states of the economy. 
The main objective of this section is to understand the potential link between 
momentum profitability and firms’ financial distress and to identify the gaps in the 
literature that deserve further attention. 
4.2.1 Momentum investment strategies 
4.2.1.A. Theoretical background 
On the one hand, there are a large number of economists and statisticians supporting the 
theory of random walk, which emphasises that historical security prices cannot predict 
future price changes, thus attempts to construct trading rules based on past stock returns 
are “mechanical” and will not lead to profitability (Jensen 1967, p.77). On the other 
hand, numerous investment strategies have been proposed and tested, for example value 
strategies (Graham and Dodd 1934) and contrarian strategies (De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987), to name but a few, which pursue the past poor performers. Debate on the 
long-standing presence of these trading strategies has received a lot of attention from 
both theoretical and practical standpoints. More importantly, it raises the question of 
whether the random walk theory and trading rules can compromise. 
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In the early literature on investment strategies, Levy (1967), notably, empirically 
documented a new set of trading rules, of which the most discussed ones were 
momentum strategies. He observed a significant profitability when buying past winners 
and selling past losers over a period of 27 weeks. However, studies by Jensen (1967) 
and Jensen and Benington (1970) soon pointed out a number of methodological issues 
in Levy’s work that made it not replicable, such as sample selection bias and a strong 
assumption of no lag trading. They found that, after correcting the errors, momentum 
trading was not as profitable as a simple buy-and-hold strategy. The validity of the 
momentum strategies was therefore questioned until Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
developed a more practical method, that unlike Levy’s approach allows the test to be 
replicable. They constructed portfolios based on ranking stock returns with lag intervals 
rather than price ratios of individual stocks with no lag. Their research showed that the 
momentum trading did generate significant positive returns. In the long run, however, 
the profitability tends to disappear, suggesting the presence of return reversal effects. 
The phenomenon is interesting because if information about stock prices in the past can 
be used to beat the market and generate excess returns, this implies a violation of the 
weak form market efficiency which claims that all past stock prices are reflected in 
current prices. Hence, the success of momentum strategies is also referred to as an 
anomaly in the market. 
In explaining the momentum anomaly, Fama (1998) reviews several competing 
explanations, among which the two theories that gain the most support are risk-based 
explanation and mispricing theory. According to the first theory, there is a strong 
relationship between risk and return, in which a higher return is expected as a 
compensation for bearing higher risk (Avramov and Chordia 2006). As a result, the 
abnormal return is likely to be a result of taking extra risk that has not been captured by 
the market beta. Whereas, behavioural finance suggests that investors tend to delay 
price reactions to relevant information and misprice stocks as a result (Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998). In other words, the success of momentum strategies is attributed to 
these investors’ psychological biases. Let us review in detail discussions on each of the 
two explanations. 
(i) Risk-based theory 
The argument that the risk unobserved by the CAPM can be a source of abnormal return 
has gained much support from market efficiency theorists. For example, in a book 
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chapter published in 2010, Lai, Li, Conover and Wu (2010) provide comprehensive 
analysis on risk asset pricing and find strong support for common risk factors, such as 
BM, size and financial distress in asset modelling. Regarding momentum, under the 
efficient market hypothesis, momentum-reversal effects are consistent with time-
varying risk premium19. The common approach is constructing explanatory variables 
from mimic portfolios that aim to capture certain types of risk that can potentially 
explain the return differentials between the winner and the loser stocks. For example, 
Ball and Kothari (1989) and Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that cross-sectional 
variation can explain momentum profits while Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show 
strong support for the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables, including 
dividend yield, default spread, term spread and yield on the three-month Treasury bill. 
They also indicate that the momentum payoffs disappear once the market adjusts for the 
information proxied by the variables. On the contrary, Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) find 
no evidence that those macroeconomic variables can explain the significant and 
consistent momentum profits both in and outside the US. The return reversal over one- 
to five-year periods observed in their sample is not in line with the risk-based 
explanations. 
Some studies question whether momentum can be explained by firm investment policy. 
For example, Johnson (2002) proposes a risk-based model of partial equilibrium that 
shows that stochastic dividend growth rate can account for momentum abnormal return. 
In Liu and Zhang’s (2008) study, most of the momentum profits are explained by the 
expected growth rate of industrial production, while Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) find 
that stocks of firms that invest more have lower returns. Concerning the 2003 US 
proposal cutting taxes on dividends, Dong and Goss (2011) show that both BM and 
momentum effects were not driven by changes in shareholders’ dividend income. 
Explaining momentum anomaly using the risk-based theory can be challenging because 
(a) naturally well-performing stocks do not appear to be riskier; and (b) the abnormal 
returns so far have not been explained by the risk proxies in standard asset pricing 
models like the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model. Regarding systematic risk, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the market beta of the past losers is higher than 
that of the winners. Additionally, there is no evidence of positive serial correlation of 
factor portfolio return that could lead to favour high beta stocks. Hence, pursuing the 
                                                 
19 See Berk, Green and Nail (1999), Johnson (2002), Liu and Zhang (2008) for more examples. 
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past winners is not riskier under the CAPM. Also, Fama and French (1996) indicate that 
their model cannot explain the momentum anomaly. Moreover, in a study on single 
securities, Avramov and Chordia (2006) confirm that none of the examined asset pricing 
models, including conditional and unconditional versions of the CAPM, Consumption-
based CAPM (CCAPM) and the Fama and French model, can capture momentum 
effects.  
However, one risk element that some researchers found to have played a crucial role in 
explaining those challenges is business cycle risk. The idea has its root in Cochrane 
(1991) which provides evidence that some variables reflecting the upturn or downturn 
characteristics of the economy can forecast aggregate stock return, which in turn has 
the ability to predict future economic activities. Hence, it is natural to expect an 
explanatory relationship between business cycle risk and expected stock market return. 
Section 4.2.2 will present more detailed evidence of this relationship in the literature. 
(ii) Mispricing theory 
Early studies by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) document that investors in financial 
markets tend to overreact to information, especially “bad” news. Based on behavioural 
theories, they suggest that not only does investors’ overreaction affect stock prices, it 
also can explain the large difference in returns between the losers and the winners in the 
long run. Additionally, their results which show a lower risk associated with higher 
returns among the losers indirectly imply a rejection of the risk-based theory.  
Lo and MacKinlay (1990), among others, however, argue that most of the abnormal 
returns observed in previous studies are due to the delay of stock price reactions rather 
than to investors’ overreaction. They indicate that the continuation of short-term returns 
is the fundamental reason for the success of past well performing stocks over past poor 
performers. Accordingly, mispricing theory attributes momentum profitability to 
investors’ psychological biases. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) also find that past trading 
volume, which reflects investors’ interest in a stock, plays an important role in 
predicting the magnitude and persistence of momentum profitability. The study 
suggests that investors are indeed slow in modifying their view in accordance with new 
information. Supporting these views, Grinblatt and Han (2005) show that momentum 
profit is caused by investors’ tendency to hold on to their positions regardless of their 
potential gains/losses and, when this factor is controlled for, past stock returns can no 
longer explain the anomaly. 
  
151 
The mispricing explanation gains much support among momentum researchers. For 
example, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) classify investors’ 
psychological biases into two groups: overconfidence in private information, and self-
attribution asymmetrically. According to their research, the former issue is likely to lead 
to mispricing, especially when the information is in the form of public announcements 
that have strong effects on return. More interestingly, the latter bias is documented to 
be the underlying reason of the short-term success of momentum strategies as investors 
shift from overconfidence to underconfidence once the biases are found.  
Consistent with the mispricing arguments, Griffin and Lemmon’s (2002) study points 
out that small and distressed firms are those mostly likely to be mispriced by investors, 
and this is the underlying reason behind the large return differentials between high and 
low BM stocks observed in the US, especially among the group with highest probability 
of bankruptcy. 
Analysing at a more detailed level, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find no evidence that 
either systematic risk or delays in price reactions to common factors could explain the 
high abnormal returns generated from momentum trading strategies but delayed price 
reactions to firm specific information can. This theory is supported by Hong, Lim and 
Stein (2000) who demonstrate that when firm size is kept fixed, momentum strategies 
are more prominent among firms with low analyst coverage, especially in the past loser 
group. They, therefore, conclude that it takes time for investors to react to firm specific 
information and that negative information travels more slowly in the market. 
Besides the main two arguments that risk-based and mispricing theories could explain 
momentum, some people think momentum premium is caused by data mining. 
However, the robust success of momentum strategies across markets and over time 
shows that data mining is unlikely to be a valid explanation. Besides the evidence in the 
US shown in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and their updated paper in 2001, momentum 
return is also found in many non-US markets. Some examples are Foerster, Prihar and 
Schmitz (1995) providing evidence of large momentum profitability in Canada, 
Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) confirming the result in 12 European markets and 20 
emerging countries, while Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) find similar results in Asian 
markets. 
The following sections will review more recent evidence of momentum strategies across 
different markets, and especially their performance in the UK. 
4.2.1.B. Performance of momentum investment strategies 
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This section does not ambitiously aim to review the vast discussion on momentum 
strategies. It rather focuses on presenting the main arguments that have shaped the 
momentum literature of the present time, and from which further explorations are based 
on. 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented large momentum profitability in the 
US, there has been an enormous amount of studies on the performance of these 
investment strategies both inside and outside the US. On one hand, among others, 
Grundy and Martin (2001) find consistent momentum abnormal returns in the US over 
the entire post-1926 period. Also, an extensive study by Griffin et al. (2003) on a large 
sample of 40 markets across continents shows strong support for momentum trading 
both abroad and in the US. On the other hand, Schewert (2003) argues that profit-related 
market anomalies, such as the size and value anomalies, typically weaken, disappear or 
even reverse after the investment strategies become known. Nevertheless, recent studies 
by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001, 2002) continue to confirm findings in many researches 
on the validity of momentum investing which was first documented in their earlier paper 
in 1993. Moreover, a more recent study by Fama and French (2008, p.1662) even 
concludes that the abnormal returns from momentum trading continue to be 
“pervasive”. Their updated study, Fama and French (2012), confirms the presence of 
momentum profitability across the globe, except in Japan. They explain that the failure 
of momentum strategies in Japan is a chance result. 
It is worth noticing that momentum strategies which take into account stock prices 
should not be mistaken for earnings momentum which is based on firm earnings. While 
Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) point out that more profitable firms have 
superior average stock returns, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) show that 
although the two anomalies coexist, they still find significant momentum profits after 
adjusting for momentum in firm earnings. 
The strategies of buying (selling) the highest (lowest) past return stocks have been 
popular not only among researchers but also among traders. It is natural for both 
professional and non-professional investors to choose the currently successful stocks 
over the rest. Interestingly, quantitative trading managers as well as non-quantitative 
mutual fund managers also show interest in at least some form of price momentum 
strategies (Daniel, Jagannathan and Kim 2012). 
One interesting observation about momentum strategies which is unlike any other 
anomalies, is that momentum profitability is sensitive to the holding period and to 
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investment horizons. The early study of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) has shown that 
momentum profit is large and significant over holding periods of 3 to 12 months. In the 
following year the profit partly disappears and no longer exists in the subsequent two 
years. In addition, an updated work by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) also finds 
momentum investment turns from large positive strategies in the first year to negative-
return investment during months 13 to 60 following the formation period. Later, Griffin 
et al. (2003) document that there are some periods when momentum investors may 
suffer losses if they exercise their stocks. Additionally, George and Hwang (2004) 
provide empirical support for momentum strategies based on a flexible rather than a 
fixed horizon. However, Daniel et al. (2012) propose “dynamic” momentum strategies 
that incorporate the hidden Markov’s model of Hamilton (1989) to predict those periods 
of negative returns, and document that these strategies are superior to the traditional 
static momentum. This is because the dynamic approach can help momentum investors 
avoid periodic losses. As a result, momentum-oriented investors could benefit from a 
more consistent return premium. 
4.2.1.C. Momentum strategies in the European markets 
It is perhaps worth reporting the findings of some key papers on momentum in the 
European markets - the economic area that the UK operates in. Generally, momentum 
profitability is documented in majority of European markets. For example, Griffin et al. 
(2005) report positive momentum returns in 14 out of 17 European countries. The 
exceptions are Portugal, Norway and Greece. Similarly, Nijman, Swinkels and Verbeek 
(2002) find a momentum effect in the stock returns of 13 European countries, in which 
the returns are statistically significant in the UK, Denmark and France.  
In terms of investment periods, Rouwenhorst (1998) found that momentum profit is 
large and significant in their sample of 12 European countries in the medium term (3- 
to 12-month holding periods). Similarly, Mengoli (2004) observes significant 
momentum return over less-than-12-month periods in the Italian Stock Exchange. The 
profitability, however, disappears after one year. These findings are consistent with the 
US results documented earlier by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). More recently, Lam 
(2007) also documents significantly positive returns generated by 6-month momentum 
strategies in three major European countries, France, Germany and the UK, between 
1977 and 2002. 
In contrast, Franck, Walter and Witt (2013) do not find evidence that German mutual 
funds employing momentum strategies outperform other funds. They further explain 
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that it is because German funds largely use the strategies in trading European and Asian 
stocks but less on domestic stocks. Also, the mutual funds with such global equity focus 
account for just half of the number of funds in Germany. So this perhaps explains their 
different findings. 
Although momentum effect is documented in many markets in Europe, it is important 
to study the underlying reasons behind the anomaly on a country level. On the one hand, 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) argue that a national culture effect could explain the 
differences in performance of momentum strategies between countries. On the other 
hand, Nijman et al. (2002) and Fama and French (2012) among others indicate that it is 
individual stock performance that determines the presence of momentum, not countries’ 
or industries’ characteristics. The next section will focus on discussions on momentum 
in UK firms, and the aim is to identify potential gaps, if any, in the momentum literature 
in the UK. 
4.2.1.D. Momentum strategies in the UK 
Research on momentum investing in the UK market is relatively underdeveloped 
considering the position of the London Stock Exchange in the world’s financial centres. 
Most studies have the UK as a subset in their international-scale research. 
Rouwenhorst’s (1998) work, for example, admits that more than half of firms in his 
sample of twelve international markets are those in three major countries, namely the 
UK (23%), France (20%) and Germany (10%)20, and among which, he finds the UK 
exhibits a 0.9% monthly return on average from momentum strategies. More recently, 
examining a sample of 40 countries, Griffin et al. (2003) also notice the presence of 
abnormal return in most markets and report that momentum-oriented investors in the 
UK can gain a return of 1.03% per month on average for a 3-month holding period. This 
excess return is statistically significant (t-value of 6.14) and among the highest rates in 
their sample. However, this abnormal return decreased to only 0.20% if investors held 
their portfolios for 12 months and disappeared afterward. In their updated study, Griffin 
et al. (2005) confirm these findings but do not attempt to research further. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that most investment strategies were originally discovered in the 
US. However, thorough examination in non-US markets would provide out-of-sample 
evidence about what truly drives these anomalies21. 
                                                 
20 Calculation is based on the details given in Rouwenhorst (1998, p.272-273) showing that among 2,190 
stocks in his sample, the UK contributes 494, France: 427 and Germany: 228 firms. 
21 As pointed out in Griffin et al.’s (2003) international study, if momentum is explained by risk, it is 
largely country-specific risk. 
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Realising this gap, some researchers have recently begun to explore the subject in the 
UK. A study by Chabot, Ghysels and Jagannathan (2009) shows that momentum 
strategies generated significant abnormal returns even during the Victorian era with an 
exemption of the January reversal, which they attribute to the tax-free system on capital 
gains at the time. However, they find a period of no momentum profit for 3.8 months 
once every 1.4 years. Also, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find evidence that during a more 
recent period between 1979 and 2002 past winners outperform past losers among 
distressed stocks but it is not the case within the non-distress group22. Figures in Table 
3 of their paper indicate that the return differentials between the winners and the losers 
are not statistically significant. However, since their work does not focus on testing the 
performance of momentum strategies, no further analysis is carried out.  
Therefore, there is still a need for more in-depth analysis on the performance and the 
driving factors behind momentum trading in the UK, and this thesis aims to contribute 
to that segment of the existing literature. 
4.2.2 Momentum and business cycles 
From a theoretical standpoint, many theorists predict that changes in credit market 
conditions could affect a firm’s risk bearing and their expected stock returns23. In 
particular, Berk, Green and Naik (1999) estimate a firm’s value to be based on the value 
of its assets plus growth options. Their theoretical model predicts that economic 
conditions can directly affect expected stock return through interest rate changes. 
Regarding momentum anomaly, whether it is driven by risk-based or behavioural 
factors, there are perhaps still reasons to expect that business cycles and market 
conditions could have an effect on its profitability. More specifically, the risk levels 
have long been serving as the first point of concern in investment decision making 
whenever there are changes in the market conditions. These are grounds for concern 
because Ahmed and Lockwood (1998) and Howton and Peterson (1998), for example, 
find evidence of a significant difference in systematic risks in upturn and downturn 
markets. Also, it is widely documented that well performing stocks and poorly 
performing stocks react to good and bad market conditions differently (Ang and Chen 
2002, and Li, Miffre and Brooks 2006 among others). Hence, one could expect changes 
in the expected return of the winners and the losers as a result of changes in risk levels. 
                                                 
22 In Agarwal and Taffler’s (2008) study, distressed stocks are defined as securities of firms that have a 
negative Z-score, and therefore are at risk of bankruptcy. 
23 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for examples. 
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On the other hand, it is also possible to relate the differing states of the economy to 
investors’ sentiment and to the possibility of investors’ misvaluation. The behavioural 
finance theory implies that investors are more positive (negative) when good (bad) news 
comes along and as a result, they tend to under-react (over-react) to the news (DeBondt 
and Thaler 1985). That is the foundation of the misvaluation arguments. In contrast, 
Antoniou, Lam and Paudyal (2007) find that although business cycles contribute 
significantly in capturing momentum returns, behavioural biases are not the underlying 
reason behind that explanatory ability. They further explain that it is risk factors that are 
attributable to business cycles that drive momentum abnormal returns. 
Empirically, there have been a large number of studies showing a strong link between 
momentum profitability and the states of the economy. According to Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002), poor business conditions, especially recessions, have been shown 
to have negative impacts on momentum performance. They find momentum strategies 
result in negative returns during these periods, yet which are statistically insignificant. 
The trading strategies, however, generate considerably larger profits in the US during 
economic booms. Similarly, Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) find that returns 
from momentum strategies are only positive and significant during economic 
expansion. They attribute this result to changes in investor sentiment which is reflected 
by stock market conditions. However, Griffin et al. (2003) point out that market upturns 
or downturns can reflect other measurable variables. In particular, they list a range of 
macroeconomic variables that are more related to the market states, such as changes in 
industrial production and in inflation. More importantly, the study provides strong 
evidence of significant momentum profitability across 4 continents, in both “good” and 
“bad” economic conditions. 
4.2.3 The relationship between firm distress condition and momentum 
From the asset pricing viewpoint, there has been evidence of distress-risk explanatory 
power in predicting equity returns. Early studies by Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama 
and French (1992) show that higher returns generated by small and value stocks are a 
compensation for their higher distress risk. Additionally, Fama and French (2008) find 
evidence that small and unprofitable firms experience unusually low stock returns, 
whereas equity returns increase with profitability among profitable firms. 
Momentum investing, a sub-branch of the asset pricing literature, further suggests that 
the higher return of the winner stocks over the losers is associated with firm size and 
financial conditions. More specifically, Eisdorfer, Goyal and Zhdanov (2011) provide 
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evidence that size, value and momentum anomalies are most noticeable among stocks 
that are under great financial pressure. They explain that investors tend to greatly 
misvalue those stocks. These findings are consistent with Hong et al.’s (2000) research 
which shows that momentum profitability is much higher among stocks with low 
analyst coverage (usually associated with a higher likelihood of being mispriced). In 
addition, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find higher momentum profits among 
consistent winners. 
Connecting the two concepts, there is a growing body of research studying whether 
firms’ financial distress risk can explain the long-standing momentum anomaly. For 
instance, a study by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007) reports a strong 
link between momentum profits and firm distress conditions in the US. They find that 
momentum strategies yield significant abnormal profits among firms with low credit 
ratings while there is no such premium found among high-grade firms. Their study 
further documents that stock volatility and firm characteristics, such as size, age and 
leverage, do not seem to have the ability to capture the return differential between the 
high and low credit rating groups. 
Similarly, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) confirm the important role of default risk in 
explaining momentum profitability in the UK market. Using a different proxy for firm 
financial distress, they argue that momentum anomaly in the UK is explained only by 
Z-score (i.e. Altman’s (1968) measure of probability of bankruptcy). They document 
that the market tends to underreact to firms’ distress conditions, and momentum profits 
are in fact driven by a very slow response to the poor performance of firms with a 
positive Z-score (i.e. having similar characteristics of previous bankrupt firms). As a 
result, momentum is a proxy for financial distress risk and the Z-score-based factor 
should act as an alternative to momentum factor in the traditional Carhart (1997) four-
factor asset pricing model. 
A more recent study by Abinzano, Muga and Santamaria (2014) in four EU countries 
(UK, France, Germany and Spain) finds that default risk could explain the returns on 
loser portfolios but not the returns on winner portfolios. This is because the 
characterisation of the winner stocks is more complex and therefore it is difficult to 
explain their returns. 
From a theoretical perspective, Campbell et al. (2008) point out that if firm distress risk 
has not been captured by the CAPM, it may contribute to explaining market anomalies, 
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such as size and value premiums. This implies that the abnormal returns may be a 
compensation for bearing a higher default risk. 
However, the question of whether or not these arguments are valid empirically is still 
under debate and this chapter devotes sub-section (ii) of section 4.2.4 to discussing this 
concern. 
The next section will discuss in detail the gaps in the momentum and financial distress 
literature, from which this chapter’s research questions emerged. 
4.2.4 Gaps in momentum literature 
There are a number of areas in the literature that can potentially be developed further in 
order to meet the growing demand for fully understanding the underlying reasons 
behind the well-recognised momentum anomaly. 
(i) Under-developed research in the UK 
As discussed in the previous section, there is evidence supporting the link between 
firms’ financial distress condition and the performance of momentum strategies, though 
it is mostly found in the US market. Research outside the US would provide the 
necessary out-of-sample evidence of momentum and the sources of the anomaly. 
However, among a limited number of works concerning momentum in the UK, there 
have not been any attempts to study the role of default risk in explaining momentum 
anomaly. Also, the most recent empirical works on momentum in the UK are on a 
dataset up to 2002. Thus, this chapter aims to explore this under-developed area in the 
literature. 
Additionally, a large-scale research by Griffin et al. (2003) points out that if business 
cycle risk drives momentum, it is not global risk but country-specific risk factors that 
are responsible for the momentum profits. They, therefore, strongly suggest for future 
researchers to look at momentum anomaly on a country-by-country basis. Figure 4.1 
shows that from 1989 to 2013 the UK economy has experienced both sides of the 
business cycle with a long period of growth and stability found between two market 
downturns in 1990-1992 and 2007-2010. It is, therefore, worth testing whether 
momentum profitability in the UK is explained by business cycles. 
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Figure 4.1: UK GDP Growth rate (1989-2013) 
 
(ii) Measures of financial distress risk 
Previous studies have set up a link between momentum and firm distress risk but there 
are some concerns over the proxies for distress risk used in their tests. For example, 
Avramov et al. (2007) propose using credit rating as a proxy for firms’ bankruptcy risk. 
It is not only a familiar and straightforward measure but also the only measure that takes 
into consideration both quantitative and qualitative firm-related information. However, 
as Griffin et al. (2003) observed, bond markets and corporate credit ratings outside the 
US are not developed well enough to provide a reliable measure of firm’s creditability. 
Thus, despite the promising benefits of the proxy, it is difficult to apply this approach 
in non-US markets without causing some forms of data bias. 
Alternatively, using Altman’s (1968) Z-score to measure default risk, Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008) find that, unlike Fama and French’s (1992) results, in the UK market 
firm size and BM factors do not capture distress risk but that momentum does. They go 
further, making a rather strong statement that a risk factor built from Z-score portfolios 
should replace the winner-minus-loser factor in Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model as 
the Z-score-based factor is superior in representing the same type of risk.  
There are a number of reasons suggesting that Agarwal and Taffler (2008) might have 
overstated the role of Z-score in explaining asset return in general and momentum profit 
in particular. First of all, by considering only whether Z-score is positive or negative 
(which is appropriate when relying on this measure, as they pointed out that the actual 
value of Z-score is meaningless), they automatically disregard the fact that some firms 
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can experience a more serious financial distress than others, and so do the associated 
stock prices. Thus, instead of only two groups, a more detailed ranking of their risk 
level is needed and the return on their stocks should be weighted accordingly. Secondly, 
Z-score is well recognised as an easily-calculated measure of default probability, 
originally built from a sample of only 66 firms in the manufacturing sector. Applying 
this score on firms in the financial sector is not advisable while the Winner-minus-Loser 
factor is not limited in any particular sectors. This perhaps prevents Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) from generalising their findings. Finally, although being a popular measure of 
default risk, Z-score is constructed purely based on accounting variables while 
momentum strategies are based on past stock market prices.  
In this thesis, we therefore propose using Campbell-Hilscher-Szilagy’s (2008) proxy 
for default probability which covers a large set of both accounting and equity market 
variables. More details on the proxy construction and its advantages over the previous 
measurements are provided earlier in section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2. 
(iii) Controlling for thin trading issues 
Moreover, it is worth noticing that most UK-based studies look at the FTSE All-share 
index, which includes a large number of small and medium stocks which experience 
long periods of irregular trading activities. Their past returns, therefore, do not provide 
reliable evidence of their actual performance. Irregular trading stocks would therefore 
unsurprisingly be classified as losers. There are two issues with including them in loser 
portfolios: (a) In theory, momentum investors should sell the losers to gain profit, while 
in practice, there is little chance that the ask offers (or sell offers) can actually been 
exercised due to the thin trading experience. (b) While momentum profit is documented 
to be driven by the poor performance of small and distressed stocks24, the thin trading 
issue associating with stocks within this category will potentially bias toward accepting 
this hypothesis. To reduce these possible biases, the chapter, therefore, proposes the use 
of FTSE350 stocks when explaining momentum anomaly in the UK. The exclusion of 
extremely small and irregular trading stocks has also been strongly recommended for 
the US market by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) among others in order to reduce 
standard errors. 
                                                 
24 Hong et al. (2000) and Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find that most momentum profit comes from the return 
continuation of past poor performing stocks and small and distressed firms are more likely to fall into this group. 
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(iv) The possibility that firm default risk and business cycle risk can explain 
momentum. 
Whereas there is an extensive literature on momentum and a growing literature on its 
relationship with business cycles, as well as with firms’ financial distress conditions, 
there have not been any efforts connecting these three related phenomena. This is 
possibly because there is a possible link between business cycles and firm default risk 
while there is no clear-cut measure of the effect of the former on the latter. Putting 
default risk and business cycle effects in one context may allow their role, if any, in 
explaining momentum anomaly to be distinguished and quantified.  
This thesis therefore aims to bridge these gaps in the literature by testing the following 
three main hypotheses. 
4.2.5 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Momentum strategies are profitable in the UK. 
The chapter revisits the anomaly in the UK market and updates the validity of 
momentum strategies. Hypothesis 1 is to find out if the strategies of buying the past 
winners and selling the past losers generate a positive abnormal return in the UK. 
Testing the hypothesis also provides an answer for the question of whether or not these 
trading strategies outperform a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
In addition, the chapter also addresses the performance of momentum investing in 
different states of the economy. Many researches in non-UK markets show a large 
momentum profit during economic expansion but not during downturns while others 
find significant momentum returns in both states of the economy. The objective of this 
hypothesis is to contribute to this debate with UK evidence. 
Hypothesis 2: Momentum profitability varies over business cycles. 
There is evidence in the literature of a link between momentum profitability and 
business cycles. In order to better understand whether business cycles can contribute to 
explaining momentum in the UK, this chapter also looks at how momentum strategies 
perform over different business cycles. It compares momentum returns over periods of 
negative versus positive GDP growth rates, and between these during two extreme states 
of the economy: economic recessions and expansions. 
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Hypothesis 3: Momentum profitability can be explained by default risk. 
If there are momentum profits in the UK, testing Hypothesis 3 will fulfil the need for 
researching the explanatory power of firms’ default risk in explaining momentum 
anomaly in the UK. As studies in this subject were carried out only recently and mostly 
in the US, it is important, especially for practitioners, to ensure that their trading 
strategies are based on research findings that have been tested both in- and out-of-
sample.  
Hypothesis 4: Firm distress condition and business cycle risk contribute to explaining 
momentum profitability. 
There is evidence that firm financial distress conditions can explain momentum 
anomaly and that momentum profits vary with economic conditions. Therefore, it is 
natural to ask if the two factors contribute to capturing momentum profitability. 
Examining this link provides new evidence of the explanatory abilities of firms’ default 
probability and business cycles collectively. Additionally, the test can also help us 
answer an important question of whether momentum anomaly in the UK is driven by 
risk or investor irrationality. 
4.3 CHAPTER CONTRIBUTION 
Momentum investment strategies have been documented widely in the literature. Most 
studies, however, focused on the US market or on certain groups of countries as a whole. 
Studies focusing exclusively on the UK market were dated back in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Given the important role of the UK in the global economy and a number of 
recessions which have occurred recently, it is worth revisiting the question of whether 
there are abnormal momentum returns in the UK market and, if so, what are the factors 
explaining the anomaly. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature firstly by incorporating effects of the 
recent shocks in the market together with firms’ default risk in capturing momentum 
premium in the UK. There have been numerous studies25 reporting a strong link 
between the presence of momentum premium and states of the economy. However, this 
is the first empirical study that examines the impact of economic shocks in more recent 
years, most notably the financial crisis in 2008, on momentum investors in the UK. 
                                                 
25 For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper et al. (2004) for the US, and Griffin et al. 
(2003) for the UK market. 
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Section 4.5.1 of this chapter will report the performance of momentum strategies in the 
UK in various market conditions, such as market downturns versus upturns, or 
recessions versus expansions. More importantly, the chapter provides an assessment on 
the role of risk associated with these changes in the economy in explaining momentum 
anomaly. While there is not a single proxy for states of the economy, the analysis is 
based on a set of business cycle factors that are collectively meant to mimic the risk 
elements associated with changes in the state of the economy. 
Secondly, when taking firm distress conditions into account, unlike previous studies the 
chapter employs a range of distress variables to ensure more risk elements associated 
with distress conditions in common stock returns are captured. These include default 
risk, BM, size and past return effects, together with business cycle components such as 
term spread and default spread. While some variables have been mentioned in the 
momentum literature, such as BM, size and past return effects, the role of the others has 
not been tested in the same context. 
In regard to default risk, the analysis is based on a more accurate proxy for firms’ default 
probability calculated from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) dynamic 
probability model. The measure includes not only accounting but also equity market 
variables. Before Campbell et al. (2008), models predicting the probability of corporate 
failure were developed nearly four decades ago. Additionally, the default indicator 
proposed by Campbell et al. (2008) has been documented to have a higher accuracy 
than the earlier indicators. Campbell et al.’s (2008) proxy, however, has not been used 
in the momentum studies. For the first time, Campbell et al.’s (2008) corporate failure 
indicator is used as the main proxy for default risk in explaining momentum anomaly. 
Other measures of default probability, such as O-score and Z-score, are also employed 
for robustness check purposes. 
Finally, although there is already evidence of momentum anomaly being explained by 
firm default risk while also associating this with business cycles, the chapter is the first 
work linking the three elements in the same context. This approach enables the study to 
report on whether the risk component associated with one variable has been captured 
by the other, and whether these risk elements can collectively explain momentum 
anomaly in the UK. If they do, this would contribute to enhancing the performance of 
momentum modelling going forward.  
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4.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Data 
Data used in this chapter are the FTSE350 stocks, covering a period from 31st January 
1990 to 31st December 2012. As discussed earlier, the use of the FTSE350 rather than 
the FTSE All share is more suitable for asset pricing in the UK market. This is also in 
line with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) among others who exclude small and illiquid 
stocks from their sample to reduce standard errors. The stock returns for each month are 
the natural logarithm returns of stock prices. Firms must at least have data on stock 
returns from 6 months prior to the portfolio formation date until the end of the holding 
period to be included in the related portfolios. For example, 6-month-holding portfolios 
in month t include firms that have data at least from month t-6 to month t+6. In line 
with previous studies on momentum strategies, this chapter includes financial firms and 
firms with no BM data. In short, 10 portfolios (described in Section 4.4.2 B) are formed 
from a full sample of 290 firms (see Appendix 1 for the constituent list). 
Data are obtained from the DataStream database unless stated otherwise. There is some 
accounting data that is not available in DataStream for some firms, for instance Earnings 
Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT). EBIT is obtained from Bloomberg and in some cases 
hand-collected from the firms’ annual reports published on their official websites. The 
UK Gilt rates are obtained from the UK Debt Management Office database. Details of 
data sources and data collection process are described in Appendix 2 of this thesis. 
Among input variables, only the market excess return is obtained from Prof. Kenneth 
R. French’s website. Other variables are constructed as described the in next section (a 
summary can also be found in Appendix 3). 
4.4.2 Methodology 
4.4.2. A Default risk proxies 
There are number of proxies for default probability discussed in the literature, the most 
commonly used measures are Altman’s (1968) Z-score, Merton’s (1974) distant-to-
default, Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, and Campbell-Hilscher-Szilagy’s (2008) model 
(CHS hereafter). To measure firms’ default risk, the chapter employs the last and also 
the latest measure – the CHS dynamic hazard model – for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the distinct merit of this method is that it is by far the only measure considering a large 
set of both accounting and equity market variables, and thus can potentially possess a 
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higher predictive ability on bankruptcy risk26. Moreover, unlike value and size 
anomalies, momentum is based on past equity returns; the CHS is therefore a more 
appropriate measure in momentum analysis than accounting-based measures, such as 
Z-score and O-score. Furthermore, some studies such as Aretz, Florackis and Kostakis 
(2017) show that for non-US markets, the CHS measure appears to be more suitable 
due to its ability to incorporate country-specific characteristics. Lastly, Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) and Campbell et al. (2008) find evidence that the CHS model 
outperforms Merton’s (1974) model, which was based on bond pricing, in forecasting 
bankruptcy in their sample. They find that over a long period of time, the volatility in 
many variables such as firm characteristics, market value and equity prices become 
significant in predicting bankruptcy rate and the CHS has the ability to capture that time 
variance. Nevertheless, the chapter will later utilise other proxies for robustness check 
purposes. 
We follow Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) study to compute the CHS value 
of each company27. CHS values are made up of a number of accounting and equity 
ratios as described in section 2.5.1.B of Chapter 2. Accounting ratios forming the CHS 
variable have been widely used in previous studies such as Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) to forecast the risk of bankruptcy. By also including equity information, 
Campbell et al. (2008) allow the market view on firms’ default probability to be 
captured in the CHS. More details on the procedure for computing the CHS score can 
be found in Appendix 5 of the thesis. 
4.4.2. B Portfolio formation 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we first form 10 portfolios based on ranking 
past 6-month lagged return and hold for 6 months. At the end of each month t, stocks 
are classified into portfolios by ranking in ascending order their monthly returns from 
month t-5 to month t and then forming 10 equally weighted portfolios, in which the 
lowest past return is P1 and the highest past return is P10. That means P1 (P10) consists 
of 10% of the stocks with the lowest (highest) returns over the previous 6 months. The 
                                                 
26 Franzen, Rodger and Simin (2006) raise the concern that measures of distress risk based solely on 
accounting variables are losing their accuracy in recent times. Market-based measures, however, are not 
subject to this criticism. 
27 See Appendix 3 for the mathematical formula of constructing each variable, proposed by Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008). 
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portfolios are held from month t+1 to month t+6 following the formation month. The 
momentum profits are defined as the return differentials between P10 and P1.  
In addition, to examine momentum profitability in the periods following portfolio 
formation as considered in previous studies, the chapter also separately constructs 10 
portfolios based on 6-month lagged return with 3-, 9-, 12- and 60-month holding 
periods. The main reason for choosing these timelines is to check if there is a momentum 
reversal over 12+ month investments, which previous studies, for example Griffin et al. 
(2003), have documented in several countries, including the UK and the US. Portfolios 
are equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. In this chapter, we consider only 6-month 
lagged returns as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that trading strategies based on 
returns of the last 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters do not yield significantly different results. 
Moreover, since this chapter is particularly interested in the default probability variable 
which is constructed using information from firms’ financial statements, it is important 
that the requirement of a minimum of 6-month lag is met to ensure that outside investors 
have time to fully consider the financial reports. 
4.4.2. C Explanatory variable construction 
Variable construction has been discussed earlier in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 and more 
details can be found in Appendix 3 of this thesis. Beside Fama and French’s (1993) 
three factors, in Chapter 4 there are a number of explanatory variables employed to 
proxy for business cycles, including default spread (DES), term spread (TERM), 
dividend yield (DIV) and the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate LIBOR (a proxy 
for the short-term Treasury Bill, T-Bill). A large number of early studies, such as Fama 
(1981) and Fama and French (1988), have shown that these variables are closely related 
to short-term and long-term business cycles. They found that these variables 
experienced mean reversion across different economic cycles. 
DES is defined as the difference between the average yields on corporate bonds and on 
long-term Government bonds (UK Gilt with a 15+ year maturity). DIV refers to the 
average value-weighted dividend yield of all stocks in the sample. TERM is the 
difference between average returns on long-term and short-term Government bonds 
(15+ year Gilt and 3-month rate, respectively) and T-Bill is the rate of return of the 3-
month LIBOR. 
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In addition, the chapter also uses a portfolio-based approach to form the distress factor, 
in which stocks are also sorted into three portfolios: high, medium and low distress 
groups, based on their probability of default. It is worth noticing that, unlike the way 
distress portfolios were constructed in the previous section, CHS portfolios are formed 
using the usual 30:40:30 breakpoint. This is because portfolio-based explanatory 
variables aim to proxy for the associated risk factors rather than measure actual stock 
returns. 
In the four-factor model, there is a potential simultaneity bias concerning the dependant 
variable (Ri-Rf) and the Winner-minus-Loser (WML) variable as both variables aim to 
capture certain aspects of the momentum effects. To reduce this possibility, this chapter 
constructs two variables using different intervals with a lag in formation date. As 
described earlier, the winner and loser portfolios are formed every month based on their 
past 6-month returns and rebalanced every 6 months. On the other hand, following 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), WML is constructed based on stocks’ 11-month past 
returns. The monthly portfolio returns are calculated at July, year t with a 1-month lag 
and value weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t. The WML is the 
return differential between the top 30% and the bottom 30% stocks.  
4.4.2. D Valuation models 
(i) Estimation methods 
The chapter will start with the traditional FF three-factor model. Although Fama and 
French (1996) find that the FF model fails to capture momentum patterns in average 
returns in the US, we look to test whether an augmented FF model, enhanced with a 
default factor – CHS – can explain momentum in the UK market. The augmented FF 
model is given by: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  +  𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 
Where, Rit is returns on asset i at time t; Rmt is returns on the market at time t; HMLt is 
the High-minus-Low variable at time t; SMBt is the Small-minus-Big variable at time t; 
and CHSt is the CHS variable. These explanatory variables are described in detail in 
Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. 
Following Fama and French (2012), we will also use the four-factor model proposed by 
Carhart (1997) to capture momentum returns. The Carhart classical risk-based model is 
(4.1) 
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also documented to perform well in capturing momentum effects in the UK. Gregory, 
Tharyan and Christidis (2013) show that after removing illiquidity stocks from the 
FTSE All share index, which are mostly non-FTSE350 stocks, stock cross-sectional 
returns can be explained by Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, including market beta, 
HML, SMB and WML variables. In addition, for the UK market, they strongly support 
the use of risk factor models, in which factors are constructed based on portfolios with 
similar characteristics. For instance, the factor HML is formed from the return 
differentials between high and low BM portfolios. They find evidence that these models 
can explain abnormal returns in general and momentum anomaly in particular.  
This empirical study will consider an augmented Carhart model given in the below 
equation to explain momentum in the FTSE350: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝛼’ + 𝛽’𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  + 𝛽’𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽’𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛽’𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛽’𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  
Where, Rit is returns on asset i at time t; Rmt is returns on the market at time t; HMLt is 
the High-minus-Low variable at time t; SMBt is the Small-minus-Big variable at time t; 
WMLt is the Winner-minus-Loser variable at time t; and CHSt is the CHS variable at 
time t. These explanatory variables are described in detail in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. 
To ensure the results are not sensitive to the choice of proxy, we employ a number of 
most commonly used variables, including CHS’s (2008) estimated variable, Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score, and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score. 
The chapter then considers if adding business cycles could contribute to explaining 
momentum returns. Section 4.5.2 provides analysis on how momentum profitability 
changes over different business cycles by looking at the potential effects of changes in 
investment opportunities during economic cycles. To proxy for the changes in 
investment opportunities, this chapter uses a range of variables that have been widely 
reported in the literature, namely DES, TERM, DIV and T-Bill. Next, section 4.5.3 
addresses the possible explanatory power of firms’ distress conditions in explaining 
momentum in the UK. In addition, the section aims to find out if adding business cycles 
can contribute to explaining momentum profitability. One concern raised is the 
possibility of multicollinearity issues between distressed firms and market conditions. 
This concern will be addressed later in section 4.5.4 to ensure the robustness of the 
results. 
(4.2) 
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The regression models are given as follows. 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝜎 + 𝛾𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  +  𝛾𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  
+ 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡  +  𝛾𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡  +  𝛾𝑇−𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 
and,      
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝜎’ + 𝛾’𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  + 𝛾’𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾’𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛾’𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾’𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  +  𝛾’𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡  + 𝛾’𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛾’𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡  +  𝛾’𝑇−𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 
Where, Rit is returns on asset i at time t;  
Rmt is returns on the market at time t;  
HMLt is the High-minus-Low variable at time t;  
SMBt is the Small-minus-Big variable at time t;  
WMLt is the Winner-minus-Loser variable at time t;  
CHSt is the CHS variable at time t; 
DESt is the Default spread variable at time t; 
TERMt is the Term spread variable at time t;  
DIVt is the Dividend yield variable at time t; and  
T-Billt is the Short-term Treasury Bill variable at time t.  
These explanatory variables are described in detail in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. 
(ii) Seasonal effects 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) notice an unusual seasonality in momentum behaviour. 
Unlike any other calendar month, January sees a sudden shift in momentum profits from 
largely positive to significantly negative returns. Although there is nothing to suggest 
that January differs from any other months, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) revisit this 
phenomenon and find that it is small-size and low-priced stocks that drive the 
seasonality. However, the seasonality is still not fully explained when excluding those 
stocks. Thus, this chapter also examines the performance of momentum strategies in 
January and in non-January months to see whether the January effect in momentum 
profit exists in the UK. If it does, the analysis will be adjusted accordingly. 
(4.4) 
(4.3) 
  
170 
In addition, as mentioned in previous sections, there has been evidence that market 
conditions can affect momentum profitability. It shows that momentum anomaly 
exhibits large positive abnormal returns during economic expansions and may shift to 
losses during recessions. At the same time, during the testing period the UK experienced 
a long period of recession following the 2008 global financial crisis. Hence, it is also 
crucial to check if these events have had effects on momentum strategies in the UK 
market. 
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.5.1 Performance of momentum strategies 
4.5.1. A Momentum anomaly  
Several studies have documented the presence of momentum profitability in the UK28. 
However, given the important position of the UK in the global economy, the number of 
studies done on this market is relatively modest. Also, it is worth mentioning that most 
of the works were performed on the 1990s and early 2000s data. Since then, there have 
been a number of significant events that could change the cost of investment 
opportunity, such as the recent financial crisis in 2008 and the Bank of England’s 
decision to keep interest rates at a record low of 0.5% since March 2009. Thus, it is 
important to incorporate these changes and to update momentum-oriented investors 
with more recent findings.  
Table 4.1 reports the average monthly returns of momentum strategies across 
investment horizons. Most studies have documented the results for 6-month investment 
periods or longer. In this section, we first look at the less commonly reported strategies 
which involve buying the past 6-month winners, sell the past 6-month losers and 
rebalancing every 3 months.  
The results in Table 4.1 further confirm that in the UK market the winner stocks also 
outperform the losers for a shorter investment period of 3 months. On average, 
momentum investing generates 1.24% per month. The average excess return is both 
statistically and economically significant (t-statistic value of 4.12). It is also worth 
noticing that the return differentials between the top winners are larger in comparison 
with those at the bottom groups.  For instance, stocks in the loser group (P1) and the 
                                                 
28 See Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) and Antoniou, Lam and Paudyal (2007) for examples. 
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second lowest past return stocks (P2) is 0.03% (i.e. 0.61% minus 0.58%). This is much 
smaller than the return differential between P10 and P9 (0.25% per month). Thus, it is 
likely that the momentum effect is stronger among the winners. The explanation for this 
result perhaps ties with Fama and French’s (1992) observation that firms tend to 
continue their performance over a period of less than 6 months.  
Additionally, in comparison with buy-and-hold strategies, which buy securities at the 
beginning and hold until the end of the investment period, all of the momentum 
strategies tested in this chapter outperform these simple strategies. The result reinforces 
the view that frequent trading does generate profit for UK investors. 
The next section will verify the performance of momentum investing over different 
investment horizons in order to ensure the robustness of the results. The most commonly 
reported holding periods are 6 months, 9 months and 12 months. We also look at a 60-
month investment as there has been a concern about a reversal momentum effect over 
a long holding period. 
4.5.1. B Momentum premium checks 
(i) Different investment horizons 
In this section, the chapter checks if the difference in holding periods affects its findings. 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, there are momentum abnormal returns in the UK for up-
to-one-year holding periods. Statistically, the returns are largely significant only in 3- 
and 6-month investment periods. The average abnormal returns range from 1.01% to 
1.24% per month with t-statistic values of 3.23 and 4.12, respectively. These results are 
slightly lower than those documented in previous studies. Some examples are 
Rouwenhorst (1998) and Antoniou et al. (2007) which found momentum profitability 
at about 2.10%. The slight difference is perhaps due to the fact that their samples also 
cover small and illiquid stocks which are shown to yield higher momentum but not 
likely to be exercised in reality. 
From the table, one observation drawn is that the return from momentum strategies is 
squeezed more quickly as investors extend their holding period. For example, keeping 
their position for 9 to 12 months is still profitable but the rates of return were much 
lower than those for 6 months. More specifically, on average the 9-month (12-month) 
strategies generate returns of 0.67% (0.25%) monthly, decreasing by a half (a quarter), 
compared with 1.01% previously. Additionally, returns from both strategies are 
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statistically insignificant. This confirms the results documented in the literature that 
momentum profitability tends to last for one year. To cap it all, holding the winners for 
a long period of 60 months even leads to a loss of 0.37% per month on average.  
(ii) Seasonality 
This section examines the possible seasonal effects on the performance of momentum 
strategies in Januaries as have been noticed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). It is worth 
noticing that in order to identify seasonality, analysing portfolios that have been held 
for more than a year may not be very meaningful. Thus, this section only looks at 
momentum profits over 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month holding periods. 
In Panel A of Table 4.2, overall the UK momentum strategies experience a slightly 
worse performance during Januaries compared with other months. Although the average 
momentum returns are still positive, they become less significant. The 3-month holding 
strategies yield a return of 1% per month, statistically significant at a 1% level. Apart 
from the 3-month investing horizon, other strategies (6-, 9- and 12-month holding 
periods) generate statistically insignificant returns of 0.83%, 0.39% and 0.11% a month 
on average. On the other hand, excluding Januaries sees higher returns for momentum 
investors across all holding periods. However, the difference is relatively small 
suggesting that the January effects, if any, in the UK do not have a significant impact 
on momentum strategies. The returns are also statistically significant for 3- and 6-month 
investment periods. The results are largely similar to those for the whole testing period.
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Table 4.1: Momentum strategies 
At the end of each month t, stocks are classified into 10 equally weighted portfolios, P1 to P10. The portfolio P1 (P10) consists of 10% of the stocks with the lowest (highest) 
returns over the previous 6 months. The first column reports average returns of simple buy-and-hold strategies on each portfolio. Separately, the portfolios are held for a K-month 
period, including 3-, 6-, 9-, 12- and 60-month holding periods. For example, when K= 6-months, the portfolios are held from month t+1 to month t+6 and rebalanced at the end of 
month t+6. The momentum profits are defined as the return differentials between P10 and P1. The time-series means are presented in percentage. t-statistics (in parentheses) report 
the results of the test for a zero mean. *, ** and *** denote significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 Buy and 
Hold 
K = 3-month  6-month  9-month  12-month  60-month 
 Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat. 
P1 0.07 0.58 (1.74)  0.52 (1.60)  0.23 (1.01)  0.15 (1.01)  0.08 (1.11) 
P2 0.05 0.61 (1.98)  0.55 (1.62)  0.28 (1.03)  0.16 (1.04)  0.07 (1.09) 
P3 0.04 0.66 (2.11)  0.60 (2.01)  0.30 (1.03)  0.14 (1.00)  0.03 (1.02) 
P4 0.02 0.65 (2.29)  0.64 (2.15)  0.45 (1.06)  0.18 (1.06)  0.01 (1.01) 
P5 0.01 0.69 (2.32)*  0.69 (2.20)  0.62 (1.10)  0.20 (1.07)  -0.01 (-0.98) 
P6 0.01 0.76 (2.76)**  0.73 (2.48)**  0.66 (1.12)  0.24 (1.08)  -0.02 (-1.00) 
P7 -0.03 0.98 (3.17)***  0.87 (3.15)***  0.74 (1.45)  0.27 (1.18)  -0.07 (-1.01) 
P8 -0.05 1.42 (4.32)***  0.94 (3.19)***  0.73 (1.30)  0.33 (1.51)  -0.16 (-1.02) 
P9 -0.14 1.57 (4.74)***  1.20 (4.15)***  0.78 (2.08)  0.35 (1.78)  -0.24 (-1.05) 
P10 -0.22 1.82 (5.37)***  1.53 (4.31)***  0.90 (2.14)  0.40 (2.02)  -0.29 (-1.08) 
Momentum 
(P10-P1) 
-0.29 1.24 (4.12)***  1.01 (3.23)***  0.67 (1.14)  0.25 (1.09)  -0.37 (-1.10) 
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4.5.2 Momentum and states of the economy 
As mentioned earlier in section 4.2.1.A, there are some concerns about the performance 
of momentum strategies over business cycles documented in Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002). Hence, in this section, we look at how momentum strategies performed over 
different states of the economy. In this chapter, GDP real growth rates are used as a 
proxy for the state of the UK economy. They include market upturns and downturns 
(i.e. positive and negative GDP growth rates) and extreme market conditions (economic 
recessions and expansions). Regarding the extreme states, two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth rate indicates a recession and a period of rapid growth in GDP of 
more than the trend rate of economic growth (i.e. 2.5% annually for the UK) is defined 
as an economic expansion. Accordingly, over the period from January 1990 to 
December 2012, there were two main periods of economic expansions (1993Q1 - 
2000Q4 and 2002Q4 - 2007Q4) and two periods of economic recessions (1991Q1 - 
1991Q4 and 2008Q3 - 2009Q4) in the UK. Among those periods, the second recession 
period from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 appears to be the most serious. It is associated with the 
recent financial crisis which started around September 2008 when Lehman Brothers 
went bankrupt. Although the precise starting date of this financial crisis is subject to 
discussion, this chapter does not intend to engage in this debate.  
From Panel B of Table 4.2, it can be said that momentum profitability is most significant 
over 3- to 6-month investment periods and in “good” economic conditions. During 
periods of GDP growth, the return differentials between the winners and the losers are 
between 1.10% and 1.28% (statistically significant at a 1% level) for these two 
strategies. Momentum strategies weaken as the investment horizon expands. 
Nonetheless, they still generate between 0.23% and 0.64% returns over 9- and 12-month 
investment periods. Expansion periods see even higher momentum abnormal returns. 
On average, momentum investors receive 1.34% per month if they hold their portfolios 
for 3 months; 1.23%, 1.02% and 0.72% for 6-, 9- and 12-month holding periods, 
respectively. The average returns are also statistically significant for all investment 
horizons, except for the 12-month investment. 
On the contrary, momentum strategies do not seem to generate profits during market 
downturns and perform especially poorly during recessions. During negative GDP 
growth periods, there is not much difference in returns between the past winners and 
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the past losers. The return differentials range from almost zero to 0.91% and are 
statistically insignificant. Unsurprisingly, the momentum strategies even lead to losses 
during recessions. 
In short, the results in this chapter confirm that momentum strategies only generate 
positive and significant abnormal returns during “good” economic conditions but 
perform particularly poorly during recessions. The next section will explore these links 
from a dynamic approach that perhaps will offer a better picture of the relationship 
between momentum profitability and business cycles. 
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Table 4.2: January effects and states of the economy 
The table reports monthly momentum premium in January versus non-January (in Panel A), and over different economic conditions (in Panel B). An economic expansion is defined 
as a period of more than 2.5% annual growth. Two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth rate indicates a recession. Portfolios are also held for 3-month, 6-month, 9-month 
and 12-month periods. See notes in Table 4.1 for details of portfolio formation. M is the sample length (in months). The means are presented in percentage and t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at a 1% level. 
  K = 3-month  6-month  9-month  12-month 
 M Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat.  Mean t-stat. 
Panel A: January effects             
January 23 1.00 (3.21)***  0.83 (2.67)  0.39 (1.01)  0.11 (0.97) 
Non-January 253 1.29 (3.93)***  1.08 (3.22)***  0.74 (1.15)  0.32 (1.05) 
Panel B: Macroeconomic 
states 
           
 
GDP < 0 30 0.91 (2.75)  0.68 (1.98)  0.38 (1.00)  -0.01 (-0.68) 
GDP >0 246 1.28 (4.07)***  1.10 (3.14)***  0.64 (1.12)  0.23 (0.10) 
Recessions 28 0.77 (2.05)  -0.09 (-0.75)  -0.21 (-0.99)  -0.41 (-1.24) 
Expansions 147 1.34 (4.43)***  1.23 (4.05)***  1.02 (3.38)***  0.72 (1.12) 
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4.5.3 Firm distress condition and business cycles in explaining momentum 
4.5.3. Momentum and default risk 
Similar to the Griffin et al. (2003) approach, regression analysis in this section will 
focus on portfolios held for 6 months only. This is because (i) it is more common to use 
the 6-month horizon in momentum return estimations, (ii) only up-to-6-month 
momentum returns are statistically significant in our sample, and (iii) there has not been 
any evidence of estimation biases caused by differences in portfolio holding periods. 
The role of firms’ default risk in capturing momentum returns will be addressed by 
incorporating a default risk factor into the FF three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) 
four-factor model. The augmented model is given by equations 4.1 and 4.2 as described 
in section 4.4.2.D. In this section, we focus on estimating the average returns of the top 
winners (P10) and the bottom losers (P1). The estimation results are shown in Tables 
4.3 and 4.4.  
The results in Table 4.3 show that default risk plays an important role in improving the 
FF three-factor model in capturing momentum effect. The coefficients associated with 
the CHS variable are statistically significant for both the P1 and P10 portfolios. The 
coefficient values are -0.122 (t-statistic is -2.07, significant at 5%) and -0.108 (t-statistic 
is -1.79, significant at 10%) for the losers and the winners, respectively.  
In line with Fama and French’s (1993) conclusions, we find that market beta and HML 
are the key explanatory variables in explaining average stock returns. The market beta 
is higher in the regression on winner excess returns and the value is 0.727, compared to 
0.308 for the loser excess returns. Both coefficients are positively and statistically 
significant at a 1% level. On the contrary, the coefficient associated with HML shows 
a negative relationship between the BM effect and excess returns on the winners but a 
positive relationship with the excess returns on the losers. The βHML are -0.124 (t-
statistic is -2.14, significant at 5%) for the winners and 0.220 (t-statistic is 2.71, 
significant at 1%) for the losers.  
Size effect however is not statistically significant in explaining excess returns on the 
losers, P1, and only significant at 10% level in the case of P10, the winners. It may be 
because a majority of the winner companies in the FTSE350 are big firms while the 
pattern is not clearly evident among the loser group. 
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From Table 4.3, it can be said that default risk plays an important role in capturing 
momentum effects. The coefficients associated with the CHS variable are statistically 
significant in regressions on the loser and the winner excess returns. The distress factor 
is also negatively associated with the average excess returns on both portfolios. βCHS 
values are -0.122 (statistically significant at 5%) and -0.108 (statistically significant at 
10%), respectively. 
F-statistics shows that all explanatory variables in the regressions are jointly significant. 
The estimated Adjusted R2s are 61% for the winner group and 59% for the losers. These 
results mean the estimations are relatively good but can be improved further.  
Overall, the results in this table suggest that default risk can contribute to explaining 
momentum anomaly and that default risk proxies for the risk element that has not been 
captured by the three FF factors. 
Next, we will look at an augmented Carhart (1997) model which differs from the 
previous model (mode 4.1) by the addition of a momentum effect, WML. A full formula 
of the augmented Carhart model is given by model 4.2 presented in section 4.4.2.D. 
Estimation results of model 4.2 are reported in Table 4.4. 
The findings in Table 4.4 are consistent with those in previous studies including 
Carhart’s factors (i.e. market beta, HML, SMB and WML) in explaining momentum in 
the UK, such as Lam (2007), which shows that the four factors play a relatively 
important role in explaining the anomaly. Betas associated with the market factor (Rm-
Rf) are both significant at a 1% level (0.311 and 0.740 for P1 and P10 respectively). The 
explanatory power of HML is slightly more significant within the loser group. The 
HML coefficient is 0.201, statistically significant at a 1% level (t-statistic of 2.58) in 
the estimation explaining the movement in return on stocks with poor past performance. 
It is, however, negative and slightly less significant (-0.086, t-statistic of -1.78, 10% 
significance) for the group of stocks with high past returns. The opposite observation is 
seen for the SMB and WML factors. The estimated coefficients associated with these 
two variables are statistically significant at a 10% level in the estimations explaining 
momentum returns on the past winners (β’SMB and β’WML are -0.102 and 0.106, 
respectively). They are, however, only -0.011 and -0.023 (statistically insignificant) in 
the estimations on the past loser returns. 
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Since one of this chapter’s main objectives is to look at the role of default risk, it hereby 
focuses more on analysing this factor in the estimations. As can be seen from Table 4.4, 
default risk does contribute to explaining momentum profitability for the losers but less 
so for the winners. The coefficient associated with the CHS default risk is -0.054 
(significant at a 5% level, t-statistic of -1.89) for P1, the bottom group, indicating that 
the return on firms with low profitability in the past is more sensitive to the distress 
factor. In other words, the CHS default risk could explain more movement of excess 
return on the past losers. It is, however, not the case in P10, the top past return firms. A 
β'CHS value of -0.013 (t-statistic -1.14) in the estimation on P10 excess returns is 
statistically insignificant. It indicates that the CHS default risk does not seem to be an 
important factor in explaining stock returns of the winner portfolio. Perhaps, the past 
poorly performing firms are more sensitive and therefore more likely to suffer from 
potential distress than the past top performers. 
In addition, F-statistics values of the regressions reported in Table 4.4 show that there 
is evidence of joint significance between explanatory variables. There are also potential 
areas for model improvement as Adjusted R2 ranges between 64% and 68%, slightly 
higher than those in the augmented FF model. Next, sub-section 4.5.3.B which 
considers more possible explanatory variables will touch on possible areas for model 
improvement. It is, however, worth mentioning again that this chapter does not aim to 
engage in the discussion of the best fit models and thus only compares the Adjusted R2 
to see if there are any significant differences between estimated regressions. 
Regarding robustness checks, one concern is whether the choice of CHS as an indicator 
for default risk would lead to biased results compared with the results that would have 
been found if using traditional proxies, such as O-score and Z-score. The robustness 
check on findings in Table 4.4 is reported in Table 4.8 and it will be collectively 
analysed in detail in section 4.5.4 at the end of this chapter. 
In the next section, we continue testing the potential role of default risk in explaining 
the expected returns on the top winners and on the losers but with business cycle 
variables also included.
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Table 4.3: Momentum and Default risk 
The table reports the estimated results of the below regressions on momentum returns (model 4.1) 
Ri - Rf =α +βm (Rm-Rf) + βHML HML + βSMB SMB+ βCHS CHS 
The winners (P10) and losers (P1) are classified based on their 6-month past returns and held for 6 months before being rebalanced. Portfolio P1 (P10) consists of the 10% of stocks 
with the lowest (highest) returns over the previous 6 months. See notes in Table 4.1 for construction of the dependent variables, and notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2 for explanatory 
variables. The table shows estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show results of the test on the 
joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. 
  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α t(α)  βm t(βm)  βHML t(βHML) 
P1 0.001 0.03  0.308*** 2.95  0.220*** 2.71 
P10 0.002 0.05  0.727*** 2.93  -0.124** -2.14 
 SMB  CHS  F-statistics Adj. R2 
 βSMB t(βSMB)  βCHS t(βCHS)    
P1 -0.099 -0.26  -0.122** -2.07  2278 0.59 
P10 -0.110* -1.84  -0.108* -1.79  2154 0.61 
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Table 4.4: Momentum, WML and Default risk 
The table reports the estimated results of the following regressions on momentum returns (model 4.2) 
Ri - Rf =α’ +β’m (Rm-Rf) + β’HML HML + β’SMB SMB + β’WML WML + β’CHS CHS 
The winners (P10) and losers (P1) are classified based on their 6-month past returns and held for 6 months before being rebalanced. Portfolio P1 (P10) consists of the 10% of stocks 
with the lowest (highest) returns over the previous 6 months. See notes in Table 4.1 for construction of the dependent variables, and notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2 for explanatory 
variables. The table shows estimated coefficients and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show results of the test on the 
joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model.  
  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α’ t(α’)  β'm t(β’m)  β'HML t(β’HML) 
P1 0.001 0.04  0.311*** 2.98  0.201*** 2.58 
P10 0.003 0.05  0.740*** 3.11  -0.086* -1.78 
 SMB  WML  CHS 
 β'SMB t(β’SMB)  β'WML t(β’WML)  β'CHS t(β’CHS) 
P1 -0.011 -0.14  -0.023 -1.56  -0.054** -1.89 
P10 -0.102* -1.59  0.106* 1.82  -0.013 -1.14 
 F-statistics Adj. R2       
P1 2304 0.64       
P10 2210 0.68       
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4.5.3. B Momentum, Default risk and Business cycles 
As documented earlier, there is evidence that some variables which are attributable to 
business cycles could explain momentum. Also, some studies show that there is a link 
between momentum profits and firm financial conditions. These observations motivate 
this section to put all three elements together in order to test if distress risk together with  
default risk and business cycles can contribute to explaining momentum returns from a 
risk-based approach. The augmented FF model with CHS and business cycle variables 
is given by equation 4.3 in section 4.4.2. The augmented Carhart model with CHS and 
business cycle variables is given by equation 4.4. The results are reported in Tables 4.5 
and 4.6, respectively. 
When considering firms’ default risk and business cycles in one regression, there are 
potential biases caused by a correlation between these two groups of explanatory 
variables. This is when firms go bankrupt due to poor economic conditions without 
respect to their operating performance. This is known as a multicollinearity problem. 
Multicollinearity can be identified via the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance 
values of the estimation in question. The VIF and tolerance values of model 4.3 (and 
4.4) can be found in Tables 4.5 (and 4.6), and detailed discussions will follow in section 
4.5.4.B. 
According to Table 4.5 (reporting results from model 4.3), in the presence of business 
cycle variables, there are not significant changes in sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients associated with explanatory variables in the augmented FF model (model 
4.1). While the signs are unchanged compared with model 4.1, the coefficients are 
slightly lower when adding business cycle variables.  
The intercepts are between 0.001 and 0.002 (t-statistics are 0.02 and 0.03) in regressions 
on excess returns on the loser and winner portfolios. The market beta (γm) and BM effect 
(γHML) remain important explanatory variables in capturing momentum abnormal 
returns. For the loser (winner) portfolio, the coefficient associated with the market 
factor is 0.254 (0.769) and the t-statistic value is 2.52 (3.61). These are slightly lower 
compared with those in model 4.1 but still statistically significant at a 1% level. Similar 
results are observed for the HML variable. The estimated value of γHML is 0.205 (t-
statistic of 2.84, 1% significance) in regression on the excess returns on the losers. The 
coefficient is estimated to be -0.110 (t-statistic of -2.15, 5% significance) in regression 
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on the winner excess returns. Size effects are, however, statistically insignificant in the 
loser regression and significant in the winner regression. This pattern has been observed 
previously in model 4.1 when a default variable was added to the FF three-factor model. 
These show that size effects are more dominant among the winner stocks but less 
evident in the loser portfolio. 
With the presence of business cycles, the default variable still plays an important role 
in explaining momentum. However, the coefficient associated with default risk (γCHS) 
becomes slightly less significant in statistical terms. In regression on the excess returns 
on P1 (the losers), the estimated coefficient associated with the CHS variable is -0.115, 
still negative and statistically significant at a 5% level. However, for P10 (the winners) 
the estimated coefficient is -0.069, statistically insignificant, compared with -0.108 
(statistically significant at a 10% level) that was previously seen in Table 4.3 for model 
4.1 – the augmented FF model. 
In regard to business cycle variables, default spread (DES) and dividend yield (DIV) 
could explain more of the risk patterns in average stocks returns than term spread 
(TERM) and short-term Treasury bill (T-Bill). The coefficients associated with the DES 
variable are negative and statistically significant at a 10% level in regressions on the 
loser and winner excess returns. The values are -0.122 (t-statistic of -2.13) and -0.110 
(t-statistic of -2.11), respectively. The estimated DIV coefficient is 0.118 in the 
regression on the loser excess returns, but has a negative value of -0.103 in the winner 
regression. In both cases, the coefficients are statistically significant at a 10% level. This 
reflects the common practice in which the winner companies are less likely to pay high 
dividends while still being able to keep shareholders’ interest. Unlike the winners, the 
loser companies are expected to pay a high dividend in order to demonstrate that they 
are worth the shareholders’ investment. Therefore, the losers tend to have lower retained 
earnings to reinvest in their business. 
Unlike findings in previous studies29, TERM and T-Bill do not seem to play as 
important a role as the other business cycle variables in explaining average stock 
returns. This is because, unlike the US market, the UK interest rates and Treasury Bill 
rates are not changed as frequently. Therefore, they are less attractive to investors 
looking to profit from the rate differentials. In this chapter, the estimated coefficients 
                                                 
29 See Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Petkova (2006). 
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associated with these variables are statistically insignificant. The value of γTERM is 0.073 
(-0.068) in regression on the loser (winner) excess returns while the γT-Bill value is 0.034 
(0.051) in regression on the loser (winner) excess returns. In both cases, the coefficients 
are statistically insignificant.  
In terms of F-statistics, regression on the loser and the winner excess returns provides 
F-statistics values of 2412 and 2256, respectively. These indicate a high level of joint 
significance between explanatory variables in the regressions. Adjusted R2s are also 
higher in the presence of business cycle variables. They increase from 59% (losers) and 
61% (winners) in model 4.1 to 65% (losers) and 68% (winners) in model 4.3. Although, 
it is not this chapter’s objectives to assess the goodness of fit of the regressions, it is 
worth recognising the role of business cycles variables in improving these estimation 
models.   
In order to establish a comparison between models with and without WML variables, 
the rest of this section also reports the estimation results of a model that consists of 
Carhart’s (1997) four factors (including the FF three-factor model and WML), default 
risk and business cycle variables (i.e. model 4.4). 
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Table 4.5: Momentum, Default risk and Business cycles 
The table reports the estimated results of the following regressions on momentum returns (model 4.3): 
Ri - Rf =σ + γm (Rm-Rf) + γHML HML + γSMB SMB + γCHS CHS + γDES DES + γTERM TERM+ γDIV DIV + γT-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. Explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on the 
joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values of multicollinearity 
tests are also reported. 
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ  t(σ)  γm t(γm)  γHML t(γHML) 
P1 0.001 0.02  0.254*** 2.52  0.205*** 2.84 
P10 0.002 0.03  0.769*** 3.61  -0.110** -2.15 
 SMB  CHS  DES 
 γSMB t(γSMB)  γCHS t(γCHS)  γDES t(γDES) 
P1 -0.058 -0.34  -0.115** -2.23  -0.122* -2.13 
P10 -0.097* -2.11  -0.069 -1.34  -0.110* -2.11 
 TERM  DIV  T-Bill 
 γTERM t(γTERM)  γDIV t(γDIV)  γT-Bill t(γT-Bill) 
P1 0.073 1.72  0.118* 2.03  0.034 1.29 
P10 -0.068 -1.62  -0.103* -1.97  0.051 1.47 
   F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1    2412 0.65  1.22 0.82 
P10    2256 0.68  1.21 0.83 
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In Table 4.6, which reports regressions on Carhart’s four factors, CHS and business 
cycle variables, we note that the magnitude and significance of explanatory variables 
decrease in the presence of WML. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the 
dividend yield (DIV) variable which is no longer statistically significant. 
As can be seen from the table, the (Rm-Rf) and HML variables remain important in 
capturing returns on the UK top winners and top losers. Estimated coefficients 
associated with the two variables are relatively high at 0.232 and 0.193, respectively, 
for the past poorly performing stocks (both statistically significant at a 1% level). The 
coefficient γ’m is 0.771 (1% significance) and γ’HML is -0.097 (10% significance) for the 
past top performers. Similar to findings in the previous section for model 4.2, two 
variables, SMB and WML, show the ability to explain more of the movement in returns 
on the past top performing portfolio (P10) than on the last poorly performing group 
(P1). However, the magnitude of the SMB variable in regression 4.4 on the P10 returns 
is slightly higher than that of model 4.2 before including business cycles (γ  SMB equals 
-0.109, significant at 10% in model 4.4, compared to -0.102, significant at 10% in model 
4.2). 
The distress variable, CHS, still plays an important role in explaining returns on the 
loser P1 but is less important in capturing returns on the winners P10. The estimated 
coefficient stands at -0.124 (5% significance) for the former and at only -0.027 
(insignificant) for the latter. Compared with regression 4.3 which does not include the 
WML variable, the coefficients associated with the default risk CHS are slightly higher 
(lower) in absolute terms for the losers (winners). These confirm the earlier findings in 
the previous section that the past poorly performing firms seem to be more sensitive to 
potential distress than the past top performers. 
Regarding business cycle variables, there is only the market default indicator (DES), 
which is measured as the difference between the average yields on corporate bonds and 
on long-term Government bonds, showing some degree of explanatory ability in 
explaining the movement in returns on both the losers and the winners. The estimated 
coefficients, γ’DES, are -0.105 and -0.108, respectively, and they are both statistically 
significant at a 10% level. The negative values signal that returns on both portfolios are 
likely to decrease as corporate bonds across the market become riskier with poorer bond 
ratings. The dividend yield variable (DIV), which is the average value-weighted 
dividend yield of all stocks in the FTSE350, could capture the movement in returns on 
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the past poor performers but becomes less important when explaining returns on the 
past winners. The estimated coefficients associated with the dividend yield, γ’DIV, are 
0.102 (significant at a 10% level) and -0.057 (statistically insignificant). Note that in 
regression on the winner excess returns, the coefficient associated with the DIV variable 
is no longer significant in the presence of the WML variable. However, there is no 
evidence that other variables such as term spread (TERM) and short-term Treasury bill 
(T-Bill) play a significant role in explaining the returns on the winners and the losers. 
F-statistics indicate a high level of joint significance between explanatory variables in 
regressions on returns in the winner and loser groups. Adjusted R2s range from 67% to 
69%, which are slightly higher than they were before adding business cycle variables. 
The difference, however, provide little insight into the role of these variables in 
explaining returns on the two portfolios. 
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Table 4.6: Momentum, WML, Default risk and Business cycles 
The table reports the estimated results of the following regressions on momentum returns (model 4.4): 
Ri - Rf =σ’ + γ’m (Rm-Rf) + γ’HML HML + γ’SMB SMB + γ’WML WML + γ’CHS CHS + γ’DES DES + γ’TERM TERM+ γ’DIV DIV + γ’T-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on 
the joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values of multicollinearity 
tests are also reported.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ ' t(σ’)  γ’m t(γ’m)  γ’HML t(γ’HML) 
P1 0.001 0.03  0.232*** 2.71  0.193*** 2.86 
P10 0.004 0.05  0.771*** 3.53  -0.097* -1.92 
 SMB  WML  CHS 
 γ’SMB t(γ’SMB)  γ’WML t(γ’WML)  γ’CHS t(γ’CHS) 
P1 -0.010 -0.13  -0.021 -1.43  -0.124** -2.15 
P10 -0.109* -1.97  0.103* 1.96  -0.027 -1.23 
 DES  TERM  DIV 
 γ’DES t(γ’DES)  γ’TERM t(γ’TERM)  γ’DIV t(γ’DIV) 
P1 -0.105* -1.91  0.051 1.63  0.102* 1.89 
P10 -0.108* -1.98  -0.046 -1.47  -0.057 -1.62 
 T-Bill  F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1 0.020 1.33  2457 0.67  1.27 0.79 
P10 0.045 1.44  2315 0.69  1.16 0.86 
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4.5.4 Robustness and diagnostic tests 
4.5.4. A Robustness checks 
The main objective of this section is to check the robustness of the results in section 
4.5.3 using different proxies for default risk. Other commonly used proxies for firms’ 
default probability, Z-score and O-score, will be used to ensure results are not sensitive 
to the choice of default risk proxy. In these tests, portfolios are constructed based on 6-
month past returns and 6-month holding periods, similarly to the way they were formed 
in the CHS approach for comparison purposes. The estimation results from model 4.1 
to model 4.4 are summarised in four tables, sequentially numbered Table 4.3 to Table 
4.6; and the robustness checks on these models are reported in Tables 4.7 to 4.10. These 
test outcomes will be discussed in turn below. 
Robustness check on model 4.1: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  +  𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 
Firstly, to ensure that the results reported in Table 4.3 (model 4.1: augmented FF model 
including a CHS variable) are not driven by the choice of default risk proxies, we use 
O-score and Z-score as alternative proxies for firms’ distress situations. The results of 
using O-score are summarised in Panel A and these of using Z-score are shown in Panel 
B of Table 4.7. 
In Panel A of Table 4.7, the estimated coefficients of regressions given by model 4.1 
using O-score are slightly lower in absolute terms than those using CHS. However, the 
levels of significance are not affected by the choice of default proxies. The market beta 
from a regression on the loser excess returns is 0.235 (significant at a 1% level) and the 
estimated beta for the winner portfolio is much higher, at 0.416 (significant at a 1% 
level). This indicates that the market factor could explain more of the movement of the 
winner returns that it does for the losers.  
The opposite is true in the case of HML. Whilst the BM effect is important in explaining 
momentum, it tends to capture more of the movement in the loser stock returns than that 
of the winners. In regression on the loser excess returns, the coefficient associated with 
the HML variable is positive and statistically significant (β"HML is 0.214, t-statistic is 
2.62). However, the β"HML takes a negative value of -0.145 (t-statistic is -2.10) in 
regression on the winner excess returns. This is because in the FTSE350 index, there 
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are more value firms (i.e. High BM) that fall into the loser category than into the winner 
category. As a result, the loser average returns are more likely to be positively correlated 
with the High-minus-Low effect. 
Similar to the findings reported in Table 4.3, the results in Table 4.7 show that the size 
effect is more noticeable in the winner average returns. The estimated coefficient 
associated with the SMB variable is -0.121 (statistically significant at a 10% level) in 
the regression on the winner excess returns while it is only -0.076 (statistically 
insignificant) in the case of the losers.  
In this robustness check, the results also confirm that when O-score is used as a proxy 
for default probability, default risk remains an important variable in explaining 
momentum anomaly. The coefficient associated with the O-score variable, βO-score, is -
0.124 (-0.105) in regression on the loser (winner) excess returns. In both regressions, 
the coefficients are negatively and statistically significant. When firms suffer a higher 
default risk, they have lower expected returns. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows that using Z-score rather than CHS as a proxy for default 
risk does not affect the findings documented earlier. Intercepts from all estimations are 
positive and statistically insignificant. In terms of explanatory variables, the results 
confirm that besides (Rm-Rf), HML is an important factor that could explain the returns 
on both the losers and the winners. The coefficients associated with these explanatory 
variables are largely significant for both the loser and the winner portfolios. Similar to 
what has been reported previously, the size effect is only evident in the winner excess 
returns and less in the loser excess returns. The coefficient associated with the size effect 
is -0.122 (statistically significant at a 10% level) in regression on the winner excess 
returns. It is, however, only -0.091 (statistically insignificant) in the case of the losers. 
When Z-score is employed as a proxy for default risk, the coefficients associated with 
the variable are slightly more significant than using other proxies. In regression on the 
loser excess returns, βZ-score is -0.156 (t-statistic is -2.09, significant at a 5% level) while 
it is -0.174 (t-statistic increases to -2.13, significant at 5% instead of 10%) in the 
regression on the winner excess returns. 
In summary, estimations reported for model 4.1 are robust and not driven by the choice 
of default risk proxies.  
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Table 4.7: Robustness check on model 4.1 
Panel A: Estimated results of model 4.1 using O-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =α” +β”m (Rm-Rf) + β”HML HML + β”SMB SMB + βO-score O-score 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. The table shows the estimated coefficients 
and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show the results of the test on the joint significance of explanatory variables and 
Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α" t(α”)  β"m t(β”m)  β"HML t(β”HML) 
P1 0.002 0.04  0.235*** 2.86  0.214*** 2.62 
P10 0.002 0.03  0.416*** 3.04  -0.145** -2.10 
 SMB  O-score   
 β"SMB t(β”SMB)  βO-score t(βO-score)    
P1 -0.076 -0.42  -0.124** -2.02    
P10 -0.121* -1.88  -0.105* -1.79    
 F-statistics Adj. R2       
P1 2257 0.58       
P10 2048 0.59       
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Table 4.7 - Continued 
Panel B: Estimated results of model 4.1 using Z-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =α” +β”m (Rm-Rf) + β”HML HML + β”SMB SMB + βZ-score Z-score  
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. The table shows the estimated coefficients 
and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show results of the test on the joint significance of explanatory variables and 
Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α" t(α”)  β"m t(β”m)  β"HML t(β”HML) 
P1 0.003 0.04  0.420*** 3.01  0.215*** 2.92 
P10 0.002 0.03  0.615*** 3.12  -0.201*** -2.86 
 SMB  Z-score   
 β"SMB t(β”SMB)  βZ-score t(βZ-score)    
P1 -0.091 -0.56  -0.156** -2.09    
P10 -0.122* -1.87  -0.174** -2.33    
 F-statistics Adj. R2       
P1 2784 0.60       
P10 3061 0.63       
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Robustness check on model 4.2: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝛼’ + 𝛽’𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  + 𝛽’𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽’𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛽’𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛽’𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 
The second robustness test is carried out on results in Table 4.4 (model 4.2: an extension 
of the Carhart model including a CHS variable) and the results are reported in Panels A 
and B of Table 4.8. From the two panels, it can be said that the findings are largely 
similar to those found when using CHS as a proxy. The market beta, BM and default 
risk factors still remain significant explanatory variables in explaining the movement in 
returns on both the winners and the losers in the UK. Whereas, the size and momentum 
variables seem to be able to capture more movement of the winners’ returns but become 
less important in explaining the losers’ returns. In addition, the absolute values of the 
estimated coefficients are slightly higher using these two proxies. This is perhaps due 
to the different approach in calculating these proxies, which is mainly by adding up 
accounting ratios, while the CHS variable is generated from estimating the Campbell et 
al. (2008) dynamic model.  
The results in Panel A of Table 4.8 also show that when using O-score as a proxy for 
default risk, the estimations tend to result in a slightly higher t-statistic for some 
variables, namely SMB and O-score. For example, the coefficient associated with SMB 
is statistically significant at a 5% level in estimating P10 returns (comparing with a 10% 
level in Table 4.4). Coefficients associated with momentum variables remain 
statistically significant (insignificant) for the past top (poor) performance stocks. Other 
independent variables, (Rm-Rf) and HML, also present a strong explanatory power in 
explaining stock returns. The market betas are 0.526 and 0.742, both significant at a 1% 
level, in the estimations on P1 and P10 returns, respectively. The coefficients are 0.231 
(1% significance) and 0.092 (10% significance) for the HML variable. 
In Panel B, the results indicate that there is no evidence of significant differences caused 
by using Z-score instead of CHS as a proxy for distress situations. (Rm-Rf) and HML 
remain statistically significant in estimations on both portfolios while the SMB and 
WML coefficients are only slightly significant (at a 10% level) in the winner portfolio. 
The distress variable, in contrast, explains more the movement in returns on the loser 
portfolio. In other words, the past poorly performing stocks appear to be more sensitive 
to the distress factor that the past top performing stocks.  
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Table 4.8: Robustness check on model 4.2 
Panel A: Estimated results of model 4.2 using O-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =α” +β”m (Rm-Rf) + β”HML HML + β”SMB SMB + β”WML WML + β”O-score O-score 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. The table shows the estimated coefficients 
and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show the results of the test on the joint significance of explanatory variables and 
Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α" t(α”)  β"m t(β”m)  β"HML t(β”HML) 
P1 0.004 0.23  0.526*** 3.01  0.231*** 2.15 
P10 0.015 0.54  0.742*** 3.23  0.092* 1.97 
 SMB  WML  O-score 
 β"SMB t(β”SMB)  β"WML t(β”WML)  β"O-score t(β”O-score) 
P1 -0.015 -0.63  -0.101 -1.72  -0.207*** -2.13 
P10 -0.198** -2.07  0.124* 1.98  -0.101* -1.82 
 F-statistics Adj. R2       
P1 2410 0.65       
P10 2305 0.66       
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Table 4.8 - Continued 
Panel B: Estimated results of model 4.2 using Z-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =α” +β”m (Rm-Rf) + β”HML HML + β”SMB SMB + β”WML WML + β”Z-score Z-score  
See notes in Table 4.1 for the P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. The table shows the estimated coefficients 
and their t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. F-statistics show the results of the test on the joint significance of explanatory variables and 
Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 α" t(α”)  β"m t(β”m)  β"HML t(β”HML) 
P1 0.001 0.17  0.372*** 2.96  0.216*** 2.52 
P10 0.010 0.23  0.629*** 3.22  -0.172* -2.11 
 SMB  WML  Z-score 
 β"SMB t(β”SMB)  β"WML t(β”WML)  β"Z-score t(β”Z-score) 
P1 -0.027 -0.54  -0.075 -0.79  -0.176** -2.12 
P10 -0.162* -1.92  0.131* 1.91  -0.083 -0.87 
 F-statistics Adj. R2       
P1 2311 0.63       
P10 2212 0.67       
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Robustness check on model 4.3: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝜎 + 𝛾𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  +  𝛾𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  
+ 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡  +  𝛾𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡  +  𝛾𝑇−𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 
The third robustness check is on model 4.3 of which the estimations are shown earlier 
in Table 4.5 of section 4.5.3 B, and the results of the check are reported in Table 4.9.  
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 4.9, using O-score rather than CHS as a proxy 
for default risk does not affect the results. In this robustness test, an O-score variable is 
added to the augmented Carhart (1998) four-factor model. Although the intercepts of 
the regression are higher, the differentials are insignificant in both absolute terms and 
statistical terms. The regression constants from estimations on the loser and winner 
excess returns are 0.003 and 0.002 with t-statistic values of 0.05 and 0.02, respectively. 
These values were only 0.001 and 0.002 (t-statistic values of 0.04 and 0.03) in the 
previous estimations and none was statistically significant. 
In terms of independent variables, their explanatory power is largely unchanged in the 
robustness check. The market factor, (Rm - Rf), is still the key variable in capturing the 
movement of stock excess returns. The market beta is 0.310 (0.797) and the t-statistic 
is 2.67 (3.56), which is statistically significant at 1% in the regression on the loser 
(winner) excess returns. 
Similarly, the results in Panel A confirm that BM and size effects are important 
explanatory variables in explaining the momentum anomaly. The coefficients 
associated with HML are 0.214 (t-statistic value is 2.54) and -0.175 (t-statistic is -2.10) 
in regressions on the loser and winner excess returns, respectively. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant. The difference in sign between these coefficients could be 
because there are more high BM companies in the loser portfolio than there are in the 
winner portfolio.  
In contrast, the size effect only plays an important role in explaining the winner returns 
but not in the loser returns. In particular, the coefficient associated with the SML 
variable is -0.114 with a t-statistic value of -2.02 (statistically significant at a 10% level) 
in the regression on the winner excess returns, but it is only -0.031 (t-statistic is -1.23, 
statistically insignificant) in the case of the losers. 
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In addition, the robustness check results once again confirm that the choice of proxies 
for default risk does not significantly affect the role of the default factor in capturing 
the return differentials between the winner and the loser portfolios. For the loser stocks, 
capturing default patterns in their average returns is particularly vital. The O-score 
coefficient takes the value of -0.147 (t-statistic of -2.09) in a regression on the loser 
excess returns. Nevertheless, the role of the default variable in explaining the winner 
returns is less significant. Similar to the findings summarised in Table 4.5, in this 
estimation the coefficient associated with default probability is statistically 
insignificant. It has a value of -0.056 with a t-statistic value of -1.62, just slightly higher 
than those reported for the estimations using the CHS proxy. 
When O-score is used instead of CHS as a default risk proxy, the estimated coefficients 
associated with business cycle variables show that default spread and dividend yield 
remain important in explaining excess returns both on the losers and on the winners. 
Compared with the results reported for regressions using CHS, the coefficients 
associated with DES and DIV are marginally lower but remain statistically significant 
at a 10% level. On the other hand, the term spread and T-Bill variables are insignificant 
in regressions explaining the excess returns on the loser and the winner portfolios. The 
coefficients γ”TERM and γ”T-Bill take the values of 0.032 and 0.042 in the loser 
regressions, and values of -0.041 and 0.055 in the winner regressions. Also, the VIF and 
tolerance indicators confirm that there are no multicollinearity issues in these 
estimations. 
Next, Panel B of Table 4.9 summarises the robustness check results on model 4.3, 
employing Altman’s (1968) Z-score, another widely-used bankruptcy indicator, as a 
proxy for default probability. It can be said that the findings are not materially changed 
following this modification. The regression intercepts and coefficients remain at a 
similar level to those observed in regressions using CHS and O-score. 
The estimated constant terms are insignificant, being at 0.002 in regressions on the loser 
excess returns and slightly higher at 0.004 in the case of the winner excess returns. In 
terms of explanatory variables, there are no significant changes in sign and magnitude, 
compared with those previously recorded. The market beta is 0.215 (t-statistic is 2.74) 
for the losers, P1, and is 0.578 (t-statistic is 3.34) for the winners, P10. Both coefficients 
are statistically significant at a 1% level. The coefficients associated with the HML 
variable are also relatively high in absolute terms, at 0.187 and -0.123 for P1 and P10, 
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respectively. The size effect is more significant in regressions on the winner excess 
returns than it is in the loser regressions. The estimated ℽ’’SMB is -0.102 with a t-statistic 
value of -2.13 for the former and being only -0.032 (t-statistic is -0.21) for the latter.  
Default risk, which is proxied by Z-score, remains statistically significant in explaining 
the loser excess returns but insignificant in capturing the movement of the winner excess 
returns. Similar to what has been documented in Table 4.5, the robustness check finds 
that among business cycle variables, default spread and dividend yield contribute to 
explaining momentum but there is no evidence that term spread and T-Bill variables 
have the same explanatory power. The regression on VIF and tolerance show that there 
is no multicollinearity problem in this robustness test. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.9 indicate that there is no empirical evidence that the 
findings reported in Table 4.5 for model 4.3 are biased and driven by the choice of 
default risk proxies. 
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Table 4.9: Robustness check on model 4.3 
Panel A: Estimated results of model 4.3 using O-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =σ” +γ”m (Rm-Rf) + γ”HML HML + γ”SMB SMB + γ”O-score O-score + γ”DES DES + γ”TERM TERM+ γ”DIV DIV + γ”T-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on the 
joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values are also reported 
from multicollinearity tests.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ” t(σ”)  γ”m t(γ”m)  γ”HML t(γ”HML) 
P1 0.003 0.05  0.310*** 2.67  0.214*** 2.54 
P10 0.002 0.02  0.797*** 3.56  -0.175** -2.10 
 SMB  O-score  DES 
 γ”SMB t(γ”SMB)  γ”O-score t(γ”O-score)  γ”DES t(γ”DES) 
P1 -0.031 -1.23  -0.147** -2.09  -0.111* -2.01 
P10 -0.114* -2.02  -0.056 -1.62  -0.105* -1.97 
 TERM  DIV  T-Bill 
 γ”TERM t(γ”TERM)  γ”DIV t(γ”DIV)  γ” T-Bill t(γ”T-Bill) 
P1 0.032 1.33  0.106* 1.99  0.042 1.36 
P10 -0.041 -1.34  -0.110* -2.00  0.055 1.46 
   F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1    2742 0.62  1.51 0.66 
P10    2301 0.65  1.32 0.76 
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Table 4.9- Continued 
Panel B: Estimated results of model 4.3 using Z-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =σ” +γ”m (Rm-Rf) + γ”HML HML + γ”SMB SMB + γ”Z-score Z-score + γ”DES DES + γ”TERM TERM+ γ”DIV DIV + γ”T-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on the 
joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values are also reported 
from multicollinearity tests.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ” t(σ”)  γ”m t(γ”m)  γ”HML t(γ”HML) 
P1 0.002 0.01  0.215*** 2.74  0.187*** 2.53 
P10 0.004 0.02  0.578*** 3.34  -0.123** -2.32 
 SMB  Z-score  DES 
 γ”SMB t(γ”SMB)  γ”Z-score t(γ”Z-score)  γ”DES t(γ”DES) 
P1 -0.032 -0.21  -0.153** -2.34  -0.172** -2.36 
P10 -0.102* -2.13  -0.056 -1.15  -0.106* -2.17 
 TERM  DIV  T-Bill 
 γ”TERM t(γ”TERM)  γ”DIV t(γ”DIV)  γ” T-Bill t(γ”T-Bill) 
P1 0.052 1.12  0.113* 2.21  0.028 0.72 
P10 -0.066 -1.37  -0.098* -1.98  0.062 1.25 
   F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1    2542 0.66  1.15 0.87 
P10    2782 0.67  1.36 0.74 
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Robustness check on model 4.4: 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑹𝒇,𝒕  =  𝜎’ + 𝛾’𝑚 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)  + 𝛾’𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾’𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛾’𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝛾’𝐶𝐻𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  +  𝛾’𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡  + 𝛾’𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛾’𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡  +  𝛾’𝑇−𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 
Finally, we perform a similar check on the results reported in Table 4.6 for estimations 
using model 4.4. The robustness check results are summarised in Table 4.10, in which 
Panel A reports the estimation using O-score while Panel B is the results of the 
estimation using Z-score as a proxy for distress conditions. 
As can be seen from Panel A, the findings are largely similar to those in Table 4.6. 
Using O-score instead of CHS as a proxy for default risk does not change the dominant 
roles of the market and BM factors in explaining stock returns in the UK. The market 
betas stand at 0.321 for the loser stocks (P1) and at 0.561 for the winner stocks (P10), 
both significant at a 1% level. The coefficients associated with the HML variable are 
also high, at 0.128 (t-statistic is 2.82) and -0.101 (t-statistic is 2.41) when estimating 
returns on the losers and on the winners, respectively. 
Additionally, the momentum variable (WML) still plays a role in explaining returns on 
the winner group but is less important in capturing the loser returns. The βWML for P10 
is 0.096 (t-statistic value of 1.94, significant at a 10% level) and -0.032 for P1 (t-statistic 
is -0.45, statistically insignificant). The opposite is true for the dividend yield variable, 
DIV, which could explain more movement in returns on the P1 portfolio (βDIV is 0.105, 
significant at a 5% level) but does not show a significant explanatory power on P10 
returns.  
In terms of the term spread and T-Bill variables, the results in Panel A confirm that they 
are not able to explain much the returns on both the winner and loser portfolios. Their 
estimated coefficients range from -0.041 to 0.063, which are statistically insignificant 
with t-statistic values being from -1.04 to 1.07, respectively. 
However, in this regression the size factor does not seem to capture movement in returns 
on either of the portfolios. The estimated coefficients range from -0.026 to -0.073, and 
both are statistically insignificant. In contrast, compared with the estimation results in 
Table 4.6, default risk (O-score) and default spread (DES) show a higher explanatory 
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ability in explaining returns on the winner stocks. Their associated coefficients are -
0.085 (t-statistic is -1.92) and -0.112 (t-statistic is -2.14), respectively.  
Panel B of Table 4.10 shows the estimation results on model 4.4, using Z-score as a 
proxy for default risk. They confirm most of the findings reported earlier in Table 4.6. 
The market, HML and DES variables remain strong factors in explaining the movement 
in returns on both the top performing and poorly performing groups. The HML 
coefficient is even more significant for the winners P10 (-0.116, significant at a 5% 
level compared to -0.097, significant at a 10% level).  
The explanatory power of the SMB and WML factors is more significant for the winners 
but becomes insignificant for the loser stocks. The coefficients are -0.214 and 0.072 for 
the winners but only -0.031 and -0.041 for the losers. The SMB variable, -0.214, is also 
slightly more significant (t-statistic at -2.55, significant at a 5% level) compared with a 
SMB coefficient of -0.110 (t-statistic at -2.07, significant at a 10% level) in Table 4.6, 
when CHS is used as a proxy for default risk. In contrast, dividend yield (DIV) could 
explain more movement in returns on the loser stocks but less on the winners. The 
coefficient, βDIV, estimated from the regression on the losers’ returns, is slightly 
significant (-0.124, significant at 10%) while it stays at -0.051 (insignificant) for the 
winner group. 
Similar to the findings in Table 4.6, the default variable remains important in capturing 
movement in returns on the past poorly performing stocks (P1) while it loses this 
explanatory ability in the regression on returns on the top performing stocks (P10). For 
the P1 group, the coefficient associated with the default variable is -0.147 (t-statistic is 
-2.20, significant at a 5% level) but being only -0.036 (t-statistic is -0.77, statistically 
insignificant) in the case of P10. 
For the last two explanatory variables in the regression, TERM and T-Bill, again there 
is no evidence that they are able to capture the movement in returns on either the losers 
or the winners in the FTSE350. This result confirms a conclusion documented in section 
4.5.3 B. 
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Table 4.10: Robustness check on model 4.4 
Panel A: Estimated results of model 4.4 using O-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =σ” +γ”m (Rm-Rf) + γ”HML HML + γ”SMB SMB + γ”WML WML + γ”O-score O-score + γ”DES DES + γ”TERM TERM+ γ”DIV DIV + γ”T-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values are also 
reported from multicollinearity tests.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ” t(σ”)  γ”m t(γ”m)  γ”HML t(γ”HML) 
P1 0.001 0.06  0.321*** 3.10  0.128*** 2.82 
P10 0.003 0.07  0.561*** 3.36  -0.101** 2.41 
 SMB  WML  O-score 
 γ”SMB t(γ”SMB)  γ”WML t(γ”WML)  γ”O-score t(γ”O-score) 
P1 -0.026 -0.31  -0.032 -0.45  -0.207*** -3.07 
P10 -0.073 -1.18  0.096* 1.94  -0.085* -1.92 
 DES  TERM  DIV 
 γ”DES t(γ”DES)  γ”TERM t(γ”TERM)  γ”DIV t(γ”DIV) 
P1 -0.081* -1.90  0.036 0.52  0.105** 2.14 
P10 -0.112** -2.14  -0.041 -1.04  -0.071 -1.65 
 T-Bill  F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1 0.014 0.26  2535 0.66  1.32 0.76 
P10 0.063 1.07  2412 0.69  1.17 0.85 
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Table 4.10- Continued 
Panel B: Estimated results of model 4.4 using Z-score as a proxy for default risk, given by the following formula: 
Ri - Rf =σ” +γ”m (Rm-Rf) + γ”HML HML + γ”SMB SMB + γ”WML WML + γ”Z-score Z-score + γ”DES DES + γ”TERM TERM+ γ”DIV DIV + γ”T-Bill T-Bill 
See notes in Table 4.1 for P1 and P10 portfolio formation. The explanatory variables are defined in the notes in Table 2.8 of Chapter 2. F-statistics show the results of the test on 
the joint significance of explanatory variables and Adjusted R2 measures the goodness of fit of the model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values are also reported 
from multicollinearity tests.  
 Constant  Rm - Rf  HML 
 σ” t(σ”)  γ”m t(γ”m)  γ”HML t(γ”HML) 
P1 0.002 0.10  0.312*** 3.25  0.083** 2.26 
P10 0.001 0.04  0.537*** 3.47  -0.116** -2.43 
 SMB  WML  Z-score 
 γ”SMB t(γ”SMB)  γ”WML t(γ”WML)  γ”Z-score t(γ”Z-score) 
P1 -0.031 -0.74  -0.041 -0.77  -0.147** -2.20 
P10 -0.084* -1.95  0.072* 1.81  -0.036 -0.77 
 DES  TERM  DIV 
 γ”DES t(γ”DES)  γ”TERM t(γ”TERM)  γ”DIV t(γ”DIV) 
P1 -0.112* -2.02  0.033 0.75  0.124* 2.14 
P10 -0.100* -2.13  -0.062 -1.03  -0.051 -1.00 
 T-Bill  F-statistics Adj. R2  VIF Tolerance 
P1 0.026 0.54  2412 0.65  1.23 0.81 
P10 0.066 1.28  2368 0.69  1.21 0.83 
  
205 
4.5.4. B Multicollinearity tests 
As briefly mentioned earlier, when considering the roles of firms’ default risk and 
business cycles in capturing the movements of momentum returns in one regression 
(e.g. model 4.3 and model 4.4), it is possible that there is a correlation between these 
two groups of explanatory variables. It would be that regardless of firm operating 
performance, they are more likely to go into default during poor economic conditions 
and less likely during market expansions. If this multicollinearity issue does exist, the 
explanatory power of individual variables will not be identified. The problem of 
multicollinearity could be detected by looking at the VIF and tolerance values of the 
estimation in question.  
It is worth noticing that the multicollinearity issue is less likely to materially bias models 
4.1 and 4.2 because there are yet to be any economic reasons suggesting a linear 
correlation between the explanatory variables in the model. Therefore, this chapter will 
perform multicollinearity test on models 4.3 and 4.4 only. The VIF and tolerance values 
of the estimations on these models are reported at the end of Tables 4.5 and 4.6. 
From the tables, it can be seen that there is no evidence of any multicollinearity 
problems in the estimations. As can be seen from Table 4.5, the VIF values are 1.22 and 
1.21 for the loser (P1) and the winner (P10) portfolios, respectively. All values are less 
than 5 and the tolerances are greater than 0.20. These indicate either a weak correlation 
or none at all between the proxies for firms’ default risk and business cycle variables in 
mode 4.3. That means the estimation of their individual explanatory power is not biased.  
Similarly, the results in Table 4.6 show that the VIF value is 1.27 (tolerance value of 
0.79) for the regression on the loser portfolio and it is 1.16 (tolerance value of 0.86) for 
the regression on the winner portfolio. As the VIF values are less than 5 and the 
tolerances are greater than 0.20, we can safely conclude that there is no multicollinearity 
problem in model 4.4. 
To sum up, the findings reported in this chapter on momentum and firm distress 
condition are not sensitive to the choice of proxies and are relatively free from 
multicollinearity biases. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 4 addresses momentum anomaly in the UK, seeks the underlying risk factors 
that would potentially explain the momentum premium, and focuses particularly on the 
role of distress risk in this assessment. In the chapter, distress risk is examined through 
a number of indicators, such as the risk of corporate failure, business cycle risk in 
changes in the bond market and interest rates. The main findings of this chapter are as 
follows. 
Firstly, in testing hypothesis 1 the chapter finds evidence of momentum profitability in 
the UK market between 1990 and 2012. The abnormal returns are statistically 
significant for 3- and 6-month holding periods (the monthly rates of return are 1.24% 
and 1.01%, respectively). However, momentum strategies weaken as the investment 
horizon is widened and disappear after 12 months. The chapter also finds that the simple 
buy-and-hold strategies underperform all of the tested momentum strategies. On 
average, the buy-and-hold approach leads to a loss in returns. However, overall the 
return losses as a result of holding the past winners for a long term (i.e. up to 5 years) 
are relatively small and statistically insignificant. In addition, results in this chapter 
show that although momentum investors might see small differences in stock returns 
between Januaries and other months, there is no evidence of a significant January effect 
in the UK stock market. 
Secondly, from an assessment on how momentum strategies perform over different 
states of the economy, the chapter finds that the momentum abnormal returns are large 
in absolute terms. Also, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis 2 that states of 
the economy affect momentum premium. The momentum premium is found to be 
statistically significant in “good” market conditions, and particularly noticeable during 
economic expansions. Over a 3-month investment period, the return differentials 
between the winners and the losers increase from 1.24% per month in normal 
circumstances to 1.28% during market upturns, and to 1.34% in booming periods. 
However, momentum strategies perform poorly during market downturns and even lead 
to huge losses during recession periods. Momentum investors might start to experience 
losses as early as 6 months after the investment. 
Thirdly, regarding hypothesis 3, the results in the chapter reveal that the default risk 
factor plays a significant role in explaining the movement in returns on the loser 
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portfolio in the UK but is less important in explaining the winners. The past poorly 
performing firms are more likely to suffer from potential distress than the past top 
performers. The results also show that default risk could indeed contribute to explaining 
momentum profitability. Using alternative proxies for default risk, such as O-score, Z-
score and CHS score, does not significantly affect the findings. 
Finally, in explaining momentum anomaly, the results in Chapter 4 show that the 
traditional explanatory variables, such as the market and HML variables, consistently 
show significant explanatory power whereas size and momentum variables seem to 
capture more movement of the returns on the winners but become less important in 
explaining the losers’ returns. One possible explanation is that the majority of the 
winner companies in the FTSE350 are actually big firms while the pattern is not as clear 
in the loser portfolio. 
The chapter also finds that business cycle factors may contribute to explaining 
momentum premium. Among four business cycle variables, only market default spread 
(DES) plays a significant role in explaining the movement in returns on both the loser 
and the winner portfolios. The dividend yield variable (DIV), however, could only 
capture the movement in excess returns on the past poor performers but becomes less 
important in explaining excess returns on the past winners. In addition, Chapter 4 finds 
no evidence that other business cycle variables, including term spread (TERM) and 
short-term Treasury Bill (T-Bill), could explain the movement in returns on the winners 
or the losers. The results are largely similar regardless of the choice of proxies for 
default risk, whether DEF, DEF’ or CHS. As there are a number of distress risk variables 
presented in the model, such as default risk and default spread, it is necessary to test 
whether they are correlated, which would lead to biased estimations. The tests confirm 
that the results in this chapter do not suffer from multicollinearity biases. These mean 
the results in Chapter 4 do not support rejection of the null hypothesis 4. 
When comparing the performance of all models used in the chapter, it is found that the 
model goodness of fit does improve in the presence of default factor and business cycle 
variables. In the augmented FF model, the Adjusted R2s are 59% and 61% in regressions 
on the excess returns on loser and winner portfolios, respectively. The measures of 
model goodness of fit increase to 64% and 68% when adding a momentum variable 
(WML), and to 65% and 68% when adding business cycle variables. In the presence of 
all explanatory variables, including the three FF factors, the Carhart WML element, a 
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default variable and business cycle variables, the Adjusted R2s are 67% in the regression 
on the loser portfolio returns and 69% in the estimation on the winner portfolio returns. 
Although the Adjusted R2s are relatively high, they show that there is still potential for 
further improvement in modelling momentum-based trading strategies. It is worth 
noting that the Adjusted R2 measure has made the necessary adjustment for the number 
of predictors in the model. Therefore, the newly added explanatory variables 
contributed to the above improvement in model performance by more than what would 
be expected by chance. In conclusion, it can be said that distress risk could contribute 
to enhancing model performance in capturing momentum premium; however, the 
improvement is not substantial and more needs to be done in order to better explain 
momentum anomaly.  
It is recognised that the chapter has a number of limitations that could potentially be an 
area for further research. For example, the chapter’s conclusions were only drawn from 
the UK sample using linear regressions. Testing on a larger sample and using a more 
dynamic form of asset pricing models would perhaps improve the robustness of the 
results. Also, more indicators could be used as a proxy for firms’ distress conditions, 
such as analyst coverage and distance to default, in the robustness checks. These might 
be of interest for future research on distress risk and asset pricing. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research 
The thesis brings together analyses of two dominant investment strategies, namely value 
investing (buying shares in value firms and selling shares in growth firms) and 
momentum strategies (buying best past performing stocks and selling worst past 
performing stocks). Although the market and firm-level distress risks have been 
documented to be important factors in explaining movement of stock returns, this thesis 
is one of the first studies researching the link between these distress conditions 
collectively and outcomes of the above investment strategies. 
The thesis contributes to the extant literature from both methodological and empirical 
aspects. First of all, it addresses the questions in value premium (chapter 3), and 
momentum premium (chapter 4) in a more recent dataset – taking into account 
substantial changes in the market post-2008 and changes in investors’ strategies to 
respond to the recent financial crisis. This is particularly relevant when default risk is 
the main focus of the thesis. Further contributions and empirical findings of each 
chapter will be summarised as follows. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the value anomaly literature in a number of ways. 
(i) In terms of methodology, the chapter uses collectively a number of different 
measures and approaches to explaining value premium, some of which have 
been incorporated for the first time in the value anomaly literature. There are 2 
analysis approaches used in the chapter. The first method is a regression system 
which estimates the relationships among risk factor variables. This approach 
allows us to measure the explanatory ability of each factor in explaining the 
dependent variables, which are the excess returns on value and growth 
portfolios. The regression analysis provides a direct comparison between the 
roles of different explanatory variables in one model as well as across different 
estimation models. The second approach is a portfolio-based analysis which 
aims to capture the risk patterns that stocks in the same portfolio would share. 
Used in conjunction with the regression analysis method, the portfolio-based 
approach provides some valuable insight into how stocks with different risk 
characteristics might behave and what factors could explain these differences. 
In addition, the present study is one of the first analyses looking at the return 
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differentials between stocks that bear different default and BM risks. It also 
seeks to explain the underlying reasons behind the return premium. 
(ii) Another contribution of Chapter 3 is capturing the link between default risk and 
value premium in a constructive and direct way. The chapter measures default 
risk using a relatively more indicative proxy, namely firm probability of 
bankruptcy. While previous studies tend to use indirect measures of default risk, 
such as corporate credit ratings and analyst coverage – the use of an indicator 
for company default probability would eliminate the possibility of capturing a 
different risk element to what was initially intended. For example, small 
companies might receive a low level of analyst coverage but it does not 
necessarily mean they are under financial distress. In addition, the chapter 
analyses default risk from two dimensions, which are the risk patterns associated 
with average stock returns on 9 default/BM intersectional portfolios, and the 
default risk factor in explaining common stock returns.  
(iii) Considering an additional proxy for distress conditions, the chapter also uses 
stock volatility. More specifically, it provides an analysis on the risk pattern 
associated with idiosyncratic volatility in explaining average stock returns. The 
analysis aims to capture firm distress risk that has not been covered by default 
risk. It occurs when stock prices are influenced by factors other than the firm’s 
financial performance. 
(iv) The empirical aspects of volatility and default risk relation are analysed, and 
their potential roles in explaining value premium are carefully addressed for the 
first time. While idiosyncratic volatility and default risk have been analysed 
separately in the value anomaly literature, it is important to test their roles 
individually as well as collectively in the same context. From an investor’s view, 
these two risk components are somewhat related; the present study provides an 
assessment on whether they measure the same type of risk and, if not, whether 
one can contribute to explaining the other.  
To summarise the findings of Chapter 3, there is evidence of positive but insignificant 
value premium in the FTSE350 over 276 months from 31st January 1990 to 31st 
December 2012. The results in the UK also show stocks with low BM and/or low 
idiosyncratic volatility, considered to be a safer investment, generate slightly higher 
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returns than the riskier stocks. On average, the value premium is about 0.09% a month 
when using BM as the indicator and it is 0.06% in the case of E/P and DY ratios. In 
terms of firm-level volatility, there is a premium in high volatility stocks and in small 
stocks, while there is no evidence of a value premium within low volatility and big 
groups.  
In addition, Chapter 3 finds evidence indicating that default probability contributes to 
explaining the risk pattern in stock returns. Equities of firms with a high probability of 
bankruptcy tend to have lower returns on average. Moreover, considering stock 
volatility in conjunction with Fama and French’s (1993) three factors does increase the 
explanatory power of the model significantly. Furthermore, in examining the relation 
between stock volatility and default risk,  the thesis finds that highly volatile stocks tend 
to ultimately suffer a higher bankruptcy probability. The levels of firm default 
probability are shown to have the ability to explain the return differentials between high 
and low volatility stocks. 
In terms of model goodness of fit, the results in Chapter 3 show that the Carhart four-
factor model performs slightly better than the traditional FF three-factor model in 
explaining value premium. The improvement from adding a momentum factor is 
immaterial. However, in the presence of the default risk factor, both the FF and Carhart 
models achieve much higher Adjusted R2s. The measures increase by 21% to 33% 
depending on the model. This lends further support to the above conclusion that default 
risk plays an important role in capturing the risk patterns associated with company 
financial distress conditions in common stock returns. 
Chapter 4 studies the role of firms’ probability of bankruptcy and business cycles in 
explaining momentum premium. The main contributions of the chapter are as follows. 
(i) In the chapter, different proxies for default risk are incorporated with the 
changes in economic conditions before, during and after the recent 2008 crisis 
to capture momentum returns in the UK. Although it has been documented in 
the literature that distress risk at a firm level and at the market level has an impact 
on the performance of momentum strategies, there has not been any effort to test 
the explanatory power of both components in the momentum context. The 
chapter has provided a more comprehensive view of how distress risk might 
affect momentum premium through these various channels. 
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(ii) When taking firms’ distress conditions into account, unlike previous studies the 
chapter uses a well-developed proxy for a firm’s default probability. The 
indicator was first proposed by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), and 
incorporates both accounting and market information in a dynamic probability 
model. So far, the momentum literature that considers bankruptcy risk has been 
based purely on accounting-based proxies, such as O-score. They were designed 
nearly four decades ago when the stock market might not have been as complex 
as it is now. Since being put into use, Campbell et al.’s (2008) default measure 
has been regarded as being more accurate than previously developed predictors. 
In the chapter, other measures of default probability, such as O-score and Z-
score, are utilised for robustness check purposes. Thus, it is unlikely for there to 
be default risk elements missed when drawing the chapter conclusion. 
(iii)  Previously, there has been evidence in the literature that momentum anomaly 
could be explained by firm default risk, and that momentum is also associated 
with business cycles. The chapter is the first work linking the three elements in 
the same context. Linking all three variables could potentially show whether 
one’s effect has been captured by another, and whether the explanatory power 
of each variable is robust. Also, this would potentially contribute to improving 
the predictive ability of models used in the present study. 
The results in Chapter 4 indicate that there is significant momentum premium in the UK 
for up to a 12-month investment period. The returns are more significant for any holding 
periods of up to 6 months. This confirms the findings from previous studies in the UK 
that momentum strategies generate positive returns for investments of less than one 
year. The results hold even when different investment horizons and seasonality have 
been taken into account. The chapter does not find evidence of any January effects in 
the UK. In addition, results of the analysis suggest that the momentum abnormal returns 
are large and statistically significant in market upturns, these are particularly noticeable 
during economic expansions. However, the strategies underperform during market 
downturns. More damagingly, they would lead to large losses during recessions. 
When explaining momentum, the analysis confirms that the market beta and BM 
variables remain important factors. Size and momentum variables could better explain 
returns on the past winners; yet they become less important in capturing returns on the 
past losers. Among four business cycle variables, default spread and dividend yield 
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could contribute to explaining stock returns while term spread and the short-term 
Treasury bill could not. Including default risk factor in the regressions significantly 
improves the joint explanatory power of the independent variables in capturing returns 
on the losers. However, the impact is less significant in explaining the movement of 
returns on the winners. It is also worth noting that the past poorly performing firms are 
more likely to suffer from potential distress than the past top performers.  
In the thesis, there is evidence that the FF and Carhart models could explain more of 
the return differentials between winners and losers than between value and growth 
stocks. In comparison with the results in the chapter on value anomaly (Chapter 3), the 
Adjusted R2s in Chapter 4 are higher. Moreover, the model goodness of fit shows signs 
of improvement in the presence of the default factor and business cycle variables. 
However, the improvement is not substantial and more needs to be done in order to 
better explain momentum anomaly. When adding WML and business cycle variables 
to the augmented FF three-factor model, the Adjusted R2s increase from between 59% 
and 61% to about 65% and 68%. Although the Adjusted R2s are relatively high, these 
nonetheless show that there is still potential for further improvement in modelling 
momentum-based trading strategies.  
Across the above investment themes, there are some areas and issues that this thesis has 
not been able to address and would be the limitations of this study. For example, the 
thesis focuses on the UK market over the last 22 years, using the linear regression 
approach. It may be that testing on more markets over a longer period and using a more 
dynamic form of asset pricing models would improve the robustness of the results. Also, 
more indicators could potentially be used as a proxy for firms’ distress conditions, such 
as analyst coverage and credit rating, especially for robustness check purposes. These 
might be of interest for our future research on distress risk and asset pricing.  
Finally, as the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016, a new arrangement between the 
UK and the rest of the EU could have a significant impact on UK stock prices. 
Following the vote, the FTSE350 has been relatively volatile and many investors are 
showing hesitation in investing in UK assets. The topics of market downturns, business 
cycles and firm default risk become even more relevant in this time of uncertainty.  
Since it is unclear what arrangement the UK will achieve after triggering Article 50, the 
new arrangement will provide a new breakpoint for future research on FTSE350 
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companies. The new terms and agreements would provide materials to expand the 
discussion on the investment strategies in this thesis, for both the pre-negotiation and 
post-negotiation periods. When the UK leaves the EU, it is expected that the 
membership withdrawal could have a great impact on firms’ ability to apply for EU 
funding and to attract foreign investment. These in turn would have significant effects 
on default probability, especially on the ability to repay debts of FTSE350 firms. These 
would cause investors to adjust their investment strategies in general and the two 
investment strategies addressed in this thesis in particular. As such, the UK’s case would 
become particularly interesting and one hopes future research would look into the 
impact of this event and the UK investment environment.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Sample 
Appendix 1 lists name of the companies that are included in the sample, company ticker, sector 
and IPO date. In Chapter 3 which looks at value anomaly, the sample consists of 269 non-
financial firms30. Chapter 4 regarding momentum anomaly is based on a full sample of 290 
firms because unlike value studies, momentum analysis does not differentiate financial firms 
from non-financial firms.  
Source: Thomson Reuters.  
 Company Ticker Sector IPO31 
1. 3i Group PLC III Capital Markets 18/07/1994 
2. 3I Infrastructure PLC 3IN Capital Markets 08/03/2007 
3. A.G.Barr PLC BAG Beverages n/a 
4. 
Aberdeen Asset 
Management PLC 
ADN Capital Markets 28/03/1991 
5. 
Aberforth Smaller 
Companies Trust PLC 
ASL Investment Trusts n/a 
6. Acacia Mining PLC ACAA Metals & Mining 24/03/2010 
7. Admiral Group PLC ADML Insurance 23/09/2004 
8. Aggreko PLC AGGK 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
29/09/1997 
9. Alliance Trust PLC ATST Capital Markets n/a 
10. Amec Foster Wheeler PLC AMFW 
Energy Equipment & 
Services 
23/12/1982 
11. Anglo American PLC AAL Metals & Mining 24/05/1999 
12. Antofagasta PLC ANTO Metals & Mining 05/07/1982 
13. Ashmore Group PLC ASHM Capital Markets 12/10/2006 
14. Ashtead Group PLC AHT 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
n/a 
15. 
Associated British Foods 
PLC 
ABF Food Products 01/08/1994 
16. Assura PLC AGRP 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
                                                 
30 In this thesis, financial firms are Banks and Capital Markets.  
31 n/a indicates the information is not available. 
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17. AstraZeneca PLC AZN Pharmaceuticals 21/09/2007 
18. AVEVA Group PLC AVV Software 28/11/1996 
19. Aviva PLC AV Insurance 04/06/1990 
20. 
Babcock International 
Group PLC 
BAB 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
14/08/1989 
21. BAE Systems PLC BAES Aerospace & Defense 11/02/1981 
22. Balfour Beatty PLC BALF Construction & Engineering 28/06/1945 
23. 
Bankers Investment Trust 
PLC 
BNKR Investment Trusts n/a 
24. Barclays PLC BARC Banks 31/12/1953 
25. Barratt Developments PLC BDEV Household Durables n/a 
26. BBA Aviation PLC BBA Transportation Infrastructure 11/11/1960 
27. Bellway PLC BWY Household Durables n/a 
28. Berendsen PLC BRSN 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
30/03/1981 
29. 
Berkeley Group Holdings 
PLC 
BKGH Household Durables n/a 
30. BGEO Group PLC BGEO Banks 14/10/2011 
31. BH Macro Ltd BHMG  08/03/2007 
32. BHP Billiton PLC BLT Metals & Mining 28/07/1997 
33. Big Yellow Group PLC BYG 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
08/05/2000 
34. Bodycote PLC BOY Machinery n/a 
35. Booker Group PLC BOK Food & Staples Retailing 20/07/2004 
36. Bovis Homes Group PLC BVS Household Durables 09/12/1997 
37. BP PLC BP 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
29/03/1954 
38. 
Brewin Dolphin Holdings 
PLC 
BRW Capital Markets 26/05/1994 
39. 
British American Tobacco 
PLC 
BATS Tobacco 29/01/1962 
40. British Empire Trust PLC BTEM 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
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41. 
British Land Company 
PLC 
BLND 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
20/03/1951 
42. Britvic PLC BVIC Beverages 08/12/2005 
43. BT Group PLC BT 
Diversified 
Telecommunication Services 
03/12/1984 
44. BTG PLC BTG Pharmaceuticals 28/06/1995 
45. Bunzl plc BNZL 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
20/06/1957 
46. Burberry Group PLC BRBY 
Textiles, Apparel & Luxury 
Goods 
18/07/2002 
47. Cairn Energy PLC CNE 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
22/12/1988 
48 
Caledonia Investments 
PLC 
CLDN 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
49. Capita PLC CPI Professional Services 21/08/1991 
50. 
Capital & Counties 
Properties PLC 
CAPCC 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
17/05/2010 
51. Carillion PLC CLLN Construction & Engineering n/a 
52. Carnival PLC CCL 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
23/10/2000 
53. Centamin PLC CEY Metals & Mining n/a 
54. Centrica PLC CNA Multi-Utilities 17/02/1997 
55. Cineworld Group PLC CINE Media 27/04/2007 
56. 
City of London Investment 
Trust PLC 
CTY 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
57. Clarkson PLC CKN Marine n/a 
58. Close Brothers Group PLC CBRO Capital Markets n/a 
59. CLS Holdings PLC CLSH 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
12/05/1994 
60. Cobham PLC COB Aerospace & Defense 20/12/1954 
61. Compass Group PLC CPG 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
02/02/2001 
62. Cranswick PLC CWK Food Products n/a 
63. CRH PLC CRH Construction Materials 05/02/1973 
64. Croda International PLC CRDA Chemicals 10/06/1964 
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65. Daejan Holdings PLC DJAN 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
n/a 
66. Dairy Crest Group PLC DCG Food Products 31/07/1996 
67. DCC PLC DCC Industrial Conglomerates n/a 
68. Debenhams PLC DEB Multiline Retail 04/05/2006 
69. 
Dechra Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
DPH Pharmaceuticals 21/09/2000 
70. Derwent London PLC DLN 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
71. Diageo PLC DGE Beverages 06/05/1952 
72. Dignity PLC DTY 
Diversified Consumer 
Services 
02/04/2004 
73. Diploma PLC DPLM 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
n/a 
74. 
Domino's Pizza Group 
PLC 
DOM 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
24/11/1999 
75. Drax Group PLC DRX 
Independent Power and 
Renewable Electricity 
Producers 
20/12/2005 
76. DS Smith PLC SMDS Containers & Packaging 02/01/1986 
77. Dunelm Group PLC DNLM Specialty Retail 19/10/2006 
78. easyJet plc EZJ Airlines 22/11/2000 
79. 
Edinburgh Investment 
Trust PLC 
EDIN 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
80. Electra Private Equity PLC ELTA Capital Markets 20/08/2001 
81. Electrocomponents PLC ECM 
Electronic Equipment, 
Instruments & Components 
n/a 
82. Elementis PLC ELM Chemicals 01/04/1964 
83. Entertainment One Ltd ETO Media 29/03/2007 
84. Essentra PLC ESNT Chemicals 06/06/2005 
85. 
Euromoney Institutional 
Investor PLC 
ERM Media 11/06/1986 
86. EVRAZ plc EVRE Metals & Mining 08/06/2005 
87. Experian PLC EXPN Professional Services 11/10/2006 
88. 
F&C Commercial Property 
Trust Ltd 
FCPTL 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
17/07/2009 
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89 Ferrexpo PLC FXPO Metals & Mining 20/06/2007 
90. 
Fidelity China Special 
Situations PLC 
FCSS  19/04/2010 
91. 
Fidelity European Values 
PLC 
FEV 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
92. Fidessa Group PLC FDSA Software 09/06/1997 
93. 
Finsbury Growth & 
Income Trust PLC 
FGT Capital Markets 24/12/1953 
94. FirstGroup PLC FGP Road & Rail n/a 
95 
Foreign & Colonial 
Investment Trust PLC 
FRCL  n/a 
96. Fresnillo PLC FRES Metals & Mining 14/05/2008 
97. G4S PLC GFS 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
20/07/2004 
98. Galliford Try PLC GFRD Construction & Engineering 16/12/1997 
99. 
GCP Infrastructure 
Investments Ltd 
GCPI Investment  22/07/2010 
100. 
Genesis Emerging Markets 
Fund Ltd 
GSS 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
101. Genus PLC GNS Biotechnology 06/07/2000 
102. GKN PLC GKN Auto Components 14/06/1946 
103. GlaxoSmithKline PLC GSK Pharmaceuticals 22/05/1972 
104. Glencore PLC GLEN Metals & Mining 24/05/2011 
105. Go-Ahead Group PLC GOG Road & Rail 28/04/1994 
106. Grafton Group PLC 
GFTU_
u 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
n/a 
107. Grainger PLC GRI 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
n/a 
108. Greencore Group PLC GNC Food Products 18/04/1991 
109. Greene King PLC GNK 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
110. Greggs PLC GRG 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
111. GVC Holdings PLC GVC 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
112. Halfords Group PLC HFD Specialty Retail 03/06/2004 
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113. Halma PLC HLMA 
Electronic Equipment, 
Instruments & Components 
Halma PLC 
114. Hammerson PLC HMSO 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
31/05/1945 
115. Hansteen Holdings PLC HSTN 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
29/11/2005 
116. 
HarbourVest Global 
Private Equity Ltd 
HVPEa  05/12/2007 
117. Hargreaves Lansdown PLC HRGV Capital Markets 18/05/2007 
118. Hays PLC HAYS Professional Services n/a 
119. 
HICL Infrastructure 
Company Ltd 
HICL Capital Markets 29/03/2006 
120. 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
HIK Pharmaceuticals 01/11/2005 
121. 
Hill & Smith Holdings 
PLC 
HILS Metals & Mining n/a 
122. Hiscox Ltd HSX Insurance 15/11/2006 
123. Hochschild Mining PLC HOCM Metals & Mining 03/11/2006 
124. HomeServe PLC HSV 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
n/a 
125. 
Howden Joinery Group 
PLC 
HWDN 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
n/a 
126. HSBC Holdings PLC HSBA Banks n/a 
127. Hunting PLC HTG 
Energy Equipment & 
Services 
n/a 
128. IG Group Holdings PLC IGG Capital Markets 28/04/2005 
129. IMI PLC IMI Machinery 09/03/1996 
130. Imperial Brands PLC IMB Tobacco 01/10/1996 
131. Inchcape PLC INCH Distributors 02/01/1986 
132. Inmarsat PLC ISA 
Diversified 
Telecommunication Services 
17/06/2005 
133. 
Intermediate Capital Group 
PLC 
ICP Capital Markets 19/05/1994 
134. 
International Consolidated 
Airlines Group SA 
ICAG Airlines 10/01/2011 
135. 
International Public 
Partnerships Ltd 
INPP  09/11/2006 
136. Intertek Group PLC ITRK Professional Services 29/05/2002 
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137. Intu Properties PLC INTUP 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
02/06/1905 
138. Investec PLC INVP Capital Markets 29/07/2002 
139. IP Group PLC IPO Capital Markets 15/10/2003 
140. ITV PLC ITV Media 02/02/2004 
141. IWG Plc IWG 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
n/a 
142. J D Wetherspoon PLC JDW 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
143. J Sainsbury PLC SBRY Food & Staples Retailing 11/07/1975 
144. James Fisher and Sons plc FSJ 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
30/12/1996 
145. 
Jardine Lloyd Thompson 
Group PLC 
JLT Insurance n/a 
146. JD Sports Fashion PLC JD Specialty Retail 22/10/1996 
147. 
John Laing Infrastructure 
Fund Ltd 
JLIF Investment 24/11/2010 
148. John Wood Group PLC WG 
Energy Equipment & 
Services 
05/06/2002 
149. 
JPMorgan American 
Investment Trust PLC 
JAM  n/a 
150. 
JPmorgan Emerging 
Markets Investment Trust 
PLC 
JMG Capital Markets 26/06/1991 
151. 
JPMorgan Indian 
Investment Trust PLC 
JII  27/04/1994 
152. 
Jupiter Fund Management 
PLC 
JUP Capital Markets 16/06/2010 
153. Kaz Minerals PLC KAZ Metals & Mining 07/10/2005 
154. Keller Group PLC KLR Construction & Engineering 19/04/1994 
155. Kier Group PLC KIE Construction & Engineering 05/12/1996 
156. Kingfisher PLC KGF Specialty Retail 24/11/1982 
157. 
Ladbrokes Coral Group 
PLC 
LCL 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
20/09/1967 
158. Lancashire Holdings Ltd LRE Insurance 16/03/2009 
159. 
Land Securities Group 
PLC 
LAND 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
06/09/2002 
160. 
Legal & General Group 
PLC 
LGEN Insurance 02/07/1979 
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161. 
Lloyds Banking Group 
PLC 
LLOY Banks 08/10/1986 
162. 
London Stock Exchange 
Group PLC 
LSE Capital Markets 15/05/2006 
163. 
Londonmetric Property 
PLC 
LMPL 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a  
164. 
Marks and Spencer Group 
PLC 
MKS Multiline Retail 19/03/2002 
165. Marshalls PLC MSLH Construction Materials n/a 
166. Marston's PLC MARS 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
167. Meggitt PLC MGGT Aerospace & Defense 28/04/1947 
168. 
Mercantile Investment 
Trust PLC 
MRCM Capital Markets n/a 
169. 
Micro Focus International 
PLC 
MCRO Software n/a 
170. 
Millennium & Copthorne 
Hotels PLC 
MLC 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
25/04/1996 
171. Mitchells & Butlers PLC MAB 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
172. Mitie Group PLC MTO 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
n/a 
173. Mondi PLC MNDI Paper & Forest Products n/a 
174. 
Moneysupermarket.Com 
Group PLC 
MONY Internet Software & Services 26/07/2007 
175. 
Monks Investment Trust 
PLC 
MNKS Capital Markets n/a 
176. 
Morgan Advanced 
Materials PLC 
MGAM
M 
Machinery 02/10/1946 
177. 
Murray International Trust 
PLC 
MYI  21/06/1945 
178. 
National Express Group 
PLC 
NEX Road & Rail 26/04/1995 
179. National Grid PLC NG Multi-Utilities 31/01/2002 
180. Next PLC NXT Multiline Retail 12/03/1948 
181. NMC Health PLC NMC 
Health Care Providers & 
Services 
n/a 
182. Northgate PLC NTG Road & Rail n/a 
183. 
Northern Rock Building 
Society PLC 
NRK Bank n/a 
184. Nostrum Oil & Gas PLC NOGN 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
03/04/2008 
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185. Ocado Group PLC OCDO 
Internet & Direct Marketing 
Retail 
21/07/2010 
186. Old Mutual PLC OML Insurance 12/07/1999 
187. Paddy Power Betfair PLC PPB 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
30/11/2000 
188. Pagegroup PLC PAGE Professional Services n/a 
189. 
Paragon Group of 
Companies Plc 
PARA Thrifts & Mortgage Finance n/a 
190. PayPoint plc PAYP 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
21/09/2004 
191. Pearson PLC PSON Media 13/08/1969 
192. Pennon Group PLC PNN Water Utilities 12/12/1989 
193. 
Perpetual Income and 
Growth Investment Trust 
PLC 
PLI Capital Markets 16/11/2004 
194. Persimmon PLC PSN Household Durables n/a 
195. Personal Assets Trust PLC PNL Capital Markets n/a 
196. Petra Diamonds Ltd PDL Metals & Mining 22/04/1997 
197. Petrofac Ltd PFC 
Energy Equipment & 
Services 
07/10/2005 
198. Phoenix Group Holdings PHNX Insurance n/a 
199. Playtech PLC PTEC Software n/a 
200. 
Polar Capital Technology 
Trust PLC 
PCT  n/a 
201. 
Polymetal International 
PLC 
POLYP Metals & Mining 02/11/2011 
202. Provident Financial PLC PFG Consumer Finance 16/03/1962 
203. Prudential PLC PRU Insurance 29/12/1978 
204. PZ Cussons PLC PZC Household Products 26/11/1953 
205. Qinetiq Group PLC QQ Aerospace & Defense 10/02/2006 
206. Randgold Resources Ltd RRS Metals & Mining 01/07/1997 
207. Rank Group PLC RNK 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
208. Rathbone Brothers PLC RAT Capital Markets n/a 
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209. 
Reckitt Benckiser Group 
PLC 
RB Household Products 23/10/2007 
210. Redefine International PLC RDI 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
211. Redrow PLC RDW Household Durables 28/04/1994 
212. Relx PLC REL Professional Services 21/04/1948 
213. Renishaw PLC RSW 
Electronic Equipment, 
Instruments & Components 
n/a  
214. Rentokil Initial PLC RTO 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
21/06/2005 
215. Restaurant Group PLC RTN 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
216. Rightmove PLC RMV Internet Software & Services n/a 
217. Rio Tinto PLC RIO Metals & Mining 01/11/1973 
218. RIT Capital Partners PLC RCP Capital Markets n/a 
219. Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC RR Aerospace & Defense 20/05/1987 
220. Rotork PLC ROR Machinery 23/07/1968 
221. 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group PLC 
RBS Banks 10/07/1968 
222. Royal Dutch Shell PLC RDSb 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
20/07/2005 
223. Royal Dutch Shell PLC RDSa 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
20/07/2005 
224. RPC Group PLC RPC Containers & Packaging 28/05/1993 
225. RSA Insurance Group PLC RSA Insurance 03/07/1989 
226. Safestore Holdings PLC SAFE 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
09/03/2007 
227. Sage Group PLC SGE Software 14/12/1989 
228. Savills PLC SVS 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
n/a 
229. Schroders PLC SDR Capital Markets 30/09/1959 
230. 
Scottish Investment Trust 
PLC 
SCIN  n/a 
231. 
Scottish Mortgage 
Investment Trust PLC 
SMT 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
232. SEGRO PLC SGRO 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
01/12/1949 
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233. Senior PLC SNR Aerospace & Defense n/a 
234. Serco Group PLC SRP 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
12/05/1988 
235. Severn Trent PLC SVT Water Utilities 12/12/1989 
236. Shaftesbury PLC SHB 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
237. Shire PLC SHP Biotechnology 23/05/2008 
238. SIG PLC SHI 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
18/05/1989 
239. Sky PLC SKYB Media 15/12/1994 
240. Smith & Nephew PLC SN 
Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies 
13/08/1951 
241. Smiths Group PLC SMIN Industrial Conglomerates 20/12/1950 
242. Smurfit Kappa Group PLC SKG Containers & Packaging 14/03/2007 
243. Spectris PLC SXS 
Electronic Equipment, 
Instruments & Components 
29/11/1988 
244. 
Spirax-Sarco Engineering 
PLC 
SPX Machinery 02/01/1986 
245. 
Sports Direct International 
PLC 
SPD Specialty Retail 02/03/2007 
246. SSE PLC SSE Electric Utilities 18/06/1991 
247. St. James's Place PLC SJP Insurance n/a 
248. 
St. Modwen Properties 
PLC 
SMP 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
n/a 
249. Stagecoach Group PLC SGC Road & Rail 27/04/1993 
250. Standard Chartered PLC STAN Banks 02/02/1970 
251. Standard Life PLC SL Insurance 10/07/2006 
252. Stobart Group Ltd STOB 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
n/a 
253. SuperGroup PLC SGP Specialty Retail 24/03/2010 
254. SVG Capital PLC SVI Capital Markets 23/05/1996 
255. Synthomer PLC SYNTS Chemicals n/a 
256. 
Talktalk Telecom Group 
PLC 
TALK 
Diversified 
Telecommunication Services 
n/a 
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257. Tate & Lyle PLC TATE Food Products 09/12/1938 
258. Taylor Wimpey PLC TW Household Durables 07/03/1947 
259. Ted Baker PLC TED 
Textiles, Apparel & Luxury 
Goods 
n/a 
260. Telecom Plus PLC TEP Multi-Utilities 26/07/2000 
261. 
Temple Bar Investment 
Trust PLC 
TMPL Capital Markets n/a 
262. 
Templeton Emerging 
Markets Investment Trust 
PLC 
TEM Capital Markets 15/05/1996 
263. Tesco PLC TSCO Food & Staples Retailing 23/12/1947 
264. Thomas Cook Group plc TCG 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
n/a 
265. TP ICAP PLC TCAPI Capital Markets 24/10/2000 
266. 
TR Property Investment 
Trust PLC 
TRY  n/a 
267. Travis Perkins PLC TPK 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
n/a 
268. Tui AG TUIT 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
25/02/2008 
269. Tullow Oil PLC TLW 
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels 
18/12/2000 
270. UBM PLC UBM Media 01/07/2008 
271. UDG Healthcare PLC UDG 
Health Care Providers & 
Services 
05/03/1992 
272. 
UK Commercial Property 
Trust Ltd 
UKCM 
Real Estate Management & 
Development 
n/a 
273. 
Ultra Electronics Holdings 
PLC 
ULE Aerospace & Defense 03/10/1996 
274. Unilever PLC ULVR Personal Products 11/08/1939 
275. Unite Group PLC UTG 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
276. United Utilities Group PLC UU Water Utilities 28/07/2008 
277. Vectura Group PLC VEC Pharmaceuticals 02/07/2004 
278. Vedanta Resources PLC VED Metals & Mining 10/12/2003 
279. Victrex PLC VCTX Chemicals 13/12/1995 
280. Vodafone Group PLC VOD 
Wireless Telecommunication 
Services 
26/10/1988 
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281. Weir Group PLC WEIR Machinery 25/01/1946 
282. WH Smith PLC SMWH Specialty Retail n/a 
283. Whitbread PLC WTB 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
09/07/1948 
284. William Hill PLC WMH 
Hotels, Restaurants & 
Leisure 
20/06/2002 
285. 
Witan Investment Trust 
PLC 
WTAN 
Diversified Financial 
Services 
n/a 
286. 
WM Morrison 
Supermarkets PLC 
MRW Food & Staples Retailing 30/11/1972 
287. Wolseley PLC WOS 
Trading Companies & 
Distributors 
26/11/2010 
288. Workspace Group PLC WKP 
Equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
n/a 
289. 
Worldwide Healthcare 
Trust PLC 
WWH  06/04/1995 
290. WS Atkins PLC ATKW Professional Services 18/07/1996 
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Appendix 2: Data collection 
Source: Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg 
Data Abbrev. Definitions 
DSMnemonic/ 
Other databases 
Book-to-
Market value 
B/M The balance sheet value divided by the 
market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity 
WC03501 
Cash flow  Consist of three components: 
Net Cash flow Financing: the net 
cash receipts and disbursements 
resulting from reduction and/or 
increase in long or short term debt, 
proceeds from sale of stock, stock 
repurchased/redeemed/retired, 
dividends paid and other financing 
activities. 
Net Cash flow Investing: the net cash 
receipts and disbursements resulting 
from capital expenditures, 
decrease/increase from investments, 
disposal of fixed assets, increase in 
other assets and other investing 
activities. 
Net Cash flow Operating Activities: 
the net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from the 
operations of the company. It is the 
sum of Funds from Operations, Funds 
From/Used for Other Operating 
Activities and Extraordinary Items. 
The data is generally not available 
prior to 1989. 
 
WC04890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WC04870 
 
 
 
 
 
WC04860 
Current 
Assets 
 Cash and other assets that are 
reasonably expected to be realized in 
cash, sold or consumed within one year 
or one operating cycle.  
Generally, it is the sum of cash and 
equivalents, receivables, inventories, 
prepaid expenses and other current 
assets.  
For non-US corporations, long term 
receivables are excluded from current 
assets even though included in net 
receivables. 
WC02201 
Current 
Liabilities 
 Represent debt or other obligations that 
the company expects to satisfy within 
one year.  
WC03101 
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It includes but is not restricted to: 
Accounts payable, Short term debt, 
Notes payable, Current portion of long 
term debt, All accrued expenses, Other 
current liabilities, Income taxes 
payable, Dividends payable, State 
franchise, taxes, Deferred credits, 
Negative inventories (non-US 
corporations) 
Depreciation 
and 
Amortization 
 The net decrease in value of assets, both 
tangible and intangible, over time. 
Company profile 
in Bloomberg & 
Co. Financial 
Statements 
Dividend 
yield 
DY A ratio in percentage of the total amount 
of dividends weighted by the total 
market value  
WC05101 
Earning 
before 
interest and 
taxes 
EBIT The earnings of a company before 
interest expense and income taxes. It is 
calculated by taking the pre-tax income 
and adding back interest expense on 
debt and subtracting interest capitalized. 
WC18191,  
and in some 
cases: Company 
profile in 
Bloomberg 
database 
Earnings per 
Price 
E/P The earnings rate per share divided by 
the price of the common equity 
PE 
Employees  The number of both full and part time 
employees of a company. 
Company profile 
in Bloomberg 
database 
Firm age  Firm age is the number of years the 
company has been in business. It is 
calculated using the firm’s “base date” 
i.e. the date from which DataStream 
holds information about the stock 
issuing. Stocks are rebased in 
accordance to events of mergers, 
acquisitions and splitting. 
BDATE 
Funds from 
operations 
 The sum of net income and all non-cash 
charges or credits. It is the cash flow of 
the company. 
It includes but is not restricted to: 
Depreciation, Amortization of 
Intangibles, Deferred Taxes. 
It excludes: Extraordinary items, 
Changes in working capital. 
WC04201 
FTSE350 
index 
 The index consists of the largest 350 
companies by market capitalisation and 
their primary listing is on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
FTSE350 
Gross 
National 
GNP The sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation 
UKYBEV.. 
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Product 
index 
of output plus net receipts of primary 
income (compensation of employees 
and property income) from abroad. Data 
are in current local currency. 
Industry/ 
sector 
 Industry or sector in which a firm 
operates. For the UK market, the 
industry classification is provided by 
the FTSE ICB (Financial Times Stock 
Exchange Industry Classification 
Benchmark, used to be known as FTSE 
Global Classification System) 
WC07040 
Inventories  Represent tangible items or 
merchandise net of advances and 
obsolescence acquired for either (1) 
resale directly or (2) included in the 
production of finished goods 
manufactured for sale in the normal 
course of operation.  
In manufacturing companies this item 
is classified as follows (depending 
upon the stage of completion in the 
manufacturing process): 
A. Finished goods, consisting of 
products ready for sale.  
B. Work in process, consisting of 
products in various stages of 
production. C. Raw materials and 
supplies, consisting of items that will 
enter directly or indirectly into the 
production of finished goods. In non-
manufacturing companies finished 
goods bought for resale is the major 
portion of the inventories. 
Bloomberg 
database - 
Company profile 
and company 
Financial 
Statements 
London 
Interbank 
Offered 
1month-Rate  
LIBOR The average interbank rate at which a 
selection of banks on the London money 
market charge one another for loans 
with 1 month maturity, and is used in 
this thesis as a proxy for the Risk-free 
asset. 
BOELI1M 
Market value MV The share price multiplied by the total 
number of shares outstanding 
WC08001 
 
Market 
portfolio 
return 
Rm The average value-weighted rate of 
return on a portfolio consisting of all 
stocks in B/M and size portfolios plus 
negative B/M stocks. 
Kenneth R. 
French’s website 
Net Sales  Represent gross sales and other 
operating revenue less discounts, 
returns and allowances.  
WC01001 
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Proceeds 
from Sale of 
property 
 The cash inflow from the sale of 
property that are used in the normal 
conduct of business to produce goods 
and services. 
Company profile 
in Bloomberg & 
Co. Financial 
Statements 
Price Index  A price index shows a theoretical 
growth in value of a share over a 
specified period, without an assumption 
that dividends are re-invested. 
PI 
Retained 
Earnings 
 The accumulated after tax earnings of 
the company which have not been 
distributed as dividends to shareholders 
or allocated to a reserve account. 
WC03495 
LIBOR 3-
month 
T-Bill The 3-month LIBOR rate of return is a 
proxy for Short-term Treasury Bill. 
BOELI3M 
Total Assets  The sum of total current assets, long 
term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
WC02999 
Total 
Liabilities 
 Represent all short- and long-term 
obligations expected to be satisfied by 
the company.  
It includes but is not restricted to: 
Current Liabilities, Long Term Debt, 
Provision for Risk and Charges (non-
U.S. corporations), Deferred taxes, 
Deferred income, Other liabilities, 
Deferred tax liability in untaxed 
reserves (non-U.S. corporations), 
Unrealized gain/loss on marketable 
securities (insurance companies), 
Pension/Post retirement benefits, 
Securities purchased under resale 
agreements (banks)  
It excludes: Minority Interest, 
Preferred stock equity, Common stock 
equity, Non-equity reserve. 
WC03351 
Working 
capital 
 Represents the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities. It 
is a measure of liquidity and solvency. 
WC03151 
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Appendix 3: Constructing Variables 
Variable Abbrev. Construction/Formula 
Campbell, 
Hilscher 
and 
Szilagy’s 
(2008) 
model 
CHS 
score 
The conditional probability of failure, CHS score, is computed 
as follows. 
𝑃𝑡−1(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
(1 + e−α−𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1)
 
CASHMT
A 
Cash and short-term investments over the market value of total 
assets: 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
 
EXRET 
Gross excess return over FTSE350 return: 
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
MTBV 
Market value over Book-value of Equity 
NIMTA 
Net Income over Market value of Total Asset: 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
 
RSIZE 
Logarithm of firm’s market value over the total value of 
FTSE350 
SIGMA 
Daily variation of stock returns calculated as Square root of a 
sum of squared firm stock returns over a period of three 
months. It is an annualised 3-month standard deviation around 
zero (rather than around the sample mean). It is assumed that 
there are 252 trading days in a year and N days in 3 months. 
𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡−3 = (252 ∗  
1
𝑁 − 1
 ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑘
2
𝑘∈{𝑡−1,𝑡−2,𝑡−3}
)2 
 
TLMTA 
Total Liabilities over Market value of Total Asset: 
𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
 
Default 
risk 
DEF 
At the end of July of year t, stocks are split into 3 groups at the 
breakpoints of 30:40:30 based on their probability of 
bankruptcy, measured by the Ohlson’s (1980) O-scores at the 
end of December year t-1. The portfolio returns are value 
weighted and rebalanced annually. The return differential 
between the top 30% O-score stocks and the bottom 30% O-
score stocks means to capture the risk of default.  
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DEF’ DEF’ is calculated in the same way as DEF but based on the 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score as the proxy for probability of 
bankruptcy instead of O-score. 
 CHS CHS variable is calculated in the same way as DEF and DEF’ 
but based on ranking the Campbell et al.’s (2008) CHS-score 
as the proxy for probability of bankruptcy instead of O-score 
and Z-score. 
Default 
spread 
DES 
As one of proxies for business cycles, in this thesis default 
spread is defined as the difference between the average yields 
on corporate bonds and on long-term Government bonds (UK 
Gilt with a 15+ year maturity).  
Dividend 
yield 
DIV 
Dividend yield refers to the average value-weighted dividend 
yield of all stocks in the sample. It is also one of business cycle 
variables widely used in the asset pricing literature.  
High-
minus-
Low 
HML 
The portfolio-based risk factor associated with B/M. At the 
end of July of year t, stocks are split into 3 portfolios using the 
breakpoints 30:40:30 based on their B/M in June. The monthly 
value-weighted returns are rebalanced annually. The return 
differential between the top 30% B/M stocks and the bottom 
30% (i.e. HML) is used as a proxy for the B/M effect. 
O-score  A measure of probability of bankruptcy proposed by Ohlson 
(1980). The formula is follows: 
𝑶 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆
=  −1.32 − 0.407 𝑙𝑜𝑔 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝑁𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
 
+ 6.03 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.43 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.076 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.72 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 > 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 2.37 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1.83 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 0.285 (= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
− 0.521 
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1)
|𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1|
 
Risk-free 
rate 
Rf In theory, it is the return on asset that bears no risk. In practice, 
it is usually the safest asset available and guaranteed by the 
government, for example, the US Treasury Bill or the UK 
LIBOR 1-month. 
Small-
minus-
Big 
SMB 
The mimic the risk factor in returns associated with size (i.e. 
market capitalization). At the end of July of year t, stocks are 
split into 2 groups by the median. The 1 month allows the 
factor to capture underlying risks and also avoid possible 
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biases caused by asymmetric way of treating HML and SMB 
factors. The monthly portfolio returns are value weighted by 
the market value at the end of June, year t. The return 
differential between the small-cap stocks and the large-cap 
(i.e. SMB) means to capture the size effect. 
Short-
term 
Treasury 
Bill 
T-Bill 
As one of business cycle variable, Short-term Treasury Bill for 
the UK market is the 3-month LIBOR rate of return. 
Stock 
return 
Ri 
The compound rate of return of stock i in month t is computed 
from Price index using the following formula: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐿𝑛 ((𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
Term 
spread 
TERM 
Term spread is the difference between average returns on 
long-term and short-term Government bonds (15+ year Gilt 
and 3-month rate, respectively). 
Winner-
minus-
Loser 
WML 
The mimic the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) in returns. 11-month past returns are used to classify 
the winners from the losers. The return differential between 
the top 30% stocks and the bottom 30% stocks means to 
capture the momentum effects. The monthly portfolio returns 
are calculated at July, year t with 1-month lag and value 
weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t. 
Z-score  
A measure of probability of bankruptcy proposed by Altman 
(1968). The indicator is given by the following formula. 
𝒁 − 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =  0.012X1 +  0.014X2 +  0.033X3 
+  0.006X4 +  0.999X5 
Where, 
 𝑋1 = 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋2 = 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋3 = 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑋4 = 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
𝑋5 = 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Appendix 4: Alternative Asset Pricing Models 
There are a large number of econometric models designed to explain the variation of 
asset returns. This section does not ambitiously seek to review all these asset pricing 
models arisen in the financial modelling history. It rather provides the readers with 
additional information about some models that could act as the alternatives to those 
used in this chapter should they are required. The models are listed in the chronological 
order. 
(i) Merton (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 
Merton (1973) proposes the ICAPM as an alternative to the CAPM. It keeps the linear 
form of the CAPM but uses wealth and state variables that allow investors to hedge 
against potential shortfalls in consumption and changes in future investment 
opportunities. The theoretical model is based on consumer-investor behaviour which 
aims to maximise the expected value of the investors’ lifetime consumption. 
Additionally, the ICAPM requires a set of assumptions to hold. For example, apart from 
usual assumptions of a perfect market (e.g. no transaction costs or taxes), it assumes 
that investor can trade continuously in time, and the vector set of stochastic state 
variables is a continuous Markov process. 
Merton indicates that the equilibrium relationships among asset returns shown in the 
CAPM hold only under certain assumptions although this does not imply the ICAPM is 
more advanced in that sense. However, the ICAPM provides a station for further model 
enhancement. It allows for other effects than just the market risk to be included, such 
as changes in investment opportunity set. 
(ii) Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) conditional Consumption CAPM 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) link asset pricing models with economic conditions by 
looking at the correlation between consumption growth and stocks in different stages of 
the economy. They assume that risk and risk aversion are high in bad times and the 
opposite is true in good times. Following these, they conclude that as some stocks are 
more correlated with consumption growth “in bad times” and they are less correlated in 
good times, the (C)CAPM should take into account consumption growth. The model 
considers consumption growth ratio as a conditional variable in (C)CAPM and argues 
that this conditional version of (C)CAPM performs better than the unconditional model. 
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In addition, they also re-visit some augmented versions of CAPM, such as a human 
capital-augmented CAPM proposed by Campbell (1996) and Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996), and general conditional factor version of CAPM. They show that as previous 
studies did not test a conditional version of their models, the final conclusions might 
not valid. 
(iii) Cooper’s (2006) model 
Cooper (2006) introduces a continuous time dynamic model based on real options. 
Fundamentally, the methodology is derived from the Fama and French (1993) model 
by using realised returns as the dependent variable and log(B/M) and log(MV), instead 
of HML and SMB, as proxies for B/M and size effects. In terms of methodology, their 
models are fundamentally similar. However, unlike the three-factor model, Cooper’s 
(2006) method relies heavily on two assumptions: (a) Firm’s investment is irreversible; 
(b) Firm faces quasi-fixed as well as proportional adjustment costs of investment. Thus, 
this more recent model does not necessarily outperform the conventional model. 
 (iv) Hahn and Lee (2006) 
Hahn and Lee (2006) propose the usage of ΔDES and ΔTERM as an alternative set of 
variables to capture the value effect. ΔDES is the difference between default spread 
(DES) at year t-1 and this at year t. ΔTERM is the difference between term spread 
(TERM) at year t and this of year t-1. They define DES as the yield spread between Baa 
corporate bond index (Bond Index) and 10-year Treasury constant maturity (10yTbill), 
and TERM as the spread between 10-year Treasury bill and one-year Treasury bill 
(1yTbill) rates. 
To examine the relationship between SMB and ΔDES and HML and ΔTERM in a view 
to counteract Fama-French factors, Hahn and Lee (2006) document the following 2 
regressions: 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑐1 ∆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝑑1 ∆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒1,𝑡                                                                          
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑐2 ∆𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝑑2 ∆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒2,𝑡                     
They argue that ΔDESt and ΔTERMt are better proxies than Fama-French’s factors, 
SMB and HML. 
(A.1) 
(A.2) 
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(v) Petkova (2006)  
Petkova (2006) proposes using the Vector Autoregression (VAR) on an asset pricing 
model augmented from the CAPM with Fama-French’s bond-market factors, default 
spread and term spread, and some other commonly used factors which are short-term 
Treasury bill variable (STBill), and Dividend yield (DIV). The regression model is as 
followed. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚 [𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡] + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛽𝑆𝑇−𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
However, both Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova (2006) models might suffer from an 
econometric problem that could prevent them from drawing a conclusion on a better 
proxy for risk level in asset pricing models. 
The way their controlling variables are built could potentially cause a correlation 
between the controlling variables. This could result a multicollinearity problem which 
does not invalidate the model as a whole but the high correlation between regressors, 
especially in OLS estimation, will call off the predictability power of each correlated 
individual predictor, and regarding which predictor are redundant with respect to others. 
Two points rise to attention. The first is that high correlation between independent 
variables can damage the accuracy with which each of the variables’ slopes is measured 
(Pastor and Stambaugh 2003).  The second issue being that no conclusion on the 
significance of each regressor can be made. Petkova (2006) furthermore documents the 
need of a variable to be significant to be important. Unable to determine the significance 
implies this would mislead many interpretations, such as each factor’s role to the 
regression. 
 
(A.3) 
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Appendix 5: VBA programming code 
A.5.1. Computing CHS in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming 
language 
Calculating CHS variable can be complex and time-consuming. Hence, in this section 
we propose the use of a set of programming codes written in VBA – a programming 
language in Excel – that can be used to compute values of the CHS variable. While 
there may be other programming languages that can perform the same tasks, the 
following VBA procedure provides a simple and quick way for researchers and 
practitioners to apply the theoretical CHS algorithm in their analysis. It should be 
viewed as a practical tool not the only mean to reach the results reported later in Chapter 
4. See section A.5.2 of this Appendix for the detail VBA code written to calculate the 
CHS score in this thesis. The code is broken down into 3 sub-sections that correspond 
to Steps 2(a), 2(b) and 3 of the below procedure. Steps 1 and 4 are mandatory for any 
functions, and therefore, have already been incorporated in the other steps. 
Step 1: Setting the scene 
In VBA, the first step is letting VBA know where the data source and relevant variables 
are. This can be done using functions: Workbooks (). Active to open an active worksheet 
where input data are stored, Sub to introduce a new procedure and If to open a loop 
condition. 
Step 2: Defining function 
This step is divided into 2 parts: estimating vector parameters of the logit regressions 
and then computing the conditional probability of default. 
a) Calculating Logit value 
- A Logit regression (equation 2.13) estimates on a set of predictive variables, xi, 
t-1, and reports vector parameters for the regressions. Predictive variables 
include: NIMTA (Net Income over Market value of Total Asset), TLMTA 
(Total Liabilities over Market value of Total Asset), EXRET (Logarithm of  
gross excess return over value weighted FTSE350 return), RSIZE (Logarithm 
of firm’s market value over the total value of FTSE350), SIGMA (Standard 
deviation of firm daily stock returns over a period of three months), CASHMTA 
(Cash and short-term investments over the market value of total assets), and 
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MTBV (Firm’s Market to book value). This simple linear regression can be run 
in any statistical packages. 
- VBA functions: Based on the estimated vector parameters, the next step is 
calculating Logit value, whose formula is given in model (2.14). Since there are 
79,246 firm-month observations, VBA will run 79,246 loops and produce Logit 
values. 
b) Calculating the conditional probability of bankruptcy (i.e. CHS score) 
CHS score can be computed using a similar VBA set of commands to Step 2(a), 
but using formula given in model (2.15) instead. The resulted values are 
recorded in VBA under the variable named CHS. 
Step 3: Matching CHS score to firms each year 
Once CHS scores are calculated, it is a time-consuming task to match each CHS score 
to the correct firm and month. These are usually in 2 different workbooks (in this thesis, 
they are named CHS score and CHS.Each firm). The VBA code for this is Sub Match. 
Step 4: Completing the loops 
A common coding error is leaving a loop unclosed. If that happens, a compile error will 
occur and the program cannot be run. For example, when an If condition is unclosed, 
VBA will show an error message that reads “Block If without End If”. 
To exit Sub and If commands, VBA uses End Sub and End if, respectively. A simple 
rule of completing the loops is that the number of End commands should be the same 
as the number of Sub and If statements. 
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A.5.2. VBA code 
Step 1: Calculating Logit value 
 
Workbooks("CHS score").Activate 
Sub CHS() ' Computer Logit score 
    Dim i, j As Integer  
    For i = 1 To Range("Logit").Rows.Count  
        For j = 1 To Range("Logit").Columns.Count  
         If IsNumeric(Range("NIMTA").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("TLMTA").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("EXRET").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("SIGMA").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("RSIZE").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("CASHMTA").Cells(j).Value) = True And _ 
            IsNumeric(Range("MTBV").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
          
Range("Logit").Cells(i, j).Value = -4.0127 - 2.6719 * Range("NIMTA").Cells(i, j).Value _ 
+ 0.3361 * Range("TLMTA").Cells(i, j).Value – 1.8506 * (Range("EXRET").Cells(i, j).Value) _ 
- 0.2017 * (Range("RSIZE").Cells(i, j + 2).Value + 1.5289 * Range("SIGMA").Cells(i, j).Value  _ 
- 2.0152 * Range("CASHMTA").Cells(i, j).Value     + 0.4170 * Range("MTBV").Cells(i, j + 2).Value                            
 
Else: Range("Logit").Cells(i, j).Value = "x" 
        End If 
         
        Next j 
    Next i 
End Sub 
 
Step 2: Calculating the conditional probability of bankruptcy (CHS score) 
    Dim i, j As Integer  
    For i = 1 To Range("CHS").Rows.Count  
        For j = 1 To Range("CHS").Columns.Count  
         If IsNumeric(Range("Logit").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _ 
             
Range("CHS").Cells(i, j).Value = 1/ (1+ e^ (- Logit)).Value                            
 
Else: Range("CHS").Cells(i, j).Value = "x" 
        End If 
         
        Next j 
    Next i 
End Sub 
 
Step 3: Matching CHS score to firms each year 
Function CountFirms() 
    Dim m, i As Integer 
    m = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do While IsEmpty(Cells(i, 1)) = False  
          m = m + 1 
          i = i + 1 
    Loop 
    CountFirmssheet = m - 1  
End Function 
 
Sub Match CHSvalue() 
    Dim n, i, j, k, f, e, b, a As Integer 
    Dim h, c, t As String 
    Dim g As Date 
    Dim d As Integer 
    Dim ws As Worksheet 
    Dim s As Boolean 
         
Workbooks("CHS score").Activate              
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    Sheets("CHS").Select 
    a = Range("Code").Rows.Count - 1             
    b = Range("CHS").Columns.Count 
             
Workbooks("CHS.Each firm").Activate 
    For Each ws In Worksheets 
        Workbooks("CHS.Each firm").Activate 
        ws.Select 
        f = 0 
        n = CountFirmssheet                                    
         
     For i = 1 To n  
Workbooks("CHS.Each firm").Activate 
            ws.Select 
            h = Cells(i + 1, 3).Text 
             
'If IsEmpty(h) = False Then 
             
                ''Workbooks("CHS.final").Activate              
                ''Sheets("CHS").Select 
                ''a = Range("Code").Rows.Count - 1 
                For j = 1 To a 'or Range("Code").Columns.Count    
                              
                Workbooks("CHS.final").Activate         
                Sheets("CHS").Select 
                c = Cells(j + 4, 3).Text  
                 
If h = c Then 
                    ''Workbooks("CHS.final").Activate     
                    ''Sheets("CHS").Select 
                    ''b = Range("CHS values").Columns.Count 
                     
                     Workbooks("CHS.Each firm").Activate  
                        ws.Select 
                        g = Cells(1, 5).Value  
                    
                    For e = 1 To b         
                      Workbooks("CHS score").Activate  
                        Sheets("CHS”).Select 
                        'Range("CHS values").Select 
                        d = Range("CHS values").Cells(1, e).Value 'k   'd = Date(t) 
                         
 If d = Year(g) - 1 Then 
                      k = e 
                      Workbooks("CHS score").Activate  
                            Sheets("CHS").Select 
                            'Range("CHS values").Select 
                            f = Range("CHS values").Cells(j + 1, e).Value 
 'If IsEmpty(f)= False Then 
                                 
                       Workbooks("CHS.Each firm").Activate  
                                ws. Select 
                                Cells(i + 1, 4).Value = f 
                                Exit For  
                            'Else: Exit For 
                       End If 
                     Next e 
                Exit For 
                End If 
            Next j 
         'End If 
        Next i 
                 
Next ws 
     
End Sub 
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